


COMBAT

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(Formerly the Marxist-Leninist Organisation of Britain)

THE 'CULTURAL' COUNTER REVOLUTION IN CHINA

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INTRODUCTION

As, in the 1960s, the leaderships of the great majority of Communist Parties increasingly revealed their departure from Marxist-Leninist principles and their adoption of revisionism, many honest revolutionary socialists in various countries were led to join groups and parties declaring their adherence to "The Thought of Mao Tse-tung".

But a careful study of "The Thought of Mao Tse-tung" and of its practical embodiment in the policies of the Communist Party of China since 1935 reveals that those who joined such maoist groups and parties in the belief that they were "Marxist-Leninist" were grossly deceived.

"THE THOUGHT OF MAO TSE-TUNG" IS A FORM OF REVISIONISM, AND THE "GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION" IN CHINA WAS COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY IN NATURE.

A preliminary analysis of the "cultural revolution" was made by the Marxist-Leninist Organisation of Britain in its "Report on the Situation in the People's Republic of China" issued in January 1968, while the "cultural revolution" was still in progress.

Since then the MLOB, now the Communist League, has been engaged on a more detailed study of "The Thought of Mao Tse-tung". The first section of this, now out-of-print, will be republished shortly in COMPASS and other sections will follow. The report which follows is a summary of these findings, which bring the 1968 report up-to-date and correct a number of inaccurate formulations in it.

Many maoists are reluctant to make an objective examination of "The Thought of Mao Tse-tung", for the same reason that many members of the Communist Party of Great Britain are reluctant to make an objective examination of "The British Road to Socialism". To do so would, in fact, dispel illusions which they find comforting -- particularly the illusion that there exist powerful "Marxist-Leninist" parties ruling over great "socialist states" to which they can look for guidance.

But the necessity of building a new international Marxist-Leninist movement from the roots is not daunting to anyone who has really absorbed Marxism-Leninism. For the working class in any country can make no significant social advances unless it is led by a Marxist-Leninist party, and the historical march of the working class towards socialism makes the creation of such parties -- freed of all revisionist trends and strengthened by the experience of the past sixty years -- inevitable.

The Communist League

The aim of the Communist League, which publishes COMBAT, COMPASS and INTERCOM, is to build a Marxist-Leninist Party free of all revisionist trends.

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For THE COMMUNIST LEAGUE

REVISIONISM IN CHINA

The Character of the Chinese Revolution

In the years immediately prior to 1949, the social system in China was a semi-colonial, semi-feudal society, as Mao Tse-tung stated:

"Present-day Chinese society is a colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal society".

(Mao Tse-tung: "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party", in: "Selected Works", Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 315).

Thus, the Chinese Revolution was directed, in the first place, at the foreign imperialists, the Chinese landlord class and those sections of the Chinese capitalist class dependent upon foreign imperialism (the comprador bourgeoisie):

"The chief targets or enemies at this stage of the Chinese revolution . . . are . . . the bourgeoisie of the imperialist countries and the landlord class of our country. . .

The comprador big bourgeoisie is a class which directly serves the capitalists of the imperialist countries and is nurtured by them; countless ties link it closely with the feudal forces in the countryside. Therefore, it is a target of the Chinese revolution".

(Mao Tse-tung: *ibid.*; p. 315, 320).

Uninterrupted Revolution

The primary aim of Marxist-Leninists is to lead the working class to carry through a socialist revolution, by which the working class will become the ruling class in society and proceed to construct socialism.

In a colonial-type country such as China, however, the revolutionary process embraces two successive stages: that of national-democratic revolution and that of socialist revolution:

"Every Communist ought to know that, taken as a whole, the Chinese revolutionary movement led by the Communist Party embraces the two stages, i.e., the democratic and the socialist revolutions, which are two essentially different revolutionary processes, and that the second process can be carried through only after the first has been completed. The democratic revolution is the necessary preparation for the socialist revolution, and the socialist revolution is the inevitable sequel to the democratic revolution".

(Mao Tse-tung: *ibid.*; p. 330-1).

But Marxism-Leninism holds that if the working class, led by a Marxist-Leninist party, can gain the leading role in the first stage of the revolutionary process in a colonial-type country, the stage of national-democratic revolution, it can proceed without significant interruption to carry through the socialist revolution:

"While the democratic petty bourgeois wish to bring the revolution to a conclusion as quickly as possible and with the achievement at most of the above demands, it is our interest and our task to make the revolution permanent, until all more or less possessing classes have been displaced from domination, until the proletariat has conquered state power".

(K. Marx and F. Engels: "Address of the Central Council to the Communist League", in: K. Marx: "Selected Works", Volume 2; London; 1943; p. 161)

"From the democratic revolution we shall at once, according to the degree of our strength, the strength of the class-conscious and organised proletariat, begin to pass over to the Socialist revolution. We stand for continuous revolution. We shall not stop half way".

(V. I. Lenin: "The Attitude of Social-Democracy toward the Peasant Movement", in: "Selected Works", Volume 3; London; 1946; p. 145).

"The proletariat will immediately utilise this liberation of bourgeois Russia from tsarism; from the agrarian power of the landlords, . . . to bring about the socialist revolution".

(V. I. Lenin: "The Two Lines of the Revolution", in: "Selected Works", Volume 5; London; undated; p. 163).

Commenting on this last passage, Stalin says:

"This, then, is the position in regard to Lenin's idea of the bourgeois-democratic revolution passing into the proletarian revolution, for the 'immediate' transition to the proletarian revolution".

(J. V. Stalin: "The Foundations of Leninism", in: "Leninism"; London; 1942; p. 26).

and adds:

"The heroes of the Second International asserted (and continue to assert) that between the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the proletarian revolution, there is a chasm, or at any rate a Chinese Wall, separating one from the other by a more or less protracted interval of time, during which the bourgeoisie . . . develops capitalism. . . This interval is usually calculated to extend over many decades, if not longer. It is hardly necessary to prove that this Chinese Wall 'theory' is totally devoid of scientific meaning under the conditions of imperialism, that it is and can be only a means of concealing and camouflaging the counter-revolutionary aspirations of the bourgeoisie".

(J. V. Stalin: *ibid.*; p. 22).

The Communist International correctly applied this Marxist-Leninist strategy and tactics to colonial-type countries such as China:

"As a rule transition to the dictatorship of the proletariat in these (i.e., colonial-type -- Ed.) countries will be possible only through a series of preparatory stages, as the outcome of a whole period of transformation of bourgeois-democratic revolution into socialist revolution".

(Programme of the Communist International; London; p. 41)

Thus, the concept that between a national-democratic revolution led by the working class and the socialist revolution in a colonial-type country there must be a significant period of capitalism -- a "Chinese Wall", as Lenin put it -- is completely contrary to Marxist-Leninist strategy and tactics:

"To attempt to raise an artificial Chinese wall between the first and second revolutions . . . is monstrously to distort Marxism, to vulgarise it; to put liberalism in its place. It means smuggling in a reactionary defence of the bourgeoisie against the socialist proletariat".

(V. I. Lenin: "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky", in: "Selected Works", Volume 7; London; 1946; p. 191).

"This Chinese Wall 'theory' . . . is and can only be a means of concealing and camouflaging the counter-revolutionary aspirations of the bourgeoisie".

(J. V. Stalin: "The Foundations of Leninism", in: "Leninism"; London; 1942; p. 22).

The Inevitable Desertion of the National Capitalist Class

The national capitalist class is that section of the capitalist class in a colonial-type country which -- in contrast to the other section, the comprador capitalist class, which is tied to and dependent upon foreign imperialism -- has its economic and political interests held back by the domination of the country by foreign imperialism and so has an interest in carrying through the national-democratic revolution:

"With the growth of the revolutionary movement (in colonial-type countries -- Ed.) the . . . bourgeoisie in such countries is splitting up into two parts, a revolutionary part . . . and a compromising part (the big bourgeoisie), of which the first is continuing the revolutionary struggle (against foreign imperialism -- Ed.), whereas the second is entering a bloc with imperialism".
(J. V. Stalin: "The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East", in: "Works", Volume 7; Moscow; 1954; p. 147).

In the first phase of the national-democratic revolution, when leadership of the revolution is in the hands of the national capitalist class, the party of the working class should attempt to form an alliance with this latter class:

"In the first stage (of the national-democratic revolution in China -- Ed.) the driving force of the movement was the national bourgeoisie, bourgeois intellectuals and students, which sought support in the ranks of the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie.

In the second stage the character of the movement changed . . . ; the working class (particularly the industrial proletariat) appeared on the arena as a political factor of first class importance.

The proletariat is forming a bloc with the peasantry . . . , with the petty, urban bourgeoisie and a section of the capitalist bourgeoisie".
(Resolution on the Chinese Situation, 7th. Plenum ECCI, in: "International Press Correspondence", Volume 7; 1927; p. 231).

