

**INVOLVEMENT IN
STRUGGLE**

CURRENT SURVEY

**VICTORY IN
VIETNAM**

**GENERATION IN
REVOLT?**

READERS' VIEWS

THE MARXIST

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INVOLVEMENT IN STRUGGLE

CHALLENGE FROM OXFORD

We are pleased to publish the following contribution from Oxford in number 4 of *The Marxist*. The issues it raises, concerning the journal's role in the revolutionary movement, are of fundamental importance. It is essential that the *Marxist* should serve those who are engaged in the struggle. We urge readers to join the discussion and to send in their views.

We are delighted that *The Marxist* has come into existence and that it is making the long-needed effort to bring Marxism-Leninism back to life in England. But we feel it is time to stop patting the journal on the back and congratulating it on its existence and to begin asking it what its purposes are. Is *The Marxist* to be merely a journal of discussion, comment and review—an English equivalent of such American publications as *Monthly Review* or *Science and Society*? Or is it to be something more? Is it to involve itself in the struggle now beginning in this country to build a new revolutionary movement? If *The Marxist* decides to play safe and take the former role it is hardly likely to prosper. Although theory, of a kind that the journal evidently espouses and wishes to propagate, is sorely needed in this country, theory in the absence of practice always turn out to be bad theory. One of the lessons of Marxism-Leninism that *The*

Marxist should be teaching by its own example is that theory and practice form a dialectical unity. One without the other is useless, indeed meaningless.

Let us assume that *The Marxist* has learned this lesson and that it wants to involve itself in the revolutionary struggle. One way to do this would be to leave its office stool and go to the struggles wherever they are taking place. The ideological character of these struggles is immaterial; any conflict between any section of the population and the ruling class or its state apparatus is worth reporting and analysing. During the last six months there have been a number of notable industrial strikes that have not received a word of mention in *The Marxist*, e.g. Morris Radiators, Myton's and Sunley's, Roberts-Arundel. Tenants movements, student movements, immigrant workers' movements and movements against the Vietnam war—all these might be investigated and discussed.

It is worth giving special attention to those areas of struggle (even though they are no larger than fragments) in which leadership is being provided by Marxist-Leninists. Indeed *The Marxist* should put itself at the service of existing Marxist-Leninist groups which are actively engaged in struggle. No matter how small these groups at present may be, the fact that they are giving correct ideological guidance to struggle makes them important and worth cultivating. *The Marxist* could then help by reporting their activities and thus becoming a medium for the sharing of revolutionary experiences.

As we are essentially starting from scratch in this country, innovation and experiment in the realm of tactics are desirable, but they must be followed by proper assessment. This could be made in the pages of the journal, and the effect would be to involve all its readers in the successes and failures of the new activities. *The Marxist* could also help to advance the education in Marxist-Leninist theory of people in the groups. This should not, of course, be just a vague exposition of theory but rather should attempt to meet the specific needs of those engaged in struggle. For example, groups which find themselves fighting revisionism use Lenin's *State and Revolution* as a weapon. But this work was written fifty years ago; it needs to be seen in its historical context and in the light of experience gained in the last half-century.

If *The Marxist* plays the role described above it will find itself becoming the organ of a movement of people engaged in struggles themselves and aware of the nature of all the struggles going on around them. This movement will have an obvious ultimate goal—the seizure of state power and the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship. It will have an equally obvious proximal goal—the formation of a revolutionary political party. But the details of the programme of the new movement are not so obvious. These will have to be thrashed out in *The Marxist* as revolutionary experience accumulates.

The new movement must give full emphasis to both theory and practice. Many young people who are actively involved in struggle today are motivated by high ideals but guided by no revolutionary theory. Lacking

theory, they usually move into the periphery of various small 'left-wing' sects, often composed of Trotskyites, anarchists, revisionists or social-democrats. Inevitably they allow their activities to be governed by bourgeois theories and tend to drift into economism or some other variety of reformism. After a brief period of militancy they either recognise the logic of their own activities and become careerists in the Labour Party or the trade union movement, or become disillusioned and apolitical. It is quite wrong to write these people off from the start. If, early in their political lives, they had come into contact with a revolutionary group that was studying and applying Marxist-Leninist theory, their later careers might have been quite different.

But revolutionary practice is as essential as revolutionary theory. There are many people who during the last decades have rejected the revisionism of the Communist Party, have retained their Marxist-Leninist fire, but have allowed themselves to become divorced from struggle. They have tended to become personally arrogant and sectarian in their attitudes. In stressing theory to the virtual exclusion of practice they have drifted into the same kind of error that we see endangering *The Marxist*.

If a new movement gets underway which strikes a proper balance between theory and practice it should be able both to train young militants in Marxist-Leninist theory and to involve in struggle the older people who have already come to an anti-revisionist position.

We have described above the role that the *Marxist* can play in the movement. We hope to see signs in the near future that you are responding to this challenge.

Nick and Val Bateson

Mike and Jacqui Johnson

Oxford

CURRENT SURVEY

The Indian and French Elections : West Germany's Growing Assertiveness : By-Elections in Britain

THE INDIAN ELECTIONS

WE DO NOT ATTEMPT to deal here with the internal significance of the Indian election results. Their significance internationally is that the crumpling of the Congress Party represents a weakening of the main political instrument upon which the Americans have up till now relied for control of India. The measures the U.S. is now taking to reinforce the feeble Congress government can only discredit it further. Morarji Desai, an experienced reactionary committed to a pro-U.S. orientation, has become deputy prime minister and concurrently finance minister. Consequently

the U S SENATE, in a debate which lasted for less than five minutes on March 16 (only the third day after the installation of the Indian Government) felt able to pass unanimously a resolution sanctioning an additional three million tons of food-grains and twenty-five million dollars for other emergency 'food relief' for India.

Terms for this type of 'assistance' have been made much harsher than before. Recipient countries have to reduce their acreages of cash crops, such as cotton, to provide bigger markets for U S cotton, tobacco and other products and U S sales to them are to be made in future only against dollars, not local currencies. They must create a better environment for private foreign investment and the U S has said it will 'supervise' their economies. As a Chinese commentator has said: 'The more food-grains the U S will grant India, the more will the Indian government sell out its sovereignty to the U S'.

The weakened position of the Congress Party will not of course deter the U S imperialists from pursuing their aims in India, although they may have to review their methods. They may have to back other political groupings or even switch to military government, a line which the Indian bourgeoisie may resort to in the future.

But whatever may be the political forms, the more the Americans intervene against the anti-imperialist class struggle in India, the more they will inflame it. The Indian election results represent a considerable set-back to the U S imperialists.

THE FRENCH ELECTIONS

The French election results provide the U S with no consolation for its worries over India. De Gaulle's foreign policy of opposing U S domination received wide support. It reflects a coincidence of interests for the time being between the French imperialists, opposing their U S rivals, and broad sections of the French people concerned for their national independence. Lecanuet's group, which took a pro-American line, lost considerable ground. The gains of the 'united left' reflected dissatisfaction with aspects of the government's domestic policies, not its foreign policy. The 'united left' was far from being united over foreign policy, with some of its elements backing N A T O and the Communists following Moscow's line of seeking accommodation with the U S under cover of emphasising dangers from West Germany. That the 'united left' in its electioneering glossed over these differences indicated its realisation that a direct challenge to de Gaulle's foreign policy would have been electorally unrewarding.

Without entering into the internal aspects of the elections, we make one passing comment about the role of the French Communist Party, which increased its vote to nearly four million, thus maintaining in a larger poll its one-fifth share of the total votes. All commentators concur that the Party's principal aim was to become accepted as a normal parliamentary party which could form part of an electoral coalition and even have ministers in a coalition government. Kosygin, during his visit to France, worked with the French Party leaders to this end. This being so, we should recognise that in France today social-democracy is effectively represented not by its titular adherents, the French Socialist Party, which is weak,

declining and based on sections of the petty-bourgeoisie rather than the workers, but by the French Communist Party.

Ironically a victory for the electoral grouping which included the Communist Party would have been regarded by the U.S. as a satisfactory result. It is the French Communist Party which is the instrument for enmeshing the working class in the illusions of reformism and bourgeois democracy. It is the French Communist Party which would make French foreign policy conform to the requirements of the Soviet revisionists in their collusion with the U.S. Its gain in votes reflects the willingness of other parties to manoeuvre with it in the bourgeois electoral game now that they no longer regard it as a revolutionary force.

WEST GERMANY'S GROWING ASSERTIVENESS

The French election results have been quickly reflected in modifications of U.S. policy towards the West German government. Even more strenuously than before, the U.S. is trying to woo Bonn from 'Gaullism', *i.e.* taking an independent line from the U.S. The sound and fury of American and British demands for German contributions to the foreign exchange costs of their troops has been hushed. They have accepted Germany's derisory offers.

But the more humbly the wooer pleads, the more tartly the lady replies. The West Germans have started to object to the proposed terms of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, jointly framed by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, on grounds that demonstrate that they, like the French, wish to go their own way and will no longer meekly accept U.S. behests.

The West German economy is the strongest in Western Europe: for example, its steel production is double the French and its exports fifty per cent greater than those of the U.K. With a favourable balance of payments, it has built up large reserves and a strong financial position. It supports the Common Market as a grouping of European countries able to challenge the U.S. and to put pressure on the Soviet Union. These imperialist aims have in present conditions a certain positive aspect, insofar as they lead to opposition to U.S. domination. But there should be no illusions about the West German regime. It is controlled by the same reactionary forces as have ruled Germany since her unification in 1871 and which waged two world wars and nurtured fascism.