But a pre-requisite of the transformation of the national-democratic revolution in a colonial-type country into a socialist revolution is that the working class should win the leadership of the national-democratic revolution from the national capitalist class:

"In the colonies and semi-colonies where the proletariat is the leader of and commands hegemony in the struggle, the consistent bourgeois-democratic revolution will grow into proletarian revolution in proportion as the struggle develops and becomes more intense".
("The Programme of the Communist International"; London; 1932; p. 40, 42).

"The question of the hegemony of the proletariat in such (colonial-type -- Ed.) countries, and of freeing the masses of the people from the influence of the compromising national bourgeoisie, is becoming more and more urgent".

(J. V. Stalin: "The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East", in: "Works", Volume 7; Moscow; 1954; p. 147).

But the working class can win the hegemony of the national-democratic revolution only by class struggle against the national capitalist class:

"Either the national bourgeoisie smashes the proletariat . . . or the proletariat pushes aside the national bourgeoisie, consolidates its hegemony and assumes the load of the vast masses of working people in town and country, in order to overcome the resistance of the national bourgeoisie, secure the complete victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and then gradually convert it into a socialist revolution, with all the consequences following from that.

One or the other".
(J. V. Stalin: "Questions of the Chinese Revolution", in: "Works", Volume 9; Moscow; 1954; p. 225).

If the Marxist-Leninist strategy and tactics is pursued correctly and successfully, so that the working class is seen to be winning the leadership of the national-democratic revolution, then the national capitalist class will inevitably desert the national-democratic revolution and pass over to the side of the counter-revolution, preferring a subordinate exploiting position under imperialist domination to the prospect of losing its exploiting rights altogether under socialism:

"Now the movement is at the beginning of the third stage In this stage the driving forces of the movement will be a bloc of a still more revolutionary nature -- of the proletariat, peasantry and urban petty bourgeoisie. . . .

The industrial bourgeoisie marched with the national revolutionary movement so long as it preserved purely a bourgeois-democratic character, but on the first signs of revolution (i.e., led by the working class -- Ed.) they either desert the revolutionary cause or manoeuvre to sabotage it".

(Resolution on the Chinese Situation, 7th. Plenum ECCI, in: "International Press Correspondence", Volume 7; 1927; p. 231).

Any policy on the part of the Party which tends to damp down the class struggle of the working class against the national capitalist class for the sake of maintaining an alliance with this latter class is an extremely harmful right deviation from Marxist-Leninist strategy and tactics:

"The political self-determination of the Chinese Communists will develop in the struggle . . . against Right Liquidationism, which ignores the independent class tasks of the Chinese proletariat and leads to a formless merging with the general democratic national movement".

(Resolution of the 6th. Plenum, ECCI, cited in: J. V. Stalin: "The International Situation and the Defence of the USSR", in: "Works", Volume 10; Moscow; 1954; p. 25).

"I know that among the Chinese Communists there are comrades who do not approve of workers going on strike for an improvement of their material conditions and legal status, and who try to dissuade the workers from striking. That is a great mistake, comrades; it is a very serious underestimation of the role and importance of the Chinese proletariat It would be a great mistake if the Chinese Communists failed to take advantage of the present favourable situation to assist the workers to improve their material conditions and legal status, even through strikes. Otherwise, what purpose does the revolution in China serve?

The proletariat cannot be a leading force if during strikes its sons are flogged and tortured by agents of imperialism". (J. V. Stalin: "The Prospects of the Revolution in China", in: "Works", Volume 8; Moscow; 1954; p. 389).

"A general policy of retreat in the towns and of curtailing the workers' struggle to improve their conditions would be wrong." (Directive of Presidium of ECCI to CPC, cited in: J. V. Stalin: "The International Situation and the Defence of the USSR", in: "Works", Volume 10; Moscow; 1954; p. 20).

"The ECCI decisively denies any opposition between the tasks of the national revolution and the tasks of the proletarian class struggle. It believes that such an attitude . . . is nothing but a rejection of the hegemony of the proletariat in the democratic Chinese Revolution".

(Resolution on the Chinese Question, 8th. Plenum ECCI, in: "IKKI i VKP (b) po kitaiskomu voprosu (osnovnye resheniya)" (ECCI and RCP (b) on the Chinese Question (Principal Decisions); Moscow; 1927; p. 169).

The Democratic Dictatorship of the Working Class and Peasantry

Because of the inevitable desertion of the national capitalist class from the national-democratic revolution if the working class gain the leadership of this revolution, the form of state established by the victory of a national-democratic revolution led by the working class will be the democratic dictatorship of the working class and peasantry in the form of Soviets:

"The future revolutionary government in China will in general resemble in character the government we used to talk about in our country in 1905, that is, something in the nature of a democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, with the difference, however, that it will be first and foremost an anti-imperialist government".

(J. V. Stalin: "The Prospects of the Revolution in China", in: "Works", Volume 8; Moscow; 1954; p. 382).

"Now, if the movement gains success, Soviets can become and actually will become the main force that will rally around itself the workers and peasants of China".

(J. V. Stalin: "The Political Complexion of the Russian Opposition", in: "Works", Volume 10; Moscow; 1954; p. 162).

"The special conditions of the revolutionary struggle prevailing in colonial and semi-colonial countries . . . impose upon the Communist Parties of these countries a number of special tasks, which are preparatory stages to the general tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Communist International considers the following to be the most important of these special tasks:

- 1) to overthrow the rule of foreign imperialism, of the feudal rulers and of the landlord bureaucracy;
 - 2) to establish the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry on a Soviet basis".
- ("Programme of the Communist International"; London; 1932; p. 41).

Mao and the National Capitalists

In 1927 the Chinese national capitalist class deserted the national-democratic revolution and went over to the side of the counter-revolution -- this desertion being signified by the coup d'etat headed by Chiang Kai-shok in this year:

"The course of events has completely justified the Seventh Enlarged Plenum's prediction that the bourgeoisie would desert the united national-revolutionary front and go over to the side of the counter-revolution.

This process was expressed in the counter-revolutionary coup of Chiang Kai-shok and a number of other generals".
(Resolution on the Chinese Question, 8th. Plenum ECCI, in: "IKKI i VKP(b) po kitaiskomu voprosu (osnovnye resheniya)" (ECCI and RCP (b) on the Chinese Question (Principal Decisions); Moscow; 1927; p. 159).

The principal cause of this defection was the development of the class struggle of the workers and peasants:

"The principal reason for the treachery of the bourgeoisie and Chiang Kai-shok was the unfolding mass movement of the working class and peasantry and the successes of the Chinese Communist Party".
(Ibid).

The policy of the faction headed by Mao Tse-tung towards the national capitalists was expressed clearly in 1935, after the faction had gained control of the leadership of the Communist Party of China, as one of "winning back the national capitalist class to the national-democratic revolution":

"The national bourgeoisie . . . deserted to the enemy of the people, the Chiang Kai-shek clique. The question is whether there is any possibility that this class will undergo a change in the present circumstances. We think there is. . .

The task of the Party is to form a revolutionary national united front by combining the activities . . . of the workers, the peasants, the students, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie throughout the country."

(Mao Tse-tung: "On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism", in: "Selected Works", Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 155, 161).

In the present circumstances there is a possibility that the bourgeoisie will once again cooperate with us and join in the resistance to Japan, and the party of the proletariat should therefore not repel them but welcome them and revive its alliance with them".

(Mao Tse-tung: "The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan", in: "Selected Works", Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 272).

"The middle bourgeoisie constitutes the national bourgeoisie. . . . This is a stratum we must win over".

(Mao Tse-tung: "Current Problems of Tactics in the Anti-Japanese United Front", in: "Selected Works", Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 423).

"The task of the proletariat is to form a united front with the national bourgeoisie".

(Mao Tse-tung: "On New Democracy", in: "Selected Works", Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 348).

But we have seen that the national capitalist class deserted the national-democratic revolution because the working class was gaining the leadership of this revolution and so opening the way to its transformation into a socialist revolution which would end the exploitation of the working class by the capitalist class.

The national capitalist class could, therefore, be "won back to the national-democratic revolution" only if it could be assured of leadership of this revolution, only if it could be satisfied that its exploitation of the working class would continue after the victory of the national-democratic revolution, only if it could be satisfied that it and not the working class would dominate the state which would be set up after the victory of the national-democratic revolution.

The faction headed by Mao Tse-tung gave these assurances to the national capitalist class.

After the victory of the national-democratic revolution, as led by a Communist Party headed by the faction headed by Mao Tse-tung, the national capitalist class was assured that it would be encouraged to develop capitalism for an indefinite period:

"The people's republic . . . so far from confiscating the national bourgeoisie's industrial and commercial enterprises, . . . will encourage their development. We shall protect every national capitalist who does not support the imperialists or the Chinese traitors. . . . The labour laws of the people's republic will protect the interests of the workers, but will not prevent the national bourgeoisie from making profits or developing their industrial and commercial enterprises, because such development is bad for imperialism and good for the Chinese people".

(Mao Tse-tung: "On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism", in: "Selected Works", Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 169).

"It is not at all surprising but entirely to be expected that a capitalist economy will develop to a certain extent within Chinese society with the swooping away of the obstacles to the development of capitalism after the victory of the revolution, since the purpose of the Chinese revolution at the present stage is to change the existing colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal state of society. . . . A certain degree of capitalist development will be an inevitable result of the victory of the democratic revolution in economically backward China".

Mao Tse-tung: "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party", in: "Selected Works", Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 329).

"The republic will neither confiscate capitalist private property in general nor forbid the development of such capitalist production as does not 'dominate the livelihood of the people', for China's economy is still very backward. . . .

A rich peasant (i.e., rural capitalist -- Ed.,) economy will be allowed in the rural areas."

(Mao Tse-tung: "On New Democracy", in: "Selected Works", Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 353).

"We should not mistakenly carry over the struggle against capitalist ideas within the Party to the field of social economy and oppose the capitalist sector of the economy".

(Mao Tse-tung: Postscript to "Rural Surveys", in: "Selected Works", Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 15).

"Some people suspect that the Chinese Communists are opposed to the development of individual initiative, the growth of private capital and the protection of private property, but they are mistaken. . . . It is the very task of the New Democracy we advocate . . . to guarantee that the people can . . . freely develop such private capitalist economy as will benefit and not 'dominate the livelihood of the people', and to protect all appropriate forms of private property. . . .

The substitution of a certain degree of capitalist development for the oppression of foreign imperialism and domestic feudalism is not only an advance but an unavoidable process. It benefits the proletariat as well as the bourgeoisie, and the former perhaps more. . . . Indeed, we have too little of capitalism. . . . Under the state system of new democracy in China it will be necessary in the interests of social progress to facilitate the development of the private capitalist sector of the economy."

(Mao Tse-tung: "On Coalition Government", in: "Selected Works", Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 281, 283).

"In view of China's economic backwardness, even after the country-wide victory of the revolution, it will still be necessary to permit the existence for a long time of a capitalist sector of the economy. . . . This capitalist sector will still be an indispensable part of the whole national economy".

(Mao Tse-tung: "The Present Situation and our Tasks", in: "Selected Works", Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 168).

"At present the 'Left' deviations consist chiefly in encroaching on the interests of. . . the national bourgeoisie".

(Mao Tse-tung: "A Circular on the Situation", in: "Selected Works", Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 219).

"Because China's economy is still backward, there will be need, for a fairly long period after the victory of the revolution, to make use of the positive qualities of urban and rural private capitalism as far as possible, in the interest of developing the national economy. In this period, all capitalist elements in the cities and countryside which are not harmful but beneficial to the national economy should be allowed to exist and expand. This is not only unavoidable but also economically necessary".

(Mao Tse-tung: Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, in: "Selected Works", Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 367-8).

Thus, the socialist revolution became, for the faction headed by Mao Tse-tung, something for the far-distant future, not even to be seriously discussed at the present time:

"In the future the democratic revolution will inevitably be transformed into a socialist revolution. As to when the transition will take place, that will depend on the presence of the necessary conditions, and it may take quite a long time. We should not hold forth about transition until all the necessary political and economic conditions are present. . . Compared with Russia, China will find it more difficult, and require much more time and effort, to complete her democratic revolution politically and economically".

(Mao Tse-tung: "On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism", in: "Selected Works", Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 170).

In order "to win back the national capitalist class to the national-democratic revolution", therefore, the faction headed by Mao Tse-tung, in flagrant violation of Marxist-Leninist principles with regard to the revolutionary process in colonial-type countries, promised the national capitalists that between the national-democratic revolution, (as led by the faction headed by Mao Tse-tung), and the Socialist Revolution, there would be for a "long and indefinite period, a 'Chinese Wall', of capitalism."

On the adoption of this policy the faction headed by Mao Tse-tung became a revisionist faction, and the Communist Party of China after its domination by the faction headed by Mao Tse-tung, became a revisionist party objectively serving the interests, not of the Chinese working class, but of the Chinese national capitalist class.

The "New Democratic State"

The faction headed by Mao Tse-tung also assured the national capitalist class that the state to be set up after the victory of a national-democratic revolution carried out in accordance with "The Thought of Mao Tse-tung" would be, not the democratic dictatorship of the working class and peasantry called for by Marxist-Leninist principles, but a "new democratic state" in which representatives of the national capitalist class would play a prominent role:

"What will be the composition of the new democratic republic? It will consist of the proletariat, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and all those in the country who agree with the national and democratic revolution; it will be the alliance of those classes in the national and democratic revolution. The salient feature here is the inclusion of the bourgeoisie. . .

It was correct to put forward the slogan of a workers' and peasants' democratic republic in the past, and it is correct to drop it today".

(Mao Tse-tung: "The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan", in: "Selected Works", Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 271-2).

"Our government represents not only the workers and peasants but the whole nation. . . The present situation requires us to change our slogan into one of a people's republic. The reason is that . . . it is now possible not only for the petty bourgeoisie but even for the national bourgeoisie to join the anti-Japanese struggle".

(Mao Tse-tung: "On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism", in: "Selected Works", Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 168).

"In people's representative conferences at various levels we must, wherever possible, include representatives of all democratic strata -- workers, peasants, independent craftsmen, professionals,

intelloctuals, national bourgeois industrialists and merchants and onlightened gentry".

(Mao Tse-tung: Speech at a Conference of Cadres in the Shansi-Suitan Liberated Area", in: "Selected Works", Volume 4; Peking; p. 231).

"Who are the people? At the present stage in China, they are the working class, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. These classes . unite to form their own state". (Mao Tse-tung: "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship", in: "Selected Works", Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 417).

This state will "adjust the interests of labour and capital" so as to guarantee "legitimate profits" to the capitalists:

"The policy of adjusting the interests of labour and capital will be adopted under the new-democratic state system. On the one hand, it will protect the interests of the workers. .; on the other hand, it will guarantee legitimate profits to properly managed state, private and cooperative enterprises -- so that both the public and the private sectors and both labour and capital will work together to develop industrial production."

(Mao Tse-tung: "On Coalition Government", in: "Selected Works", Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 304).

Any conception that the "new democratic state" should favour the welfare of the working class at the expense of the profits of the capitalist class must be opposed as a harmful, one-sided "leftist deviation" from "The Thought of Mao Tse-tung":

"A sharp distinction should also be made between the correct policy of developing production, promoting economic prosperity, giving consideration to both public and private interests and benefitting both labour and capital, and the one-sided and narrow-minded policy of 'relief' which purports to uphold the workers' welfare but in fact damages industry and commerce and impairs the cause of the people's revolution".

(Mao Tse-tung: "On the Policy concerning Industry and Commerce", in: "Selected Works", Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 202).

"At present the 'Left' deviations consist chiefly in . . . laying one-sided stress in the labour movement on the immediate interests of the workers".

(Mao Tse-tung: "A Circular on the Situation", in: "Selected Works", Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 219).

The result of rejection of such "leftist deviations" from "The Thought of Mao Tse-tung" is seen in the real wage position of the Chinese workers:

"Wages rise more slowly than labour productivity. . .

Between 1953 and 1955 labour productivity in various branches of industry rose by 41.8% but the real wages of the workers rose by a mere 6.9%".

(Liu Tzu-chiu: "Wage Reform in China", in: "People's China", October 16th, 1956; p. 13).

True, the workers will be encouraged to take part -- along the lines of contemporary "industrial democracy" -- in joint production committees with the representatives of the capitalist class, but their aim will be to "reduce costs, increase output and stimulate sales":

"Under the local government's leadership, workers and capitalists should be led to organise joint committees for the management of production and to do everything possible to reduce costs, increase output and stimulate sales so as to attain the objectives of giving consideration to both public and private interests, benefitting both labour and capital".

(Mao Tse-tung: "On the Policy Concerning Industry and Commerce", in: "Selected Works", Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 203).

It is true that it is said that leadership in the "new democratic state" will be in the hands, not of the national capitalist class but of the working class:

"The people's democratic dictatorship needs the leadership of the working class. . .

The national bourgeoisie cannot be the leader of the revolution, nor should it have the chief role in state power".

(Mao Tse-tung: "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship", in: "Selected Works", Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 421).

But one must ask if this is more demagogic propaganda designed to deceive the workers or whether it was intended that the working class should play in reality the leading role in the "new democratic" state. This will be discussed in the next section.

It was envisaged that the "new democratic" state would remain basically unchanged for "several decades":

"Our general programme of New Democracy will remain unchanged throughout the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, that is, for several decades".