Salvaged after 1945 by the other imperialists in the general interests of world imperialism, the West German imperialists have rebuilt their strength to a level where they are once more ready to consider independent action for asserting their interests. It may still suit them for the moment that France should appear as the leading country within the Common Market, for France has the diplomatic, political and military standing to appear in this role without provoking all the reactions that would arise if West Germany itself played the same role. But the West Germans will not indefinitely follow French leads. West German 'Gaullism' represents not a following of France but taking an independent line for its own interests. In due course the West Germans intend, if they can, to seize the leadership of Western Europe from the French for themselves. They support the

grouping of West European capitalist countries into a bloc in order to utilise this as a base for the development of their own power. We do not forecast, of course, a repetition of 1939—the realities of power in the world have changed much since then. But in ways which take appropriate account of current political and military realities, the German imperialists will, like the French, increasingly assert their interests against the U.S.

Thus the French elections, which by endorsing de Gaulle's foreign policy were a set-back to the U.S., have also led to American attempts to woo the West Germans. These attempts will lead to a further weakening of U.S. domination over Europe as the Germans play 'hard to get' and demand concessions for which they will give the Americans little in return.

VIETNAM

In the Vietnam war U.S. imperialism has now openly set its sights on a military victory. Why? Its decision does not reflect an improved U.S. military position. All serious and informed commentators, American no less than others, agree that the bombing of the North is militarily ineffective; that the liberation forces fighting in the South are more numerous than ever and receive all necessary supplies; that the fighting spirit of the Vietnamese people is indomitable; that the Southern puppet-forces are useless and the so-called 'pacification' programme a failure. Why then the U.S. decision?

The reason is that today more than ever the Americans feel confident that the Soviet revisionists are playing the cards their way. When Kosygin visited London in February, he connived with Wilson in the pretences that all manner of serious discussions were afoot behind the scenes, that agreement for starting negotiations was near, and that Hanoi would respond if only the Americans would desist from bombing. This whole approach, with its central emphasis on the question of bombing, serves U.S. interests by confusing public opinion. It is an approach which fortifies U.S. propaganda, which is built up on a series of propositions.

First, the U.S. balances its bombing of the North against 'infiltration' into the South. Based on this, it is held that Vietnam comprises two sovereign states and that the Northern state has intervened against the South. From this the argument develops that the division of the country into two states should continue and that the Southern state must be free, as a separate country, to continue its relationship with the U.S. Thus the conclusion is that the basis for ending the war is cessation of U.S. attacks on the North in return for Hanoi's acceptance of the continued partition of Vietnam and American domination of the South.

Hanoi's demand for the U.S. to end its attacks on the North *unconditionally* is a direct refutation of all this, by rejecting the starting-point of the argument. The Vietnamese people assert the principle that Vietnam is one country whose affairs must be decided by themselves alone. The U.S. and Vietnamese concepts are not reconcilable. After Kosygin's London performance which consciously glossed this over, Johnson feels

confident of Soviet acquiescence in his extension of u s military measures. The Soviet leaders may deny saying anything publicly which endorses u s policies. But they can oppose them effectively only by forthright exposure of the whole u s 'bombing' tactic. This they have deliberately avoided doing.

This therefore was the setting in which Ho Chi Minh published his February correspondence with Johnson. Johnson's letters show that his private proposals were in no respect whatsoever more accommodating than his public statements made at the same time. All the talk by Wilson and others of secret discussions and the nearness of agreement was sheer humbug. Since all this was, of course, not news to any of the parties concerned—Washington, Hanoi, Moscow, and London—Ho Chi Minh's public revelation of the facts can be interpreted only as a blow to the Soviet revisionists and all others misrepresenting the Vietnamese position to the public. That he deemed it necessary to take this action shows both Vietnam's determination to stand firm and the role of the Soviet revisionists in colluding with the Americans. It is this collusion which has encouraged the u s imperialists to intensify their military action.

When recent developments over the world are reviewed, it is only in the extension of SOVIET - U S collusion that the American imperialists can see anything favourable to themselves. All else is adverse. The developing guerilla fighting on the South American continent shows the rising anti-imperialist tide. In Europe, the French elections, Bonn's assertiveness, the growing working-class opposition to Johnson's most obedient satellite, the Wilson government, presage mounting difficulties. In Asia, the sharpening struggle in India, where the election results mark a new stage, will lead to intensified opposition to imperialism. Above all, in Vietnam, the central focus of struggle, there have been no u s military gains to shew results for all the men and resources deployed.

Through all this, u s-revisionist collaboration has moved forward—over the nuclear non-proliferation treaty; over Kosygin's agreement to discuss the question of anti-ballistic missile systems; over trade relations (where we should mark the foreshadowing of economic penetration of Eastern Europe implied in the Yugoslav statement on encouraging foreign investment); and over Vietnam.

Touchstone of Attitude

Inevitably, as the revisionists move closer to the u s, their hostility to China increases. They are sharply attacked by the Chinese. Do these Chinese attacks push the revisionists towards the u s? Are the Chinese responsible, as the revisionists allege, for u s aggression? These ideas scarcely deserve consideration. China's statements are the *consequence* not the *cause*, of the revisionists' policies. Responsibility for disunity lies with those who talk hypocritically about unity while collaborating with the imperialists. Can there be unity between those who stand firm with Vietnam and those who would abandon her? Vietnam is a touchstone of attitude towards imperialism. So much is this the case that it can be

argued that the American position on continuing the war is in some respects becoming modified. The U.S. imperialists see the Vietnam war as a wedge splitting the former socialist camp more and more deeply. They see it as a means of isolating China. While they have reasons for wishing the Vietnam war to end (always providing that this is on their own terms), it does seem that increasingly they see advantage in keeping the war going in order to use its continuation to pressurise the countries controlled by the revisionists and to lead towards a joint U.S. - SOVIET front against China.

We can expect no early end to the Vietnam war.

THE BY-ELECTIONS IN BRITAIN -

By way of tailpiece we comment on the five recent by-elections in Britain. Our *Current Survey* in January said:

'In Britain we are at the beginning of big changes in political alignment, with a growing discrepancy between the real feelings of the people and the actions of the political organisations which profess to represent them . . . the answers of the established political parties are not being accepted. The people are mistrustful of politicians.'

This is precisely what the by-elections show. The Labour Government has lost support massively. This was outstandingly demonstrated in Rhondda, one of those areas about which it has been said that a donkey could count on being elected so long as he was labelled 'Labour'. But Labour's loss of votes have not been Tory gains.

Such a situation might seem tailor-made for ensuring the electoral advance of the Communist Party. Yet in Rhondda West, where the workers can withhold their votes from Labour without having to worry their heads over the stock reproach that this can let the Tory in, and which adjoins Rhondda East (nursed for so many years by Harry Pollitt), the candidate of the Communist Party *gained no votes whatsoever*. He lost votes, collecting only ninety-four per cent of the 1,853 votes secured at the General Election in March, 1966. Like a suddenly switched-on searchlight, the recent by-elections show the complete failure of the Communist Party to gain any electoral advantage from its taking the 'British Road' away from Marxism. The workers seem to have felt that there was no point, when rejecting the Labour Party, in accepting the same political line under a communist label. The Communist Party's failure to win votes deprives it of political leverage for persuading the Labour Party to admit it to the reformist fold. In abandoning Marxism it has thus done worse than Esau, who at least got a mess of pottage for selling his birthright.

No wonder the report in the *Morning Star* on the by-elections hurriedly slid over the Communist results and refrained from any questioning of the policies which led to them. Lenin said that the hallmark of a genuine Marxist was readiness to examine experiences, admit mistakes and learn from them. If the Communist Party does not do this, on what can it base any pretence still to be Marxist?

April, 1967

VICTORY IN VIETNAM

By Denys Noel

APPEARANCES ARE SOMETIMES deceptive. A man may claim to be my friend and indeed for a time appear outwardly to be so, in the help he gives me. Eventually he turns out to have been a secret enemy all along. How does one find out such a rogue in good time?

Such a man, indeed any man, must be judged in three ways: by what he says, by what he does, and by his motives. In sorting out real friends from hidden enemies, the question of motive can be of decisive importance. This is as true in relation to support of the Vietnamese peoples as it is in everyday life.

The people of Vietnam, in North and South, have a sworn and *open* enemy in U.S. imperialism. They are engaged in armed struggle to rid themselves once and for all of this arch interloper and suppressor. They can count on solid support from various quarters, notably from the People's Republic of China, which in word and deed has helped Vietnam to the uttermost, making, in Lin Piao's words, 'the maximum national sacrifice.' Many times have Vietnamese representatives paid tribute to China's help, describing it as 'incomparably tremendous' (Ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam D R V in Peking, Tran Tu Binh, July 1966) and 'incomparably great and most effective' (National Front for Liberation representative in China, July 1966). Moreover China's motives are clear for all to see. China regards the Vietnamese people's struggle as an immense help to China herself. She firmly supports revolutionary wars against imperialism all over the world, in whatever country they arise, and regards it as her 'bounden internationalist duty' to help Vietnam. A mass rally in Peking last December declared, 'We are ready to march to the front at any time' in aid of Vietnam. No one can doubt that these words are seriously meant.

The Soviet Union is also giving certain material aid to Vietnam for which the D R V Government has expressed thanks, describing it as 'valuable' and 'important' (Pham Van Dong, November 1966). Moreover the Soviet Union has proposed certain measures of 'united action' by socialist countries to strengthen aid to Vietnam. Concurrently with these actions the Soviet Union has also, and over long a period, engaged in diplomatic exchanges with various parties who support the Johnson aggression. As regards a solution, the Soviet Union, always stressing the dangers to world peace 'inherent' in the Vietnam war, has repeatedly pronounced in favour of an immediate ending of the 'conflict'; has emphasised the cessation of bombing by the U.S. as the key to peace; and has equivocated on the matter of peace talks. These are the contradictions which appear on the surface, and such contradictions are certainly puzzling to anyone who retains the memory of the Soviet Union as the champion of revolutionary causes. It can only be clarified and explained in terms of the motives

which lie behind the actions. Can it be that the Soviet Union is using its material aid to Vietnam to hide from the public gaze the real and sinister steps it is taking to deliver the Vietnamese people into the hands of aggressive u s imperialism?

The question can be put this way: by what yardstick is one to distinguish the true friends of the Vietnamese people from their hidden enemies?

The u s is the chief imperialist power in the world today and is engaged in interfering in the affairs of dozens of countries all over the world with a view to controlling them politically and economically, and building up positions of military strength which will make possible an eventual military onslaught on socialist China. This fiendish design, if realised, could precipitate a world holocaust of unprecedented proportions, involving incalculable suffering for humanity. It could also spell the doom of imperialism once and for all. But the practical question that arises for the peoples of the world is how to seal the fate of imperialism *without* this immeasurable suffering and loss. Revolutionary peoples are finding this answer by firmly countering interference and aggression from the u s wherever it arises and so lessening the aggressive potential of u s imperialism. Thus it is that revolutionary people, in resisting World Public Enemy Number One, are at one and the same time firmly supporting the cause of world peace. The more difficult it is made for the u s to make progress with its monstrous world plan, the less likely are we to find ourselves enmeshed in a world war.

The Vietnamese people are in the thick of the struggle and are daily performing wonders in their war for independence and national salvation against u s aggression. By the same token they are performing wonders in support of world peace. This small nation of thirty-one million inhabitants, technologically backward and possessing limited natural resources, is exposing to the whole world, and to the American leaders themselves, the impotence of u s imperialism in face of a determined and closely united people. Revolutionary struggles against imperialism in other countries are inspired and invigorated by the Vietnamese example, whereas imperialist governments, including the British, look on the future with foreboding.

Friends or Enemies?

Both governments and individuals are to be judged primarily on the attitude they take towards the struggles against imperialism, both in their words and in their actions. True friends of the Vietnamese people are those who recognise that the anti-u s war in Vietnam brilliantly serves the interests of the Vietnamese nation and also promotes the cause of world peace. Hidden enemies of Vietnam are those who, while occasionally recognising that the u s is committing aggression, argue that in resisting aggression the Vietnamese people are endangering world peace. The underlying aim and object of such people becomes to accommodate u s imperialism rather than oppose it, while at the same time seeking to appear before the world as the champions of the Vietnamese cause and the champions of world peace.

What loathsome duplicity.

But is not this precisely the position now occupied by the once great Soviet Government? Is not this the direct and inevitable consequence of the revisionist victory scored by Krushchev and others at the Twentieth Congress of the C P S U ?

The line of 'peaceful co-existence' inevitably led to a patching up of differences between the Soviet Government and the U S and to attempts to snuff out national liberation wars against imperialism. The scope of U S-SOVIET collaboration (with the U S as senior partner) has been made perfectly clear in many Soviet pronouncements. For example, 'Soviet policy (is) directed towards all round co-operation with the United States . . .' (*The Motive Force of U S Foreign Policy, Moscow, 1965*) and again 'Soviet-American relations, the relations between the two greatest powers in the world constitute the axis of world politics, the main foundation of international peace' (*The U S S R and the U S A—Their Political and Economic Relations, Moscow, 1965*). This is simply another way of saying that all questions, including that of Vietnam, must be subordinated to the needs of U S-SOVIET collaboration.

Two-faced Policy

In practical terms, it can be said that the Soviet Government finds the Vietnam war an embarrassment because it blocks the way to various agreements with the U S, the chief among which is a treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Averill Harriman, Johnson's roving ambassador, made this clear on his return from Moscow (May 8, 1965) when he announced 'I got the impression that the Soviet Union would like to see that matter (Vietnam) settled so that it could get on with what they consider more important matters Vietnam is not in Moscow's views, the most important subject'.

With such policies there is little hope that the Soviet Union seriously desires to help the Vietnamese people defeat U S aggression.

Enough has been said to clarify the question of the Soviet Government's motives in relation to the Vietnam war and why China flatly rejected the Soviet 'united action' proposals. It remains to present factual evidence of Soviet betrayal, to draw attention to the tactics employed by Soviet revisionism and its faithful shadow, the Communist Party of Great Britain, and to draw certain conclusions for the movement in this country.

The Soviet Union, as already stated, is providing material aid to Vietnam. Doubts have been expressed in many quarters as to its sufficiency both in quality and in quantity, and the Western press has been most scathing in pointing out that neither the most modern planes nor the latest anti-aircraft missiles have been sent. China specifically charged that 'their aid to Vietnam is far from commensurate with the strength of the Soviet Union' (*Refutation of the Leaders of the C P S U on United Action, November, 1965*). In answer the Soviet Government complained that China was deliberately holding up supplies overland—an obvious fabrication since, in case of real difficulties by land, supplies could be sent by sea and air. Lack of a land boundary with Cuba did not, after all, prevent the Soviet Union from

delivering medium-range ballistic missiles in 1962. Moreover the Vietnamese have themselves stated that all Soviet supplies have been transmitted efficiently and speedily over Chinese territory.

Scant material aid to Vietnam is one form of betrayal on the part of a socialist country whose duty it is, without boasting, to help to their uttermost. Its counterpart is to allow the enemy every opportunity to build up and concentrate his forces, and this is precisely what the Soviet leaders have done in their handling of questions in Europe.

U S confidence in Soviet intentions has been inspired by the detente between the Warsaw Pact countries and N A T O, the handling of the German question, the all-round economic co-operation between the Soviet Union and the U S, the test ban treaty and the progress towards a nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The result is that many thousands of U S fully-trained and operational troops have been transferred from Germany to the Far East, just at a time when the Government of the U S was in a real fix for trained military personnel to send to Vietnam. In this respect the Soviet Union is as much an accomplice of the United States as Britain who, by stationing British military construction personnel in Thailand, freed U S troops for Vietnam. Washington's indirect recognition of Soviet assistance has been made in many high level statements conceding that the focus of international struggle has shifted from Europe to the Far East.

Implicit Agreement

A further form of betrayal lies in the systematic distortion of certain basic truths about the Vietnam war. Here we find the wily approach; one that is dictated by the somewhat delicate position in which Soviet revisionism finds itself. Wishing to appear before the world as the champions of the Vietnamese people while being in reality the accomplice of U S imperialism, Soviet revisionism is forced to be devious in its handling of certain questions. 'The fundament of present Soviet-American relations in this complex situation' as the *New York Times* aptly put it (17.6.66) 'is that they must be tacit . . . the conflict between the U S A and the U S S R must remain explicit; agreement must remain implicit . . .' and (they) 'are simultaneously thus both explicit enemies and implicit allies'. Adapting themselves to the special conditions of this unholy alliance, the Soviet revisionists and their British counterpart, the C P G B, encourage false ideas about the war in Vietnam and its outcome.

Firstly they play upon the genuinely held sentiments of pacifists and many religious people against violence and the infliction of suffering. It is one thing for a pacifist honestly but mistakenly to call for an immediate end to the war to 'stop children being burned by napalm' and to welcome 'any peace which will put food into the mouths of the people', but a communist who fails to point out that these arguments actually help U S aggression and imperialist world designs, is a traitor to his cause. The Soviet Union, when it calls for 'an immediate termination to the Vietnam war' and the British *Morning Star*, with its Easter Saturday headline 'Vietnam Peace Banners Fly High' are both implying something which closely links

up with pacifist sentiments, namely 'stop the fighting without regard for right and wrong'.

Secondly they latch on to the widespread belief in the overwhelming military power of the U.S. This view is honestly held by many people who are appalled and terrified by the destructive power of U.S. military machines and can therefore see no hope of victory for the Vietnamese people. But it is the plain duty of all communists to point out ceaselessly that the only real strength lies in the Vietnamese people. They must show, by countless examples, that this truth is being borne out in South Vietnam where the National Front for Liberation is daily inflicting deep and telling wounds on the U.S. colossus. They must show, again by relevant facts, that the imperialist war machine is running down, partly because the morale of its fighting men is at a low ebb.

This kind of explanation is entirely absent from Soviet reporting and propaganda, just as it is absent from the Communist Party press in Britain. Indeed in many cases the bourgeois press and television carry more in the way of honest reporting. For example Julian Pettifer's report on '24 hours' (24 Nov 1966) when he said that the G.I.'s single thought, on reaching Vietnam, is when will he go back home.

Naked Aggression

Insistent harping on the Geneva Agreements, and on a peace settlement 'on the basis of the Geneva Agreements' is a third ruse employed by the hidden allies of the U.S. Kosygin, in his February visit to Britain, actually urged the British Government through George Brown to work towards this end. Why did not Kosygin rather demand that the British Government accept the four points of the Government of the D.R.V. which fully take into account the still relevant sections of the Geneva Agreements? Is it not true that naked U.S. aggression is the dominant feature of the war in Vietnam, and that this aggression must cease forthwith—with or without the invocation of the Geneva Agreements? No friend of Vietnam can mention the Geneva Agreements without, in the same breath, insisting on the D.R.V.'s four points and the withdrawal of U.S. troops and bases.