(Mao Tse-tung: "On Coalition Government", in: "Selected Works", Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 285).

It remains to note that by 1957 the "new democratic" state -- in which the national capitalist class at least played a prominent role -- was being described as "the equivalent of the dictatorship of the working class":

"The people's democratic dictatorship in China is in essence the dictatorship of the proletariat".

(Shen Chih-yuan: "Long-Term Coexistence and Mutual Supervision of Parties", in: "People's China", March 16th, 1957; p. 6).

"The dictatorship of the proletariat in our country rests on firm foundations and our socialist state power is unshakable".

(Chou En-lai: Report on the Work of the Government, in: "Main Documents of the Third National Congress of the People's Republic of China"; Peking; 1965; p. 26).

Mao And The Hegemony of the Working Class

In opposition to the Marxist-Leninist strategy and tactics of the national-democratic revolution, which call for the working class to strive to gain the leading role in that revolution, in his earlier writings Mao Tse-tung blatantly favoured the leading role being taken by the merchants:

"The national revolution . . . is the task of the people as a whole . . . But because of historical necessity and current tendencies, the work for which the merchants should be responsible

in the national revolution is both more urgent and more important than the work that the rest of the people should take upon themselves. . .

The broader the organisation of merchants, the greater will be their influence, the greater will be their ability to lead the people of the whole country, and the more rapid the success of the revolution."

(Mao Tse-tung: "The Peking 'Coup d'Etat' and the Merchants", in: "Hsiang-tao chou-pao" (Guido Weekly), No. 31-2; July 11th, 1923; p. 233-4).

This article does not appear in "Selected Works".

In 1926 Mao allotted the working class only a "major" role in the national-democratic revolution:

"Though not very numerous, the industrial proletariat has become a major force in the national revolutionary movement".

(Mao Tse-tung: "Analysis of the Various Classes in Chinese Society"; in: "Chung-kuo nung-min" 'The Chinese Peasant', Volume 1, No. 2; February 1st, 1926).

In the revised version published in "Selected Works" the words "a major force" have been amended to "the leading force", the sentence has been amplified and a second reference to the working class as "the leading force" in the revolution has been inserted in a later paragraph:

"Though not very numerous, the industrial proletariat represents China's new productive forces, is the most progressive class in modern China and has become the leading force in the revolutionary movement. . .

"The leading force in our revolution is the industrial proletariat".

(Mao Tse-tung: "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society", in: "Selected Works", Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 18, 19).

Later, therefore, Mao put forward in words the Marxist-Leninist principle that the national-democratic revolution, and the state established after the victory of that revolution, should be under the leadership of the working class:

"Who are the people? At the present stage in China, they are the working class, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. These classes, led by the working class and the Communist Party, unite to form their own state. . .

The people's democratic dictatorship needs the leadership of the working class . . . The national bourgeoisie cannot be the leader of the revolution and should not have the chief role in state power".

(Mao Tse-tung: "On People's Democratic Dictatorship", in: "Selected Works", Volume 4; Peking; 1965; p. 417, 421).

But the practice of the faction headed by Mao Tse-tung corresponded with Mao's words at the time in rejecting the leading role of the working class in the national-democratic revolution.

In opposition to the Marxist-Leninist strategy and tactics of national-democratic revolution in a colonial-type country, which require the working class to win the leadership of the revolution from the national capitalist class by class struggle against the latter class, the faction headed by Mao Tse-tung maintained that the class struggle must be subordinated to "the national struggle", i.o., to the maintenance of the national united front:

"To subordinate the class struggle to the present national struggle against Japan -- such is the fundamental principle of the united front."

(Mao Tse-tung: "The Question of Independence and Initiative within the United Front", in: "Selected Works", Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 215).

"The interests of the class struggle must be subordinated to, and must not conflict with, the interests of the War of Resistance. . . We do not deny the class struggle, we adjust it. . . Unity against Japan requires an appropriate policy of adjustment in class relations, a policy which does not leave the labouring people without political and material safeguards but also gives consideration to the interests of the rich, thereby meeting the demands of solidarity against the enemy".
(Mao Tse-tung: "The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War", in: "Selected Works", Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 200-1).

The faction headed by Mao Tse-tung sought, in fact, to damp down the class struggle of the working class against the national capitalist class:

"As for mass work in the cities during that period, the principal policies should have been those advocated by Comrade Liu Shao-chi, the exponent of the correct line for work in the White areas, namely, to act chiefly in the defensive (and not on the offensive). . .

Comrade Liu Shao-chi's ideas on tactics for work in the White areas are likewise a model. . . Comrade Liu Shao-chi advocated systematic organisation of our retreat and defence".
(Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party, in: Mao Tse-tung: "Selected Works", Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 198, 202).

In its fully developed form, far from upholding the hegemony of the working class in the national-democratic revolution in a colonial-type country, the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung" envisages the urban working class playing a more or less passive role in this revolution. It puts forward for all colonial-type countries the perspective of the national-democratic revolution taking the form of "the encirclement of the towns from the countryside":

"Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of . . . the encirclement of the cities from the countryside is of outstanding and universal practical importance for the present revolutionary struggles of all the oppressed nations and peoples, and particularly for the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America against imperialism and its lackeys".

(Lin Biao: "Long Live the Victory of People's War!"; Peking; 1965; p. 47-8).

And the army which is to bring about this encirclement and "liberation" of the towns, i.e., of the urban working class, is to be composed, in its overwhelming majority, of peasants and "lumpen" elements.

"'Lumpen' elements form the majority of the Red Army soldiers".

(Mao Tse-tung: Chung-kuo kung-chan-tang hung-chun ti-ssu-chun ti-chiu-tzu tai-piao ta-hui chueh-i-an i-chiu-orh-chiu nien, shih-orh yueh, Min-hsi, Ku-tien hui (Resolutions for the Ninth Conference of Delegates from the Chinese Communist Fourth Red Army, December 1929, Western Fukien, Ku-tien Conference); Hong Kong; 1949; p. 10-11).

"The soldiers of peasant or working class origin in the Fourth Army in the border area constitute an extreme minority". (Mao Tse-tung: Report to Central Committee, Communist Party of China, November 25th, 1928, in: "Hsuan Chi (hsu-pien)" (Selected Works (Supplement)); n.p.; 1947; p. 62-7.

Peasants, in fact, comprised the great majority even of the Communist Party members in the Chinese Red Army:

"There are various non-proletarian ideas in the Communist Party organisation in the Fourth Red Army. . . . The source of such incorrect ideas in this Party organisation lies, of course, in the fact that its basic units are composed largely of peasants and other elements of petty-bourgeois origin".

(Mao Tse-tung: "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party", in: "Selected Works", Volume 1; Peking; 1965; p. 105).

This anti-Marxist-Leninist conception of the "encirclement and liberation of the town by the countryside" was later extended from individual colonial-type countries to the world as a whole.

Marxist-Leninists see the struggle of the working class in the developed capitalist countries as the primary aspect of the struggle for the world revolutionary overthrow of imperialism; they see the struggle of the masses of the colonial-type countries as an important but secondary aspect of the struggle for the world revolutionary overthrow of imperialism; and they recognise, of course, the vital importance of the organised combination of these primary and secondary struggles:

"The colonial countries constitute the principal rear of imperialism. The revolutionisation of this rear is bound to undermine imperialism not only in the sense that imperialism will be deprived of its rear, but also in the sense that the revolutionisation of the East is bound to give a powerful impulse to the intensification of the revolutionary crisis in the West. Attacked on two sides -- in the rear as well as in the front -- imperialism will be forced to admit that it is doomed".

(J. V. Stalin: "The Revolutionary Movement in the East", in: "Works", Volume 7; Moscow; 1954; p. 235-6)

"If Europe and America may be called the front or the arena of the major battles between socialism and imperialism, the unequal nations and the colonies, with their raw materials, fuel, food and vast store of man-power, must be regarded as the rear, the reserve of imperialism. To win a war it is necessary

not only to triumph at the front, but also to revolutionise the enemy's rear, his reserves. Hence, the victory of the world proletarian revolution may be regarded as assured only if the proletariat is able to combine its own revolutionary struggle with the liberation movement of the labouring masses of the unequal nations and the colonies against the rule of the imperialists and for the dictatorship of the proletariat". (J. V. Stalin: "Concerning the Presentation of the National Question", in: "Works", Volume 5; Moscow; 1953; p. 57).

The revisionist "Thought of Mao Tse-tung", on the other hand, virtually negates the role of the struggle of the working class of the developed countries in the world revolutionary overthrow of imperialism, and presents the picture of this latter being achieved as a result of "the encirclement of the urban areas of the world (the developed capitalist countries) by the rural areas of the world (the national liberation struggles in the colonial-type countries)":

"Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europe can be called 'the cities of the world', then Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute 'the rural areas of the world'. Since World War II, the proletarian revolutionary movement has for various reasons been temporarily held back in the North American and West European capitalist countries, while the people's revolutionary movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America has been growing vigorously. In a sense, the contemporary world situation also presents a picture of the encirclement of cities by the rural areas. In the final analysis, the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggles of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples who make up the overwhelming majority of the world's population". (Lin Piao: *ibid.*; p. 48-9).