Fourthly there is the question of 'peace talks'. It is well known that in April 1965 the U.S. did a smart about-turn in its attitude to negotiations on Vietnam, and that ever since it has conducted a 'peace offensive', trying to force negotiations on the Vietnamese people through intensified bombing of the North and through a military show of force in the South. The about turn was a sure sign of U.S. weakness and has all along represented an attempt to secure by political means what it cannot achieve on the field of battle, namely the permanent partition of Vietnam with permanent U.S. occupation of the South. Every conceivable diplomatic and political trick has been used to bring about negotiations on U.S. terms, including various bombing pauses. Moving on a parallel track, the Soviet Union, far from denouncing Johnson's offer of talks as a blatant swindle, has laid stress time and time again on the cessation of bombing rather than on the complete withdrawal of the U.S. war machine from Vietnam. Only

recently, at the end of Kosygin's visit, a joint Soviet-British communique while declaring that 'it is essential to achieve the earliest possible end of the Vietnam war' did not mention a word about U.S. aggression. In a speech on February 8, Kosygin's formula for ending the war was the unconditional termination of American bombing. It is abundantly clear that Soviet stress on ending the bombing carries with it the implication 'so that peace talks can start—with U.S. troops still in Vietnam'. And this perfectly complements the U.S. tactics of bombing pauses to test out willingness to negotiate.

One can go further than this and produce a mass of evidence pointing to the conclusion that the Soviet Union has secretly been working closely with the U.S. administration to bring about 'peace talks'. As far back as January 1966 Shelepin led a Soviet mission to Hanoi. The timing of this mission was highly relevant. It coincided with the first bombing pause and with Johnson's much publicised fourteen point 'peace' proposals and came, in fact, at the height of one phase in Washington's 'peace offensive'. Taken alongside the Soviet Union's insistence on the danger to world peace inherent in the Vietnam war, it should be clear to any honest person that Shelepin was sent to Hanoi with the express purpose of urging the DRV to accept talks. The western press had no doubts as to what the Soviet Union was up to. 'If anything brings North Vietnam to the conference table for negotiations, it won't be the prolonged pause in U.S. diplomats. It will be the Shelepin mission from Moscow'. (*New York Herald Tribune*, January 3, 1966).

Behind Closed Doors

During 1966 the Soviet Government indulged in more diplomatic activity behind closed doors on the question of Vietnam. U Thant, Indira Gandhi and Harold Wilson were all received in Moscow for long talks on Vietnam. All of these persons are ardent supporters of 'peace talks'. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko talked in private in October with Dean Rusk (twice) and with President Johnson who publicly expressed his satisfaction with the outcome. About the same time, George Brown discussed Vietnam privately with Gromyko in New York, and the following month he was received for further talks in Moscow, firstly with Gromyko, and later with Kosygin. After Kosygin's visit to Britain in February this year, Harold Wilson made the significant comment in Parliament that the British-Soviet joint chairmanship of the Geneva Conference, 'will have a vital role to play—at the right moment.' Treachery is always carefully concealed until 'the right moment.' It must surely be obvious that if the Soviet Union engages in repeated, prolonged and private talks with the declared enemies of the Vietnamese people, there must be much common ground.

At a time when appearances on the political scene are so deceptive, the matter of friends and enemies becomes a question of special importance. All over the world new alignments are arising, and we in Britain who are concerned with the struggle against imperialism need to think carefully

about the way to work. The arguments for and against 'united action' which have been raging on the international scene find their precise reflection in the Vietnam campaigns in Britain. Some people who are themselves quite clear on the traitorous role of Soviet revisionism, nevertheless maintain that, in the interests of a broad united movement, we should limit ourselves to exposing and attacking the main enemy, U S imperialism, while supporting and popularising Vietnam's just struggle. They fear that in exposing the main accomplice of the U S we will be offending traditional loyalties and will lose some comrades who are otherwise making a valuable contribution. It must be pointed out that the specific and most damaging feature of revisionist treachery is that it is hidden and secret. Anyone who is aware of treachery but fails to speak out becomes an accomplice. Actually a great deal of harm to the movement in Britain has been caused by reluctance to criticise the Soviet Union and the C P G B; because without such criticism and exposure, the opposing interests at stake and the political lines that represent them can never be clarified.

Principled Unity

United action in support of Vietnam is an urgent matter for the movement in Britain but it must be based on agreed objectives. Throughout the activity concerned with Vietnam, one point of view has urged a political settlement to be arrived at by means of a conference, which would suit President Johnson. The opposite point of view has insisted that the U S must clear out of Vietnam, lock, stock and barrel, thus supporting the Vietnamese people in accordance with their four and five points.

The Communist Party has lent its support to President Johnson and has done so in two ways that can be clearly identified. As everyone concerned with the British Council for Peace in Vietnam (B C P V) knows, the Communist Party is prominent in most of the hundred-odd local committees and has many members on the central council. The Communist Party has consistently praised the B C P V, organised support for its activities and worked harmoniously within its framework. Never once has the C P sought to clarify the Council's stand on the key question of 'peace talks' versus 'U S get out'. Instead the C P has aided and abetted such confused and contradictory policy statements as 'The aim of bringing the warring parties to the conference table' (May 1965); '... carrying out the Geneva Agreement which means, first and foremost, that all foreign troops shall be withdrawn' (Autumn 1965); 'A ceasefire and a reconvened Geneva Conference (October 27, 1965); and 'A peace settlement on the basis of the Geneva Agreements' (June 30, 1965).

Moreover when an attempt was made in the autumn of 1966 to get the Council to take a clear stand that 'the U S and its allies must agree publicly and unconditionally to a total and speedy military withdrawal from Vietnam and to cease all interference in Vietnam's internal affairs,' the Communist Party representatives emphatically rejected it and supported instead a proposal involving negotiations. Again at the National Convention of the B C P V in November 1966, the only Vietnamese national on the platform

claimed that Vietnam's first wish was to survive and therefore 'we must have peace'. Not even a mention of U S aggression. This man received a standing ovation. Yet the C P made not the slightest attempt, either at the time or subsequently, to point out that his speech ran directly counter to the views of the Vietnamese people and the many statements of the D R V and the N F L. It should be clear that the Communist Party of Great Britain in its continuing support of the B C P V is bent on bolstering up an organisation which in fact condones U S aggression while pretending to work independently for peace.

Another organisation, the Medical Aid Committee for Vietnam, is strongly supported by the Communist Party. Its appeal for funds has been based solely on the broad humanitarian grounds of helping the 'poor, suffering Vietnamese victims.' Money collected is sent via Moscow. When challenged as to why it was not sent to the representatives of the Vietnamese people in Algiers, the committee officials claimed that since the change of government in Algeria this was no longer possible. However, the British Vietnam Committee, of some fifteen years standing, has collected considerable sum of money and send their funds direct to the N F L representative in Algiers.

The Medical Aid Committee recently organised a fund raising concert at the Royal Court Theatre and after certain discussions the Committee agreed to share the proceeds between the Vietnamese people and their enemies. Thus the Communist Party's political betrayal with the B C P V has been carried into the sphere of direct, material betrayal.

Fortunately not all organisations concerned with Vietnam in this country have joined in the big double cross, and the British Vietnam Committee is a case in point. It has sought, through its journal *Vietnam Bulletin*, to expose U S aggression and fascist brutality, to convey to British people the views of the Vietnamese and to popularise the N L F. On the negative side it has strenuously avoided all criticism of the Soviet Union and has not succeeded in fostering a nation-wide campaign in support of Vietnam's struggle. Furthermore, it has failed to give a clear political lead on the vital question of 'peace talks'. In September 1964 a resolution was placed before the B C P V calling for the immediate recall of the Geneva Conference. In its stead the British Vietnam Committee proposed the following: The U S to stop bombing the North and all acts of war in the South. This to be followed by the calling of a Geneva-type conference preparatory to the withdrawal of U S troops and war material.

While seeming to oppose negotiations this was, in fact, a call for negotiations. The idea of negotiating the withdrawal of U S troops is ludicrous, since, if the question of withdrawal is settled in advance, there is nothing left to negotiate. Negotiations without prior withdrawal can only result in a proportion of U S troops remaining. Needless to say this proposal was carried since it fitted in with existing Council policy.

It is no accident that the British Vietnam Committee should show these weaknesses in view of its close connection with the Communist Party. Indeed the Committee is gravely torn between a sense of traditional

loyalty to the Communist Party and a desire to support the people of Vietnam. Members of this Committee are faced, inevitably, with a choice as it becomes increasingly more difficult to reconcile these two opposites.

It is appropriate at this stage to make some observations about the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign (v s c) which purports to bring together 'the many tendencies on the left; left labour, Marxists, Communists etc' to 'build a united front of organisations and individuals offering full support to the Vietnamese people in their struggle against foreign aggression and domination.' At least we have here an unambiguous statement of purpose, and it must be added that the bulk of the v s c published material has firmly explained and supported the Vietnamese views, particularly on the question of 'peace talks'. This organisation's main public activity, the War Crimes Tribunal is to be welcomed, since it should play a part in exposing u s aggression in all its illegality and savagery. At the same time, it must be noted, that while it refrained from exposing Soviet betrayal in Vietnam, the Campaign's bulletin has carried an article by David Horowitz (subsequently printed elsewhere with v s c approval) violently condemning Soviet action in Hungary in 1956. In other words Horowitz, in at the beginning of the Campaign and now on the National Council, attacks the Soviet Union for its past defence of socialism but fails to condemn its present betrayal of anti-imperialist struggle. Moreover, on various occasions the v s c has permitted statements suggesting that the 1964 Geneva Agreements were a betrayal, which is tantamount to labelling President Ho Chi Minh as a traitor.

Lastly it has failed to give prominence to the fact that the Vietnamese people are winning the war.

But the most serious charge that can be levelled at the v s c is the conduct of its organisers at the first National Conference in June 1966. While expressing a desire to unite the various strands of the movement (repeated in almost every public statement) they behaved in such a way that almost half those present walked out in disgust. While declaring complete solidarity with the n f l and d r v, they refused to include in their statement of aims support for the d r v and n f l four and five point demands. The divisive nature of this conference is reflected in the fact that, of the 46 organisations sending delegates, 34 subsequently dropped out. No word about these events appeared in the conference report.

If the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign seriously intends to build a movement in support of the people of Vietnam, it will undoubtedly prove this by its work, without, in the meantime, arrogating to itself the right to co-ordinate and organise the movement.

One arrives at the position that at present there is no national unity of action in Britain in support of the people of Vietnam, over and above the welcome initiatives being taken by groups of people in various places. Communists need to reflect carefully on the situation with a view to changing it. Undoubtedly the root of the trouble lies in the traitorous role of the c p g b. In practice we have been slow to grasp the implications of this role.

Only recently have we begun to realise, in practical terms, that a

movement can only be built around the 'hard line' of unqualified support for the Vietnamese people on the strict basis of the four and five points. This means that the line on Vietnam taken by the Soviet leadership must be exposed and opposed. Working with organisations that turn out to be unwilling to 'oppose the line of the Soviet Union' makes it impossible to clarify the confusion that reigns in people's minds about the solution to the war in Vietnam—that the aggressor must cease his aggression and depart, once and for all.

Unity and an effective solidary movement will arise from the collective efforts of like-minded people on this clear basis. As Lenin said, 'Unity is a great thing and a great slogan. But what the workers' cause needs is *unity of Marxists*, not unity between Marxists and opponents and distorters of Marxism.' (*Lenin, Volume 10, p.232, Moscow 1964*).

At present the groups, whose stand on Vietnam is one of full support for the demands of the DRV and NLF are tiny fragments without mass influence. These groups, having solved the problem of the basis for unity, need to turn their attention towards the rallying of popular support.

This support can and must be won on the basis of what the Vietnamese people, who are doing the fighting, are demanding for themselves and not on what is politically expedient for the Soviet leadership or those who follow its line.

Denys Noel is a teacher and a member of the Communist Party since 1948. He has been active in the Vietnam struggle for several years.

A READER'S VIEW

Dear Comrades,

Although Don Milligan's letter on the Russian economic and social *status quo* was factually correct, I feel something ought to be said on the other side.

The actual *ownership* of capital is no longer the sole determinant of social relations. In Russia there is a new class, but it owns big cars and summer houses by the Black Sea, not stocks and shares. But this is merely a question of terminology at the lowest level—the mass of people are suffering, or beginning to, because of salary differentials and 'perks'. Current developments, if continued, might lead to a version of the affluent society in which increased production and relative comfort led to the abdication of the workers' movement and a complete hegemony of the managerial class. Surely no one, except the 'new elite', would want this.

How far Chinese polemic takes into account the real, as distinct from traditional, nature of monopoly capital, it is hard to say, but this is not of central importance. Where the Chinese are correct is in their condemnation of the increasing division in the USSR between the worker and the functionary. Such a rift may be the inevitable result of a more sophisticated economy, but it has to be fought against if the Communist Party, and society as a whole, claims to adhere to Marxism.

Bill Luckin

GENERATION IN REVOLT?

By Mike Faulkner

There are considerable problems involved in writing about youth in Britain today if one is to avoid the popular 'teenage cult' approach to the subject. Any serious attempt to say something worthwhile must get behind the image of a swinging generation of young rebels and try to evaluate the reality upon which the image has been built.

'YOUTH' is a term often used rather loosely to suggest an autonomous teenage world with a cohesion and identity quite apart from the world of 'adults'. According to myth the younger generation is in revolt against its elders and the values, conventions and institutions of the society they have created; the 'youth' are impatient, progressive and irreverent, while their elders tend to be conservative and stuffy. Such is the impression we may get of Britain's youth. The notion that all young people somehow find a common identity and community of interest in a classless category called 'youth' is one which has gained considerable currency on the Left and is assiduously propagated by the Communist Party and the Young Communist League¹.

British youth cannot be understood in this way.

There is no doubt that people in their teens and early twenties share a certain range of experience that does make it possible to regard them as a definable social grouping, in the same way that children and old people form similar groupings. For example, adolescents all experience similar problems of physical and emotional maturation and have to face inter-family relationships which may create problems. In this sense, and in the wider sense that the years of adolescence and early manhood and womanhood are years of important adjustment and intellectual curiosity, it is possible to regard 'youth' as both a phase of individual development and a loose grouping embracing all those within particular arbitrary age boundaries. We must, however, avoid the mistake of regarding youth as something like a special social class. Young people belong to different classes and the class factor is more divisive than anything suggesting a common identity. So, in discussing youth we shall avoid confusion if we remember that we are also talking about classes. All this should be axiomatic, but so much have the waters been muddied that it seems necessary to re-state first principles.

In Britain today there are about eight million young people between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four, three quarters of them are unmarried. They have grown up during a period of relative 'affluence' which contrasts strikingly with the conditions prevailing before the second world war and the immediate post war years. During this time there has not been mass unemployment and the teenagers of today have greater purchasing power than their parents had before the war.

Of the six million unmarried teenagers in Britain, there are 3.35 million boys and 2.65 million girls. Of these, 4.6 million are in full-time employment (2.4 million boys, 2.2 million girls) 1.2 million are at school or college and 200,000 are in the armed forces.

Average weekly earnings of teenagers (figures 15-24) are estimated at £12 (male) and £8 (female). There are however considerable divergences in earnings with forty per cent of males earning less than £7 per week and twenty per cent earning more than £13 per week. Amongst girls, sixty per cent earn less than £7 per week and only ten per cent more than £13 per week.

In 1965 the gross income of six million teenagers was £2,515 million, i.e. nine per cent of all personal incomes in Great Britain, of which sixty-five per cent went to males. After deductions and payment for rent or allowances to parents, the average 'disposable' income of males was £5.10 per week and of females £3.15. The total disposable income, both male and female, was almost £1,500 million (males £950 million and females £520 million) representing six per cent of all consumer expenditure and saving in Great Britain.

These figures show nothing of the relationship between earnings and social class, but they do indicate a considerable change in the position of teenagers since before the war. Of course, this is to some extent relative as postwar changes have affected all sections of the population, but an increased purchasing power and a considerable freedom from heavy domestic responsibilities has provided the economic basis for certain features of the social position of young people today.

It would be wrong to imagine that these developments have been uniform throughout the country. There are considerable regional differences and in general there is a more marked prosperity in the south of England. But the improved conditions for teenagers have opened up a new 'youth' market for the capitalist consumer industries of over £1,000 million. This factor is important to an understanding of the cultural and ideological influences at work in moulding today's younger generation.

Class Realities

Although conditions have changed, the realities of the class system have not. The conditioning of the masses to acceptance of bourgeois ideology, habits and attitudes of mind, is not simply a matter of inculcating such ideas by means of more or less direct propaganda. The myriad influences of an environment which is thoroughly bourgeois leave no one completely free from their effects.

The structure of education in Britain reflects the class nature of society. Working class children, in the main, still receive an education far inferior to that of the middle class, and, in general, do not go on to higher education. Class discrimination in education is intrinsic to the system. The continued existence of 'public' schools with fees of between £400 and £600 per annum ensures that the sons of the richest families are provided with the kind of education, and, more important, of status, that will enable them to take their places at the top.

While the theories of intelligence upon which selection for the grammar

and secondary modern school system is based are now being revised, the changes taking place in the pattern of secondary education can only bring marginal benefits to working class children. The old idea that intelligence was something innate and unchangeable has more or less given way to the recognition that abilities are socially determined and it follows from this that the working class child is less well equipped on starting school than the middle class child. However, there is a conflict between the academic theory that ability is socially determined and an education structure which militates against working class children. The present trend away from selection in favour of comprehensive education is welcome in that it provides the opportunity for larger numbers of working class children to reach a higher standard, but it is not, and cannot be, a move in the direction of an 'egalitarian' education, as it is interpreted in some quarters. For the most part the comprehensive schools already in existence are little more than glorified secondary modern schools. Their improvement demands far greater expenditure than the government is prepared to undertake. Within all schools the system of streaming still exists and a majority of teachers favour it. During the ten years of compulsory education, grammar school children, who are in the main from middle class homes, have twice as much money spent on them as secondary modern children. As a large proportion of grammar school children spend an extra two or three years at school the amount spent on their education is more than one hundred and fifty per cent in excess of that spent on the education of children from the working class.

Class Education

According to the Robbins Report, by 1958 only twenty-five per cent of all university students were the children of manual workers, which represented only an increase of well under ten per cent in children from this background since 1928.