Mao and the Leadership of the Communist Party

After Mao Tse-tung had begun to talk of the necessity of "the hegemony of the working class" in the "national-democratic revolution" and in the "new democratic state" to be set up after the victory of that revolution, the term was used to mean "the leading role of the Communist Party", defined as "the party of the working class":

"How does the proletariat give political leadership through its party to all the revolutionary classes in the country?" (Mao Tse-tung: "The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan", in: "Selected Works", Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 274).

"To sum up our experience and concentrate it into one point, it is: the people's democratic dictatorship under the leadership of the working class (through the Communist Party)." (Mao Tse-tung: "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship", in: "Selected Works", Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 422).

But even Mao's conception of "the leading role of the Communist Party" is a late formulation. In 1938 Mao was still telling the Central Committee of the Communist Party that the Kuomintang should play the leading role in the "national-democratic revolution":

"The Kuomintang and the Communist Party are the foundations of the Anti-Japanese United Front, but of these two it is the Kuomintang that occupies first place. Without the Kuomintang it would be inconceivable to undertake and pursue the War of Resistance. . .

Today it is once more leading the great anti-Japanese war. . . It has had two great leaders in succession -- Mr. Sun Yat-sen and Mr. Chiang Kai-shek".
(Mao Tse-tung: Report to 6th. Plenum, Central Committee, Communist Party of China, in: "Lun hsien chieh-tuan" (On the New Stage"; Yenan; 1939).

But by 1935 the Communist Party of China was no longer "the party of the working class", either in composition:

"At the time of the Sixth Congress, the proletariat still constituted ten per cent of the Party membership. Now their proportions have been reduced to three per cent".
(Chou En-lai: "Mu-chien chung-kuo tang ti tsu-chih wen-ti" (Organisational Problems of the Chinese Party at the Present Time); Shanghai; 1929; p.2).

or in policy -- with its adoption of the revisionist "Thought of Mao Tse-tung" it became, objectively, a political instrument of the national capitalist class.

Despite the later formulations of Mao, therefore, the leadership of the national-democratic revolution and of the new-democratic state by the Communist Party signified -- especially when taken into consideration with the policies of subordinating class struggle to the needs of national unity, of damping down the class struggle of the working class, of encircling the towns from the countryside by an army composed overwhelmingly of peasants (i.e., of rural petty bourgeois) -- not the hegemony of the working class but the hegemony of the national capitalist class.

The Communist Party, under its revisionist leadership, certainly played the leading role in the "national-democratic revolution", but the formula which spoke of the leading role of the Communist Party in the "new-democratic" state was negated at least in part by the fact that government in this state was to be a "joint dictatorship" of several parties, and that these other parties would exert "supervision" over the Communist Party (while the Communist Party would "supervise" them) on a basis of equality:

"We stand for joint dictatorship of all political parties and groups".
(Mao Tse-tung: "Unity to the Very End", in: "Selected Works", Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 438).

"It is the desire of the Communist Party, also its policy, to exist side by side with the democratic parties for a long time to come. . .

Mutual supervision among the various parties has also been a long-established fact. . . Mutual supervision, which is obviously not a one-sided affair, means that the Communist Party should exercise supervision over the democratic parties, and that the democratic parties should exercise supervision over the Communist Party".

(Mao Tse-tung: "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions

among the People"; Peking; 1964; p.44).

"Leadership by the Communist Party does not detract from the status of equality, nor from the function of supervision exercised by the other democratic parties".

(Shen Chih-yuan: "Long Term Co-Existence and Mutual Supervision of Parties", in: "People's China", March 16th, 1957; p. 7-8).

It is of interest that, of the 662 delegates to the Chinese People's Consultative Conference in September 1949, which established the "new-democratic" state of the People's Republic of China, 16 were delegates from the Communist Party.

(Liao Kai-lung: "From Yanan to Peking"; Peking; 1954; p. 112).

Mao and the "Enlightened Gentry"

As has been said, the Chinese Revolution was aimed, in the first place, at the foreign imperialists, the Chinese landlord class and the comprador capitalist class:

"The chief targets or enemies at this stage of the Chinese revolution . . . are . . . the bourgeoisie of the imperialist countries and the landlord class of our country. . .

The comprador big bourgeoisie is a class which directly serves the capitalists of the imperialist countries and is nurtured by them; countless ties link it closely with the feudal forces in the countryside. Therefore, it is a target of the Chinese revolution."

(Mao Tse-tung: "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party", in: "Selected Works", Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p.315, 320)

Following the seizure of the leadership of the Communist Party of China in 1935, however, the faction headed by Mao Tse-tung declared that "the national-democratic revolution" in China should now be directed solely against "the main target", namely, Japanese imperialism and those sections of the landlord and comprador capitalist classes dependent upon Japanese imperialism:

"Without a proper estimate of the strong and weak points of the Japanese and Chinese counter-revolutionary forces and of the Chinese revolutionary forces, we shall be unable to understand the necessity of organising a broad revolutionary national united front . . . to strike at our main target, namely, Japanese imperialism and its running dogs, the Chinese traitors, . . . but instead we shall aim at a variety of targets so that our bullets will hit not the principal enemy but our lesser enemies or even our allies".

(Mao Tse-tung: "On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism", in: "Selected Works", Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 164).

Therefore, the Communist Party must not merely take advantage of the contradictions between Japanese imperialism and its Chinese dependents on the one hand, and other imperialist powers and their Chinese dependents on the other hand, but must strive to build a "national united front" which includes those sections of the Chinese landlord and comprador capitalist classes which are dependent upon imperialist powers which are in contradiction with Japanese imperialism:

"The pro-Japanese big landlords and big bourgeoisie who

are against resistance must be distinguished from the pro-British and pro-American big landlords and big bourgeoisie who are for resistance",
(Mao Tse-tung: "On Policy", in: "Selected Works", Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 443).

"When the struggle is directed against Japanese imperialism, then the running dogs of the United States or Britain, obeying the varying tones of their masters' commands, may engage in veiled or even open strife with the Japanese imperialists and their running dogs. . . We must turn to good account all such fights, rifts and contradictions in the enemy camp and turn them against our present main enemy."
(Mao Tse-tung: "On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism", in: "Selected Works", Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 158, 159).

"The education which our Party conducts among its own members and the people in general likewise . . . teaches the proletariat and the peasantry and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie how to unite, in different ways, with the different strata of the bourgeoisie and landlord class for resistance to Japan".
(Mao Tse-tung: "Conclusions on the Repulse of the Second Anti-Communist Onslaught", in: "Selected Works", Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 467).

"Formerly, the Party's tactical line was to oppose the landlords and the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie; now it is to unite with all those landlords and members of the bourgeoisie who are not against resisting Japan.
(Mao Tse-tung: Postscript to "Rural Surveys", in: "Selected Works", Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 14).

"Only by establishing the broadest anti-Japanese national united front . . . can we defeat Japanese imperialism and its running dog, Chiang Kai-shok".
(CC of CPC: Resolution on the Present Political Situation and the Tasks of the Party, cited in: Mao Tse-tung: "Selected Works", Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 277).

Those sections of the comprador capitalist class which, being dependent upon US and European imperialism, were prepared to participate in the reorientated "national-democratic revolution", i.e. the war against Japanese imperialism, were now reclassified by the faction headed by Mao Tse-tung as belonging to the "national capitalist class". Those sections of the landlord class in this position were now reclassified as "enlightened gentry".

The Marxist-Leninist strategy and tactics of national-democratic revolution in a colonial-type country require the mobilisation of the peasantry in a class struggle -- an agrarian, revolutionary struggle -- against the landlord class. In opposition to this Marxist-Leninist strategy and tactics, the faction headed by Mao Tse-tung, in order to win a section of the landlord class -- the anti-Japanese "enlightened gentry" -- to the national united front, sought to damp down the class struggle of the peasantry against the landlord class and to protect the land of the landlords from confiscation by the land-hungry peasants, assuring the landlords that, "if no special obstacle arises", this policy would be continued after the victory of the "national-democratic revolution" led by the faction headed by Mao Tse-tung:

"It must be explained to Party members and to the peasants that this is not the time for a thorough agrarian revolution and that the series of measures taken during the Agrarian Revolution cannot be applied today . . . Our present policy should stipulate that the landlords shall reduce rent and interest, for this serves to arouse the enthusiasm of the basic peasant masses for resistance to Japan, but the reductions should not be too great. In general, land rent should be reduced by 25 per cent, and if the masses demand a greater reduction, the tenant-farmer may keep up to 60 or 70 per cent of his crop, but not more. . . Our policy should stipulate that the peasants shall pay rent and interest and that the landlords shall retain their ownership of land and other property. Interest should not be so low as to make it impossible for the peasants to obtain loans".