Spreading the comprehensive system will not alter the class nature of education in Britain appreciably and is not much more than an 'egalitarian' sop thrown out to meet the rising pressure for reform of the old selection system which was so grossly unfair and obviously class biased. To the extent that the comprehensive system succeeds in raising standards above those of the secondary moderns, it will help to meet the requirements of British capitalism, which needs a large increase in technically skilled personnel.

Because education under capitalism serves the interests of the ruling class, a 'good education' is regarded as a means to social improvement. In a class society 'improving' one's position means identifying oneself with the bourgeoisie.

The inequality in education will be finally eradicated only when the social system which rests on inequality is overthrown. To recognise this is not to deny the value of reform. But to imagine that the education system can be reformed to give working class children equal opportunities is tantamount to saying that the exploitative system of society itself can be reformed out of existence.

The large majority of working class young people turned on to the

labour market commence their lives as wage earners, having passed through a school system which has given them little and often left them with the feeling that academic pursuits are irrelevant to their lives or that school was largely a waste of time.

Since the second world war there have been considerable changes in the pattern of working class life. Relatively full employment has meant the expansion of family incomes amongst the working class and, while the position should not be exaggerated nor the incidence of real hardship and poverty forgotten, far fewer families are now living on the breadline. After leaving school most young people continue to reside with their parents either until they marry or until they have passed out of their teens. The combined incomes coming into many working class homes during these years has provided a considerable increased disposable income, and, as the figures we quote make clear, this has been particularly the case with unmarried teenagers. Even where teenage earnings are very low, as with unskilled girls, a considerable proportion of their net income is spent on clothes, footwear, restaurant meals, hairdressing, cosmetics and vehicles. Half of the average girl's income goes on expenditure of this kind, out of which one-third goes on clothes.

Youth Denied

Despite an improvement in material conditions for working class youth, their lives are frequently circumscribed without any perspective beyond their immediate environment. As unmarried teenagers they may have greater purchasing power than their parents had, but they are able to look at the future with no more certainty than did their parents. Marriage and a family depend upon having somewhere to live, and this is a real problem. Council housing lists offer no hope of speedy accommodation and more often than not young couples cannot afford the mortgage payments to enable them to buy their own house. Often married life commences in lodgings with in-laws.

For girls the situation is particularly harsh. Those without skill spend the years prior to marriage in low-paid employment in shops, factories and offices, usually with little prospect of improvement since they are expected to accept an inferior status as prospective wives and mothers. They often regard their pre-married state as a temporary working phase from which they will be released by marriage, only to find later that, as wives, they have to shoulder the double burden of a job and a family in order to make ends meet.

Decadent British capitalism does not present an attractive picture to the young. The status-seeking mentality, nurtured and encouraged in a thousand ways, is rooted in deep insecurity. The gulf between life's restricted opportunities and wide-ranging youthful aspirations becomes an area of the most subtle and destructive exploitation under modern capitalism. The anti-social, individualist motivations that capitalism itself engenders are in turn idealised and hypostatised through all the means of mass persuasion. Bank accounts, life insurance, sexual prowess, physical attractiveness, all become acquisitions or attributes at the very centre of life's purpose.

The perpetuation of habits and attitudes which themselves become the basis for new and more subtle methods of exploitation, is essential to the preservation of the capitalist economy. The cultural milieu inevitably reflects the rottenness at the heart of the system.

There is no doubt that during the past ten years there has developed a growing rebelliousness amongst wide sections of young people. Until the mid-fifties unconventional and conspicuous teenage behaviour occurred mainly amongst working class youth. (The early 'beatnik' fringe element associated with the coffee bars and jazz clubs of London's West End was mainly middle class in composition, but represented an insignificant tendency amongst youth as a whole.) The teenage rebels of the earlier post-war period came from the working class. Their rebellion was not very articulate and lacked any real sense of purpose. Its most common expression was the gang, and it was through the gang and its activities that many working class youths found compensation for the general drabness of their lives. The teenage gangs reflected the deep-rooted working class dislike of officialdom and particularly of the police. The excitement lay in the ever-present promise of trouble—of conflict either with the police or with rival gangs. Within the gang the 'leader-principle' reigned supreme and between gangs there was a ceaseless tribal warfare in which the strength of the group and the prestige of the leader was always being tested. Their hunting grounds were the dance halls and the billiard halls, the pubs and the streets and their uniform was the 'teddy-boy suit'.

Rebels Without a Cause

This form of rebellion remained largely non-constructive. It was a form of spontaneous and unconscious class reaction in which was expressed much of the pent-up resentment against a social order which offered these young people no real prospects. They were rebels without a cause.

In more recent years there have been stirrings of a different kind amongst young people. There has been a real move towards a more articulate expression and more positive forms of activity. This can be traced in part to certain developments in popular music which came in during the mid-fifties. The skiffle group gave teenagers a model which they could actually imitate and for the first time young people ceased merely responding to the commercial stimuli and began making their own music. Thousands bought guitars and numerous groups sprang up all over the country. The skiffle craze was the source of a number of trends in popular music and gave rise to both the 'folk' and 'beat' groups.

This development did not free young people from the influence of commercially inspired 'pop' music, but it did lead to a new mood of self-confidence. Of course the emergence of more creative forms of expression in the 'folk' and 'beat' groups has only been part of a much wider picture. The refusal to remain resigned to a placid acceptance of the moral code of capitalist Britain has spread amongst wide sections of middle class and working class young people. Their resistance has taken many forms and has contained much that is negative, but it has been serious. Rather than compete in what came to be called the 'rat race' they preferred to contract

out. The so-called 'beat generation' wanted to withdraw from society. They didn't like it and they saw no hope of changing it. They therefore decided to have nothing to do with it. For the most part it was no more than an intellectual pose, but some actually went 'on the road', living like hoboes and growing their hair long.

Their release was artificial simply because it is *never* possible to contract out of any society. Nevertheless, the rebellion was real enough; there was a widespread anarchism which increasingly found outlets in political activity. The protest then began to move from nihilism to more constructive forms of criticism. The emergence of a constructive mood of social protest amongst the young generation began in the late 'fifties and found an outlet particularly in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the various broad protest organisations which grew up at the same time.

Values Rejected

Whatever may have been the specific demands of the C N D² programme, its opposition to the Bomb gave expression to a real revolt on the part of a big section of youth against a society whose values they rejected. For them the Bomb seemed not only a threat to their existence but also the symbol of an impersonal bureaucracy which controlled their lives, decided their future, and allowed them no part in determining either. The campaign to get rid of the Bomb was for them a desire, however ill-defined, to have done with a society of which the Bomb was the ultimate expression. It should be noted however that while the C N D movement was very much a movement of young people, its composition at all age levels was predominantly middle class. It did not touch more than a portion of working class youth and did not involve the organised workers to any extent.

The C N D grew out of the new mood of questioning that set in on the Left in Britain after Hungary and Suez and found its expression in the trend loosely defined as the 'new left'. Its progenitors were on the one hand a relatively small number of intellectuals who had left the Communist Party in search of a more 'independent' intellectual standpoint and, on the other, an assorted group of radicals and traditional 'establishment' liberals whose consciences had been severely shaken.

Although the spiritual fathers of the new awakening may have been found amongst the university dons and undergraduate sociologists and philosophers, it soon blossomed into a considerable renaissance amongst wider sections of youth. The so-called 'new left' (which is used here to designate to the wider intellectual movement of which the *Universities and Left Review* journal was only a part), eschewed both Marxism and the traditional social-democratic notions of both left and right. It had no clearly-defined philosophy and was essentially an expression of radical discontent and rejection of the established institutions of British politics. The theoretical contributions of its leading intellectuals in the late fifties and early 'sixties were notable for their eclecticism, their pompousness and their replacement of the old jargon of the left by the new jargon of bourgeois sociology. The theorists had little impact on the development of the wider movement, but the notion of an independent 'left' position, unrelated

to any working class commitment, was present and part of the milieu in which the mass protest movement, with the C N D as its centre, had its birth.

The C N D combined in its moral attitude towards nuclear weapons many traditional pacifist and humanist sentiments with a peculiar inverted chauvinism which expressed itself in the often proclaimed demand of the campaign that Britain should set an example to the rest of the world by unilaterally forsaking the H-bomb. The political aspects of this line were never very clearly worked out and did not represent a challenge to the ruling class. The importance of the C N D movement lay in that it captured the imagination of thousands of people, most of them young people, who, whatever they may not have known, knew that they wanted to Ban the Bomb. All the diverse currents of bourgeois protest that contributed to the formation of C N D were insignificant compared to the movement they engendered.

Aldermaston and After

By 1960 the Aldermaston marches had made a considerable impact upon the political scene in Britain and their appeal had extended far beyond the particular groupings forming the permanent basis of the movement. The marches, and the many protest organisations which flowered at that time, expressed widespread criticism by a considerable proportion of Britain's youth. In 1961, at the conclusion of the Easter march, upwards of 100,000 congregated in Hyde Park. The campaign had become a mass movement. But within two years it had passed its peak and begun to decline. Since then much of the enthusiasm has been dissipated and much of the spirit has gone. Faced with the realities of the world situation, the growing national liberation struggle and the imperialist counter-offensive, the commitment to 'peace at any price' has rendered the C N D more and more irrelevant and it actually serves to channel the healthy sentiments of many young people into support for policies which objectively assist the capitalist class.