(Mao Tse-tung: "On Policy", in: "Selected Works", Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 446).

"The Communist Party has made a major concession in the anti-Japanese war period by changing the policy of 'land to the tiller' to one of reducing rent and interest. . . If no special obstacle arises, we are prepared to continue this policy after the war".

(Mao Tse-tung: "On Coalition Government", in: "Selected Works", Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 298).

"The confiscation of the land of the landlords will be discontinued".

(Mao Tse-tung: "The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan", in: "Selected Works", Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 269).

Further, Mao Tse-tung assured the anti-Japanese landlords -- the "enlightened gentry" -- that they would be granted a prominent place in the "new democratic" state to be set up after the victory of a "national-democratic revolution" led by the faction headed by Mao Tse-tung:

"Then there are the enlightened gentry who are the left-wing of the landlord class, . . . whose political attitude is roughly the same as that of the middle (i.o., national -- Ed.) bourgeoisie . . . Our policy must be to win them over.

. . .

It is possible for . . . the enlightened gentry to join us in the common fight against Japan and also in the setting up of anti-Japanese democratic political power".

(Mao Tse-tung: "Current Problems of Tactics in the Anti-Japanese United Front", in: "Selected Works", Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 423, 424).

"On the question of the enlightened gentry. . . Those who are fairly good politically and are competent should remain in the higher government bodies and be given appropriate work".

(Mao Tse-tung: "On Some Important Problems of the Party's Present Policy", in: "Selected Works", Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 184).

"We should not abandon the enlightened gentry who cooperated with us in the past and continue to cooperate with us at present. . .

"Therefore, attention must also be paid to the question of uniting with them".

(Mao Tse-tung: "On the Question of the National Bourgeoisie and the Enlightened Gentry", in: "Selected Works", Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 207, 210).

"At the present the 'Left' deviations consist chiefly in . . . not wanting the enlightened gentry".

(Mao Tse-tung: "A Circular on the Situation", in: "Selected Works", Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 219).

"In people's representative conferences at various levels, we must, wherever possible, include representatives of . . . enlightened gentry".

(Mao Tse-tung: Speech at a Conference of Cadres in the Shansi-Suiyan Liberated Area, in: "Selected Works", Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 231).

The Role of the Kuomintang

As the Communist Party of China, led by the faction headed by Mao Tse-tung, came to represent the interests of the national capitalists and of those sections of the landlord and comprador capitalist classes dependant upon US and European imperialism and as a result in contradiction with Japanese imperialism, so the Kuomintang, headed by Chiang Kai-shek, came to represent the interests of those sections of the landlord and comprador capitalist classes dependent upon Japanese imperialism.

This is clear from the official maoist history of the years 1937 to 1945:

"One force, that of the big landlords and bourgeoisie, was headed by the Four Big Families. It . . . took a line of passive resistance, repressing the people and prepared for compromise with Japan. . .

Because of the anti-popular line of the Chiang Kai-shek bloc, which suppressed the people's anti-Japanese movement everywhere and carried on only partial resistance by the armed forces, the Kuomintang troops suffered one reverse after another. . .

In December (1937 - Ed.) Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang began to waver, and through the intermediary of the German ambassador, entered into negotiations with Japan. . .

The Kuomintang forces simply melted away before the advance of the enemy. . .

The Kuomintang forces retreated to the mountainous regions of the south-west, making Chungking their centre. . . These foreign aggressors (i.e., the Japanese imperialists - Ed.) suspended their attacks on the Kuomintang troops in order to divert more than half of their main forces to north and central China to deal with the Eighty Route Army and the New Fourth Army (i.e., the former Red Army -- Ed.). The fighting between the Japanese and the Kuomintang came almost to a standstill, consisting mainly of intermittent skirmishes. . .

The Wang Ching-wei group surrendered to Japanese imperialism in December, 1938, and there was imminent danger that the Chiang Kai-shek clique would soon follow suit. The members of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang and its high-ranking military officers one after another surrendered to the enemy. They did so under the pretext that

they were concerned to 'save the nation by a devious path', and that they were uniting with the enemy for the purpose of opposing the Communists. . .

At this time the greatest obstacle to the capitulationist activities of the Kuomintang was the Communist Party and the anti-Japanese forces led by it. The Kuomintang reactionaries adopted a passive attitude towards the War of Resistance, and acted like spectators placidly watching its outcome. They were actually preparing for surrender and concentrating their main strength against the Communists and the people to that end. . .

During the winter of 1939 and the spring of 1940, the armed forces of the Kuomintang attacked the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and the anti-Japanese democratic bases in Shansi. . .

Chiang Kai-shek, seeking to cooperate with the Japanese invaders for the destruction first of the New Fourth Army and then of the Eighth Route Army, unleashed his second anti-Communist onslaught in October 1940. The following January, eighty thousand Kuomintang troops made a surprise attack on the headquarters of the New Fourth Army in southern Anhwei. . .

Immediately after this slaughter, the Japanese invaders and the troops of their puppet, Wang Ching-wei in Nanking, coordinated with Chiang Kai-shek in launching attacks on detachments of the New Fourth Army. . . Chiang Kai-shek moved large bodies of troops in preparation for another large-scale attack on the Communist-led forces. . .

The anti-Japanese democratic base areas were in dire straits in 1941 and 1942, because of the continued ruthless attacks of the Japanese invaders, their puppet troops and Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary forces. . . The Kuomintang reactionaries even sent large numbers of their troops over to the enemy, to be used as puppet forces, directly cooperating with the Japanese in attacks on the anti-Japanese forces. . .

The Kuomintang launched its third anti-Communist onslaught during June and July of 1943. . . The Kuomintang troops shelled its (i.e., the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region's -- Ed.) defence positions and prepared a nine-pronged attack on Yen-an, the capital city of the border region and the seat of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party." . . (Chien Po-tan, Shao Hsun-cheng & Hu Hua: "Concise History of China"; Peking; 1964; p. 208, 209, 210, 212, 214, 215, 217-18, 219, 221).

A similar picture is drawn in a book officially sponsored by the faction headed by Mao Tse-tung: Israel Epstein's "From Opium War to Liberation";

"For four and a half years after the Japanese attack on China in 1937, Chiang did not declare war on Japan. . .

From early 1939 onwards, Chiang did practically no fighting against the Japanese. He preferred to let them concentrate their forces against the people's armies led by the Communist Party. . .

Following the fall of Franco, he (i.e., Chiang -- Ed.) resumed direct secret touch on the highest level with Japan.

At the height of the war, Tokyo's Foreign Minister Matsuoka spoke to his Nazi counterpart, Von Ribbentrop, of 'Chiang Kai-shek, with whom he was in personal contact, who knew him and trusted him'.

After Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Kuomintang planned a large-scale resumption of civil war. . . Afterwards, some of the leading elements of the Kuomintang intended to adhere to the Axis. . .

In 1942-43 Japan gained a series of big victories over the Anglo-American forces in the Pacific. Chiang Kai-shek's government at once resumed undercover contact with Tokyo, using open traitors as well as the Nazi Walter Stennes. At one point it actually allowed an important Japanese secret service official, Kuroda, to reside under its protection in China's wartime capital, Chungking.

In this phase Chiang Kai-shek ordered 57 of his generals to go over to the Japanese with 500,000 troops so that, paid and equipped by Japan, they could fight against the Communist-led armies in North and Central China. In the next phase, 1944-45, . . Chiang put up no defence. Instead he used all the arms he had obtained from the United States, and his crack units trained by American officers, to blockade and in some cases attack areas held by the people's forces. To the Japanese fronts he sent not fighting troops but negotiators.

Every one of these facts has since been thoroughly documented, exposed and proved. Many, indeed, were made known at the time, not only by indignant Chinese patriots but also by some American officers and diplomats, among them General Stilwell, supreme commander of the US forces until removed in 1944." (I. Epstein: "From Opium War to Liberation"; Peking; 1964; p. 157, 158-59).

The United States imperialists had been informed by their intelligence service that the Kuomintang, headed by Chiang Kai-shek, were objectively assisting Japanese imperialism:

"After the United States entered the war and American military aid was extended to China, Chungking's unwillingness to commit its best armies to fight the Japanese became even more apparent. . . American officials in China repeatedly complained in their reports about the Chinese Government's lack of interest in supporting the American war effort in China, and emphasised that Chinese troops 'that could be used for the protection of our air bases are stationed elsewhere to blockade Chinese Communist areas'".

(Military Intelligence Division, US War Department: "The Chinese Communist Movement", in: US Senate Committee on the Judiciary: "Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings before the Sub-Committee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Security Laws", Part 7a, Appendix 2; Washington; 1952; p. 2355).

With the defeat and occupation of Japan by the forces of US imperialism, those sections of the Chinese landlord and comprador capitalist classes which had been dependent upon Japanese imperialism transferred their dependence to US imperialism. Thus, the Kuomintang, headed by Chiang Kai-shek, became a political instrument of US imperialism within China.

But the Communist Party of China also represented the interests, not only of the national capitalist class, but also of those sections of the landlord and comprador capitalist classes which had been dependent upon US imperialism from the outset.

The interests of the US imperialists were, therefore, in 1945 represented, in diluted form, by the revisionist Communist Party of China as well as by the (now) puppet Kuomintang. Washington therefore strove to bring about the formation of a coalition government embracing both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, with their direct puppet playing the dominant role:

"The Communists (in China -- Ed.) are not in fact Communists, they are striving for democratic principles". (W.A. Harriman (U.S. Ambassador to China) cited in: "United States Relations with China" (White Paper); Dept. of State Publications 3573, Far Eastern Series 30; Washington; 1949; p. 86).

"The President and the Secretary of State are both anxious that the unification of China by peaceful, democratic methods shall be achieved as soon as possible. . .

We believe . . . that the government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shok affords the most satisfactory base for developing democracy. But we also believe that it must be broadened to include the representatives of those large and well-organized groups who are now without any voice in the government of China".

(James F. Byrnes (US Secretary of State): Memorandum of December 10th, 1945, cited in: *ibid.*; p. 606-7).

"The United States is cognizant that the present National Government of China is a 'one-party government' and believes that peace, unity and democratic reform in China will be furthered if the basis of this Government is broadened to include other political elements in the country". (Harry S. Truman (US President): Statement on United States Policy toward China, December 15th, 1945, cited in: *ibid.*; p. 607-8).

"My concept was that the Communists would come into the Government on a minority basis"

(John Carter Vincent, Director of the Far Eastern Office of the US State Department, cited in: Institute of Pacific Relations: "Report of the Committee on the Judiciary", Report No. 2050, Part 6; Washington; 1952; p. 203).

The national capitalist class and those sections of the landlord and comprador capitalist classes which had supported US imperialism from the outset -- i.o., the class forces represented by the revisionist Communist Party -- refused to accept a minority position in the Government of the "now-democratic" state. The US imperialists, therefore, backed the armed force of their direct puppet, the Kuomintang, in a civil war against the armed force of the Communist Party.

The civil war ended with the victory of the armed force controlled by the Communist Party, and the driving of the armed force of the Kuomintang from the mainland to the island of

Taiwan (Formosa) where they established a "Republic of China" dependent upon US imperialism.

The Character of the People's Republic

The victory of the "national-democratic revolution" (as distorted by the faction headed by Mao Tse-tung into the anti-Japanese national war) resulted in the establishment on the mainland of China in September 1949 of the People's Republic of China.

This state was not one of the dictatorship of the working class and the peasantry (as called for by Marxist-Leninist strategy and tactics in the case of a national-democratic revolution in a colonial-type country carried out under the hegemony of the working class). Nor was it a dictatorship of the national capitalist class.

THE "NEW-DEMOCRATIC" STATE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA WAS A JOINT DICTATORSHIP OF THE NATIONAL CAPITALIST CLASS AND THOSE SECTIONS OF THE LANDLORD AND COMPRADOR CAPITALIST CLASSES WHICH HAD BEEN FROM THE OUTSET DEPENDENT UPON US IMPERIALISM.

Because the landlords and comprador capitalists represented in this class alliance formed only a part of these classes (the rest having their interests represented by the Kuomintang which ruled Taiwan), because the national capitalists were able under the "new democratic" state to advance their economic position relatively rapidly, because the national capitalist class took steps to win the support of the working class and peasantry to complete the national-democratic revolution, a process which was objectively assisted by the hostility of the US imperialists (hostility which reached its peak in the Korean War of 1950-53 when US and Chinese "volunteer" forces were engaged in armed conflict), on whom the section of the landlord and comprador capitalist classes represented in the PRC were dependent, THE LEADING ROLE IN THE CLASS ALLIANCE WHICH RULED THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA WAS SPEEDILY TAKEN BY THE NATIONAL CAPITALIST CLASS.

As a result of this, in the early years of the PRC the national capitalist class was able to advance the national-democratic revolution, was able to make considerable inroads into the wealth and power of the landlord and comprador capitalist classes.

The Transformation of the Landlords

One of the first acts of the "new-democratic" state, under the leadership of the national capitalist class, was to complete the land reform begun in the liberated areas before the establishment of the People's Republic. Under this reform the land of the landlord class was confiscated and distributed among the poor and landless peasantry.

This land reform, a major economic measure of the national-democratic revolution, was fully in line with the economic needs of the national capitalist class, as Mao himself says:

"The national bourgeoisie . . . approve of 'land to the tiller' because they need markets".
(Mao Tse-tung: "On Coalition Government", in: "Selected Works", Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 298).

However, while the landlords were liquidated as landlords, they were not liquidated as exploiters, being encouraged to transform themselves into "national capitalists" engaged in industry and commerce:

"Industrial and commercial enterprises run by landlords and the land and other properties used directly by landlords for the operation of industrial and commercial enterprises shall not be confiscated".

(Agrarian Reform Law of June 28th, 1950, cited in: "People's China": (Supplement), July 16th, 1950; p.3.)

Furthermore, those landlords who had supported the anti-Japanese war because of their dependence from the outset on US imperialism -- the "enlightened gentry" -- were given special "consideration politically and economically", being drawn into responsible positions in the "new-democratic" state apparatus and in social organisations:

"The enlightened gentry are certain individuals of the landlord class, who have opposed Chiang Kai-shok's reactionary regime and who have rendered positive help to the cause of the people's democracy. . . Although their landholdings and other properties should be dealt with in accordance with the Agrarian Reform Law and other laws and decrees concerned, the enlightened gentry should be given consideration both politically and economically, and should be drawn in to participate in the work of agrarian reform, people's government or people's organisations".
("Some New Decisions adopted by the Government Administration Council", cited in: "People's China" (Supplement), October 16th, 1950; p. 15).

The land owned by rich peasants (i.e. rural capitalists) was exempted from the land reform:

"Land owned by rich peasants and cultivated by them or by hired labour, and their other properties, shall be protected from infringement".

(Agrarian Reform Law of June 28th, 1950, cited in: "People's China", (Supplement), July 16th, 1950; p. 3).

Cooperation

Even before the land reform had been completed (at the beginning of 1953) an official campaign was launched designed to bring about agricultural cooperation. Indeed, economic necessity forced this measure since the average landholding after redistribution was only one-third of an acre per peasant household -- and in densely populated eastern China less than one-sixth of an acre.

The agricultural cooperation drive passed through three stages:

The first stage was the organisation of mutual-aid teams, under which the peasants retained individual ownership of their plots of

land, their draught animals their tools and their produce, but pooled their labour and tools in the busy season.

The second stage was inaugurated at the end of 1953 with the drive to form "semi-socialist cooperative farms", in which the peasants retained individual ownership of their plots of land, draught animals and tools but pooled their land for collective use. The collective income was then divided among the cooperative peasants partly in accordance with the amount of land which each owned, partly in accordance with the quantity of work performed. By the summer of 1956 100 million peasant households (comprising 90% of the rural population) had been organised into such cooperative farms.

The third stage was inaugurated in January 1956 with the drive to transform the "semi-socialist cooperative farms" into collective farms. In the collective farm the land, draught animals, etc. was purchased from the individual peasant households by the cooperative farm, the peasant household retaining only a small piece of land for their personal use as a vegetable garden, while the collective income of the farm was divided among its members only according to the work they performed. This third stage was virtually completed by the end of 1957.

Ex-landlords (who had been permitted to retain sufficient of their land for the subsistence of their family) and rich peasants were encouraged to join the collective farms, and most did so:

"The Central Committee of the Communist Party suggested in the draft National Programme for Agricultural Development (1956-67) that, according to the merits of each case, rich peasants and former landlords might be admitted to the agricultural producers' cooperatives to be reeducated. During the great upsurge of agricultural cooperation most of them were brought into the cooperatives".
(Chi An: "Agricultural Cooperation: A Record of Achievement", in: "People's China", October 1st, 1956; p. 13).

The faction headed by Mao Tse-tung presented the collective farms formed within the "new-democratic" state of China as "socialist enterprises":

"The cooperative sector of the economy is . . . socialist when collectively owned by the masses of working people" (Constitution of the People's Republic of China", Article 7, in: Liu Shao-chi: Report on the Draft Constitution of the People's Republic of China; Peking; 1962; p. 67).

But Lenin pointed out that whether a cooperative enterprise is socialist in character depends on whether the state is socialist, represents the dictatorship of the working class:

"Under the capitalist state the cooperatives are collective capitalist institutions. . .