Thousands of young people became politically active through the peace movement. During the years of C N D's ascendancy there occurred a political awakening in the universities. Students have played a prominent part in 'progressive' political movements such as the Movement for Colonial Freedom, Anti-Apartheid, the Campaign Against Racial Discrimination and the various political youth organisations which have grown up.

The activities of most of these groups have not been related to electoral work but they have been wedded to constitutional concepts looking towards a Labour government to implement their policies. The Committee of One Hundred, which was largely anarchist in outlook, engaged in direct action, but never succeeded in gaining much support and had no clearer political understanding than the wider movement.

Why, can it be asked, when so many young people were drawn into political activity over the past eight or nine years, has it not been possible to draw at least a large proportion of them into a conscious anti-imperialist

movement? This has not happened and the political youth movement today is more fragmented than it has ever been.

The involvement of young people in the 'protest movement' has been part of a much wider rebellion which in the main has found no political expression. The rebellion occurred as a reaction against the sordid morality of a society that offered nothing to the young. The energies of youth could find no constructive outlet and large numbers of young people could find no merit in being 'well adjusted' to a system whose standards and values they regarded as a set of irrelevant and outworn rules. Their comparative affluence enabled them to give their non-conformism physical expression in the form of unconventional dress, cults and interests which required a certain amount of expenditure. The widespread manifestation of their alienation has been a general irreverence for 'the establishment'. Its positive expression has been the political awakening of a minority, and its most negative, the resort of another minority to the use of narcotics. Capitalism has produced the rebellion; now it has to absorb it.

Psychological Exploitation

The economic exploitation of young people has been accompanied by a special psychological exploitation. The unrest and dissatisfaction amongst youth has been diverted into channels favourable to capitalism and the impression has been created that this manipulation is a genuine expression of the teenage rebellion. The fact that some of the trends within this teenage 'pop' culture have actually been initiated by young people, often of working class origin, has helped to foster this impression. The recent innovations in teenage fashions, affecting men's clothes as well as women's, is a good example of this. Many of the styles exhibited in the windows of Carnaby street have been adapted from the off-beat but inexpensive dress purchased from ex-army surplus stores which was popular not long ago with Aldermaston marchers. The inspiration for much of this new fashion has come from the youth but it has been taken over and turned into an extremely profitable business. The pages of the fashion magazines which used to display almost exclusively the creations of the established designers, are now full of the most bizarre examples of this new trend. A few enterprising youngsters have made their fortunes, but the net result has been to divert thousands of young people into a fruitless pursuit of the superficial and the frivolous. Often the new designs are sold to the public by popular recording stars whose preferences in dress are followed assiduously by their teenage admirers³. The unconventional has been turned into a convention and the myth of an autonomous teenage world has been encouraged to the advantage of capitalism.

A cult of 'the outsider' has been developed. Long hair has become fashionable as a badge of 'modern youth', legitimised by popular singers, and the 'protest cry' is echoed from the radio and the screens of cinema and television. Songs which a few years ago were known only to Aldermaston marchers have found their way into the hit parade and singers who started their careers in the peace movement have become television personalities almost overnight.

Of course, in the process of absorption, the 'protest' became generalised. The 'establishment' rewarded its critics by taking their criticisms and re-presenting them stripped of any specific bite. 'Anti-Establishment' satire became very popular in the early sixties with the publication of *Private Eye* and the presentation by the B B C of 'That Was The Week That Was', both of which lampooned the personalities of the Macmillan government. The debunking of the symbols of a Toryism that was fast becoming an embarrassment to the ruling class became a fashionable and profitable business which helped to create a psychological atmosphere conducive to the acceptance of Harold Wilson's 'Modern Britain' propaganda.

The rebellion of youth was contained within a 'cult of youth' which presented to the younger generation an image of themselves sufficiently related to reality to persuade them that their rebellion had achieved some success.

Seeking a Collective Identity

In the field of popular entertainment a new crop of singers emerged in the beat groups, the most spectacular of which was the Beatles. The appeal of these groups was rather different from that of earlier entertainers popular with young people, in that unlike their predecessors, they were themselves youths, cast in the popular mould. The idols of previous generations were never so closely identified with their audiences. These were long-haired rebels dressed in outlandish beatnik gear, voicing their discontent in hysterical and incoherent musical gibberish which seemed to echo all the frustrations and yearnings of thousands of young people who were seeking a collective identity against a hostile and unsympathetic environment. In some cases these groups actually came from the adolescent gang world of Merseyside, where in the late fifties this particular form of musical expression tended to replace gang warfare as a more creative pastime⁴. They produced a dynamic response amongst their followers, selling millions of discs and gaining record audiences at emotionally-charged and heavily stage-managed concerts and rallies. The frustrations of the young found an outlet in a form of idol worship which channelled their aspirations and energies into a phantasy world which could give no real satisfaction.

Thus the rebellion of youth was manipulated by the very forces against which it had been directed. It has become a source of profit for capitalism through the creation of a new teenage market. At the same time it has succeeded in removing the sting from the real element of social protest and rendered it harmless.

Of course this is only a partial picture. The response of a section of young people cannot be regarded as the response of young people as a whole. The majority of young people in Britain have never taken part in a demonstration of any kind in their lives. Those who have associated themselves with organisations of the Left comprise a small minority. They come from different class backgrounds—by no means primarily from the working class—and a very considerable proportion of them are students.

Opposition to authority is one of the most marked characteristics of the younger generation and this is a positive part of the crisis within bourgeois society. Although there is amongst young people generally no clear orientation, and even though the dialectic of capitalist cultural decay gives rise to the commercialisation and hence the negation of each new positive break that young people make with outmoded values and habits, there is, nevertheless, a permanent positive development. In nurturing the 'teenage cult', capitalism is unable to prevent the development of an assertive self-confidence on the part of youth. The habits of the past in relation to sexual attitudes, parental authority, and the family are really changing and however many concomitant negative features there may be, the changes are an inevitable part of the breakdown of bourgeois culture and, as such, should be welcomed.

The challenge to established and hitherto accepted forms of authority has been particularly pronounced amongst students. The recent events at the London School of Economics are an indication of the way things are moving. The LSE students protest actions against the appointment of a former Chancellor from the University of Salisbury, and the subsequent boycott of lectures in protest against the victimisation of their leaders, went beyond anything British students have done in the past. The LSE struggle is one of the most significant developments to have taken place in the universities and represents a move towards greater independence and a demand for genuine student participation in the administration of the colleges, which cannot be ignored. These developments are indicative of the growing mood of dissatisfaction affecting much wider sections of young people.

Developing Revolutionary Consciousness

It is not enough to recognise that there exists a mood of irreverence and rebelliousness amongst wide sections of youth. The question is how to develop this in a conscious revolutionary direction. As we have said, the numbers of young people who have become politically activated are relatively small and to the extent that young workers have been involved it has usually been an involvement in 'broad' movements such as CND which have a predominantly middle class composition. The problems affecting young workers are more or less the same as those affecting the working class as a whole, i.e. the fight for wages, for jobs, for houses etc, but to some extent the attentions of working class youth have been distracted from the issues concerning them as workers. It is significant that the popular image of the swinging young generation has blurred the class divisions amongst the youth. While the trends in such things as dress and popular music have a superficial working class appearance, their main content is a preposterous eccentricity which is distinctly bourgeois.

Any attempt to assess the problems involved in winning youth for a revolutionary position must avoid two obvious errors. In the first place it is quite wrong to imagine that recent trends, which may seem superficially progressive, actually amount to what has been termed 'youth in turmoil'.⁵

On the other hand it is equally wrong to dismiss the non-conformism of large sections as unimportant and wholly negative. Despite the partial emasculation of teenage protest through its commercialisation, the fact remains that many thousands of young people have become socially conscious and to some extent politically conscious. The participation of young people in such movements as C N D, in actions in opposition to the war in Vietnam and campaigns against racialism, is important. There is no doubt that these youngsters have an important part to play in the struggle to overthrow capitalism. The working class youth will take a leading part in building a revolutionary party, but there is every reason to suppose that considerable sections of young people from the middle class, particularly students, can be won to a revolutionary position. It is important to ensure that their zest and enthusiasm is not squandered in pursuit of ephemeral and worthless crazes which can serve only to divert them from the real task of changing society, of making revolution.

All those sections in objective opposition to capitalism can only be brought into an effective alliance behind the working class, the only class capable of leading the people to the overthrow of the capitalist system. Only a Marxist-Leninist party with its roots in the working class can give the political leadership which will guarantee success in the struggle. Such a party has yet to be built.

Present Difficulties

The absence at present of a genuine revolutionary party severely affects the work of all who are fighting capitalism, and makes more difficult the job of winning support for a revolutionary position. In a political atmosphere dominated for so long by bourgeois ideology and social democracy, the traditions and institutions of the British labour and trade union movement have become almost sacrosanct in the minds of many class-conscious workers, no matter to which political party they may give their allegiance. Reformism permeates the working class movement from top to bottom and while there is no lack of willingness to struggle, the idea of revolution is something beyond the consciousness of the average trade unionist.

These attitudes are not nearly so strong amongst the younger generation, and because young people who do become politically involved bring a freshness and enthusiasm often lacking in those with long years of experience (and disillusionment) behind them, there is every reason to be hopeful that the younger generation of workers, students and intellectuals will take the initiative in building the revolutionary party in Britain.

There are already existing on the Left a number of organisations competing for the allegiance of the youth. It is worth taking a look at two of them which claim to be Marxist, the Young Socialists and the Young Communist League.

There exist at present two separate Young Socialist organisations, one

within the Labour Party, the other outside. The membership of both combined is probably something in the region of 15,000. The Young Communist League now claims about 6,000 members. Here we shall deal with the Y C L and that section of the Young Socialists outside the Labour Party. (Numerically, the Labour Party Young Socialists organisation is much larger than the others but for the purposes of this article an examination of the latter is more important as they represent a distinct and coherent Trotskyist tendency, while the L P Y S contains a variety of different tendencies.)

The Y S direct their appeal particularly to young workers. They have a disciplined cadre force whose responsibility it is to acquaint the new recruits with the outlines of Trotskyism, firmly implanting the line on permanent revolution and the inevitability of betrayal by the 'Stalinists' (into which category they place everyone from John Gollan to Mao Tse Tung), and 'fake lefts', by which they mean left social democrats. Many young people are attracted to their ranks, imagining that they are enrolling in a genuine revolutionary youth movement. But actually the Y S propounds a line which, despite all its militant revolutionary-sounding utterances, is not Marxist at all. The enthusiasm of the membership is kept at high point by assurances that the revolution is not far away. The Labour leaders come under severe attack, together with the parliamentary left wing. Yet the Y S regard the Labour Party as basically a workers' party, constantly betrayed by its leaders. They talk about the necessity for a revolutionary party and believe that one day the Labour Party, when it has finally been purged of its right wing leaders and 'fake lefts', can become one. They consider that the transformation of the Labour Party will come about through the continual exposure of its leadership and their eventual removal from power. When this has happened and the Labour Party is controlled by the policies of the Socialist Labour League (to which the Y S owes its allegiance) it will no longer be a social democratic party but a revolutionary one capable of seizing power.

There is a very big turnover in the Y S membership as many young people, initially enthusiastic, after a period of vigorous activity and self sacrifice, become disillusioned and fall away, often to fade out of politics altogether.

The Y C L follows the line of the Communist Party. Like the Y S it believes that the Labour Party is being betrayed by the right wing, but unlike the Y S it does not call for the removal of Wilson and the leadership from power, believing instead that they can be 'pushed to the left'. It seeks, therefore, to bring about a broad alliance of 'progressive youth' to help change the policy of the Labour Government in the direction of socialism. Its efforts are directed towards winning unity with all those who, for one reason or another, criticise the Wilson Government from a 'left' position. It sees as one of the most important tasks in the achievement of this 'left unity' the building of a bigger Y C L. In order to attract new members to their ranks the Y C L puts great emphasis on social activities

and pride themselves on being 'youthful and extrovert' and in tune with the mood of modern youth. Although they would claim, like the C P, to accept Marxism as their guide, in fact they know little or nothing of Marxism and make no effort to provide Marxist education for their members. Whereas the Y S has some influence amongst young workers and lays emphasis on industrial work, the Y C L has no strength in industry and possesses neither the forces nor the desire to establish a base amongst industrial workers.

The Y C L's latest achievement has been the establishment of some working co-operation with the Young Liberals in a 'Youth for Peace in Vietnam' committee, the sole object of which is to pressurise the Government to disassociate itself from the U S and work for an end to the war through a negotiated settlement.

The Y C L's main preoccupation is the campaign, launched last May, to double its membership of 5,000 by May, 1967. As it has not yet achieved a membership of 6,000 there is no doubt that it will fail to reach anything like this target.

For the Y C L, recruitment has become an end in itself, to which everything else is subordinated. Thus it has meant a big publicity drive and an attempt to polish up their image. They have presented themselves as *the* youth organisation catering for the needs of the swinging younger generation. All their publicity is designed to fit in with the current commercially-inspired popular trends amongst youth. They are fond of referring to the 'tremendous generation' and do their best to identify with it.

We referred above to the way in which the ruling class absorbed a genuine teenage revolt and projected to the young an image of themselves which, while related to reality, was in fact designed to divert any genuine rebellion into harmless channels. The Y C L, in accepting and applauding this manipulation, has accepted a myth.

Both the Y S and the Y C L have benefited from the new mood of discontent affecting wide sections of young people and have recruited some of the most politically conscious of them. The Y S has led them into a cul-de-sac of Trotskyist ultra-leftism which they have mistaken for something really revolutionary. The Y C L offers them a jazzed-up version of the Communist Party's pseudo-Marxist reformism.

For too long young people in politics have been treated as subordinates by the parent organisations. But they are less and less willing to be subordinates. They will go on questioning and will not be satisfied with glib answers. Marxists have a responsibility to ensure that the energies of young people are not wasted in trivial pursuits, but that their imaginations are captured by the vision of the socialist future that they must build.

We are living in the era when imperialism will end and revolution will triumph all over the world. Not only in Britain but everywhere the future belongs to the youth. For that future—for *our* future—young people are fighting in the jungles of Vietnam, in the mountains of Bolivia and Venezuela, and it is the youth of China who are consolidating the foundations of the socialist order so that communism may be built.

The young people of Britain will in the course of time play their full part in the struggle. The present task is to build a revolutionary cadre force from those who are already engaged in struggle. The sharpening situation in Britain will offer widening opportunities for the building of such a force, and there is no doubt that it will be built.

Footnotes

(1) See particularly *British Youth—Progressive, Reactionary or Indifferent?* in the March 1966 issue of *Marxism Today* by Barney Davis. This article is notable for the complete absence of a class approach to the question of youth. It was sharply criticised by readers of *Marxism Today* in the May and August 1966 issues. See also the series on youth by Bob Wynn (*Morning Star*, Feb. 7, 8 and 9, 1967). These articles are even more superficial, pandering to what is currently popular amongst certain sections of young people.

(2) CND is referred to in the past tense, not to convey the impression that it has ceased to exist, but because the nature of its campaign has now become very different from what it was at its inception and the references above are concerned particularly with the 'unilateralist' and almost exclusively 'anti-nuclear' character of the movement as it was in 1958.

(3) Beneath a recent press photograph of two pop singers dressed in outlandish exhibitionist suits appeared this comment: 'Pop star Tom Jones, left, and Ken Baker step out in London yesterday in what the designer hopes will be the latest in swinging gear. The suit worn by Tom Jones is entitled 'It's the Talk of The Town', while Ken Baker's outfit glories in the name of 'People will say We're in Debt'. Both were designed by 23-year-old Gloria, who has just broken in on the London fashion scene.' (*Morning Star*, April 4, 1967.)

(4) See *New Society*, February 20, 1964, 'Beat Killed the Gang' by Colin Fletcher.

(5) See the article by Barney Davis, *British Youth—Reactionary Progressive, or Indifferent?*



Mike Faulkner was for ten years a member of the Young Communist League. He was expelled in 1966. In 1961 he served on the Communist Party's National Student Committee and is a former branch secretary of the St. Pancras YCL.

COMMENT ON CUBA

DEAR COMRADES,

There were serious misgivings about the Cuban situation in the November–December issue.

Castro's attitude towards China is not a reflection of his revisionism; it is due to his failure to understand fully the nature of Soviet revisionism.

In an objective analysis of Castro's position certain recent facts, which reveal that Castro is learning his lesson, have to be taken into consideration:

(1) The Cuban delegate criticised the Soviet Union for its failure to assist North Vietnam and the Yugoslav delegate accused Cuba of adventurism, in the Twenty-third Congress of the C P S U.

(2) In editorial's replying to the Yugoslav press, *Granma* (May 15, 1966) stated the following views of the Cuban Party—

(a) 'We have argued with the Chinese leaders for reasons of principles concerning the relationship that ought to exist between two communist parties; two socialist states. We dispute with the leaders of the "League of Yugoslav Communists" also on matters of principle, but on another plane that has nothing to do with the relationship between Communist Parties, since there is no Communist Party in Yugoslavia' (Editorial One)

(b) 'We do not accept peaceful co-existence as a policy applicable only to powerful states, with imperialism having the right to make war on small nations as it chooses' (Editorial One)

(c) 'Every communist knows that—as Marx stated—"Violence is the midwife of history", and that armed insurrection is the highest expression of class struggle. Whoever ignores this or tries to conceal it is not a communist' and

'A colonial war will mean the collapse of imperialism in Latin America.' (Editorial Two)

(d) 'Our position in relation to the intervention of the United States in Vietnam is one of a fight to the death against the invader, and the Yugoslav position is conciliation with the imperialists.' (Editorial Three)

(3) Castro severely criticised the socialist countries for giving aid to the Frei regime of Chile.

(4) According to Castro the line of demarcation between communist and reformists in the Latin American conditions is 'their attitude towards the guerrilla struggle.' (*Granma*, March 19, '67). Moreover he says, 'If those who call themselves communists will not do their duty, then we will support those who in the struggle act as communists' (*ibid*). Castro has recently attacked the reformist leadership of the Communist Party of Venezuela and supported Douglas Bravo and the FLN-FALN (*ibid*).

(5) The Cuban Education Minister rejected material incentive as it would 'revert to capitalism' (*Granma*, August 21, 1966). Castro says, 'It is perfectly possible for a country to believe that it is constructing communism when it is really constructing capitalism. This can happen!' (*Granma*, September 4, 1966)

(6) According to Castro 'the mission of the universities is not to train just technicians but revolutionary technicians.' (*Granma*, December 25, 1966)

(7) Cuba has declared its 'struggle against bureaucracy'. In one of the four editorials on this subject *Granma* (March 5 and 12, 1967) points to the task of eliminating 'all possibilities of a special stratum being formed within our revolutionary state.'

yours fraternally,

Tushar Sarkar

Glasgow

PL

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