But see how things have changed since political power is in the hands of the working class. . .

Now . . . the mere growth of cooperation . . . is identical with the growth of Socialism".

(V. I. Lenin: "On Cooperation", in: "Selected Works", Volume 9; London 1946; p. 406, 408).

Since the "new-democratic" state of the People's Republic of China was not the dictatorship of the working class, the collective farms in China were not socialist enterprises.

The Transformation of the Comprador Capitalists

With the establishment of the "new-democratic" state of the People's Republic of China, the enterprises belonging to that section of the comprador capitalist class which had been until 1945 dependent upon Japanese imperialism and had had their interests represented by the Kuomintang (that is, the so-called "bureaucrat-capitalists", were nationalised:

"The Central People's Government led the people of the whole country in carrying out a series of reforms. . .

The confiscation of enterprises formerly belonging to the bureaucrat-capitalists who worked hand in glove with the Kuomintang and their conversion into socialist state enterprises."
(Liao Kai-lung: "From Yenan to Peking"; Peking; 1954; p. 156, 157).

"In addition to the publicly-owned enterprises set up in the old revolutionary bases before liberation, the state-owned enterprises now existing in China come from two other main sources: first, there are the enterprises owned by the Kuomintang bureaucratic capitalists and taken over by the state after the victory of the revolution; secondly, there are the enterprises built up by state investment since the birth of the People's Republic of China.

By 'bureaucratic capital' is meant the monopoly capital in the hands of China's upper ruling bureaucratic clique during the days of Kuomintang rule".
(Wang Hua: "The State-owned Economy of New China", in: "People's China", No. 2, 1954; p. 3-4).

These nationalised enterprises were described by the faction headed by Mao Tse-tung as "socialist" enterprises:

"The state sector of the economy is the socialist sector".
(Constitution of the People's Republic of China, Article 6,
in: Liu Shao-chi: Report on the Draft Constitution of the People's Republic of China; Peking; 1962; p. 66).

But, as in the case of cooperative enterprises, a state enterprise is only a socialist enterprise when the state which owns it is a socialist state, when it represents the dictatorship of the working class. Since the "new-democratic" state of the People's Republic of China was not the dictatorship of the working class, the state enterprises in China were not socialist enterprises.

Nevertheless, nationalisation of the enterprises belonging to that section of the comprador capitalist class which had been until 1945 dependent upon Japanese imperialism gave the "new-democratic" state ownership of the majority of the key economic enterprises in the country:

"These state-owned enterprises, owing to their centralisation and the large proportion of China's modern industry which they accounted for, became the strongest and most influential force in shaping the country's economy."
(Liao Kai-lung: "From Yenan to Peking"; Peking; 1954; p. 157).

The enterprises owned by the imperialists other than the Japanese imperialists, and by comprador capitalists dependent upon imperialism other than Japanese imperialism were not nationalised:

"Enterprises financed by foreign capital were allowed to operate provided they abided by the laws and decrees of the Central People's Government".

(Liao Kai-lung: *ibid.*; p. 156).

Even during the Korean War of 1950-53, when US and Chinese armed forces were in actual conflict, US-owned enterprises were only placed under state control and not nationalised:

"When the United States used the Korean War as a pretext to freeze our overseas assets and impose an economic blockade and embargo upon us, our government retaliated with the announcement, on December 28, 1950, that control would be exerted over property belonging to the United States imperialists".

(Liao Kai-lung: *ibid.*; p. 157).

The comprador capitalists who had been dependent from the outset upon US imperialism and who had supported the anti-Japanese war, were, in fact, treated by the "new-democratic" state as "national capitalists".

Mao and the Socialist Revolution

In his work "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People" -- a speech of February 1957 widely republished during the "cultural revolution", Mao begins by saying:

"We are confronted by two types of social contradictions -- contradictions between ourselves and the enemy and contradictions among the people. Those two types of contradiction are totally different in nature".

(Mao Tse-tung: "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People"; Peking; 1964; p. 1-2).

In this respect, he says, what constitutes "the people" varies in different countries, and in the same country in different periods:

"The term 'the people' has different meanings in different countries, and in different historical periods in each country".

(Mao Tse-tung: *ibid.*; p. 2).

He proceeds to analyse what constitutes "the people" at the existing period in China, which he describes as "the stage of building socialism":

"At this stage of building socialism, all classes, strata and social groups which approve, support and work for the cause of socialist construction belong to the category of the people".

(Mao Tse-tung: *ibid.*; p. 2).

Then, in opposition to the Marxist-Leninist thesis that the capitalist class or bourgeoisie represents a social force fundamentally and violently opposed to the building of socialism, he puts forward the revisionist thesis that "in the conditions existing in China"

the capitalist class forms a part of "the people" during the period of the construction of socialism, that is, it forms one of the "classes, strata and social groups which approve, support and work for the cause of socialist construction":

"In the conditions existing in China today what we call contradictions among the people include the following: . . . contradictions between the working class and other sections of the working people on the one hand and the national bourgeoisie on the other. . . .

In our country, the contradictions between the working class and the national bourgeoisie is a contradiction among the people".

(Mao Tse-tung: *ibid.*; p. 3).

Mao develops this revisionist thesis by declaring that "in the period of the socialist revolution", the capitalist class has two sides to its character: the negative side is its social role as a class which exploits the working class, while its positive side is "its willingness to accept" socialism:

"In our country the contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie is a contradiction among the people. . . . This is because of the dual character of the national bourgeoisie in our country. . . . In the period of the socialist revolution, exploitation of the working class to make profits is one side, while support of the Constitution and willingness to accept socialist transformation is the other".

(Mao Tse-tung: *ibid.*; p. 3-4).

In so far as its negative aspect is concerned -- that is, its role as a class which exploits the working class -- the contradiction between the capitalist class and the working class is, Mao says, an antagonistic contradiction:

"The contradiction between exploiter and exploited, which exists between the national bourgeoisie and the working class, is an antagonistic one".

(Mao Tse-tung: *ibid.*; p. 4).

Nevertheless, Mao proceeds, "in the concrete conditions existing in China", where the capitalist class is a class which "approves, supports and works for" socialism, this antagonistic contradiction can, by proper handling, be transformed into a non-antagonistic one:

"In the concrete conditions existing in China, such an antagonistic contradiction, if properly handled, can be transformed into a non-antagonistic one".

(Mao Tse-tung: *ibid.*; p. 4).

This means, Mao says, that, with proper handling, the transition to socialism in China can be brought about peacefully, without the violent opposition of the capitalist class:

"The contradiction between exploiter and exploited, which exists between the national bourgeoisie and the working class, . . . if properly handled, can be . . . resolved in a peaceful way". (Mao Tse-tung: *ibid.*; p. 4).

"By the "correct handling" of the contradiction between the capitalist class and the working class, the "correct handling" which can bring about a "peaceful transition" to socialism, Mao explains that he means

". . . a policy of uniting, criticising and educating the national bourgeoisie". (Mao Tse-tung: *ibid.*; p. 4).

a policy of the

". . . ideological remoulding" (Mao Tse-tung; *ibid.*; p. 28)

of the capitalist class.

Because, he says, the capitalist class and the working class in China both support the construction of socialism, they have a mutual "desire for unity", so that the contradiction between them can be resolved peacefully by the "democratic method" of criticism and argument:

"In 1942 we worked out the formula 'unity-criticism-unity' to describe this democratic method of resolving contradictions among the people. . . : to start from a desire for unity, and thrash out questions of right and wrong through criticism or argument, and so achieve a new unity on a new basis. . . .

After the liberation of the country, we used this same method -- 'unity-criticism-unity' -- in our relations with other democratic parties (i.e., the open parties representing the interests of the exploiting classes -- Ed.) and industrial and commercial circles." (Mao Tse-tung: *ibid.*; p. 9, 10).

An important aspect of the "ideological remoulding" of the capitalist class, Mao says, is to encourage them to undergo "voluntary study"; by this means most capitalists learn from personal experience that it is "good for them" to continue ideologically remoulding themselves:

"Members of the bourgeoisie have already become managerial personnel in joint state-private enterprises and are being transformed from exploiters into working people. . . .

Even when they stop receiving their fixed interest payments and rid themselves of the label 'bourgeoisie', they will still need ideological remoulding for quite some time. . . .

During the past few years, most of them have been willing to study and have made marked progress. Our industrialists and businessmen can be thoroughly remoulded only in the course of work; they should work together with the staff and workers in the enterprises, and make the enterprises the chief centres of remoulding themselves. It is also important for them to change certain of their old views through study. Study for them should be optional. After they have attended study groups

for some weeks, many industrialists and businessmen. . know from personal experience that it is good for them to keep on studying and remoulding themselves"
(Mao Tse-tung: *ibid.*; p. 28, 29).

Mao's concept of the "peaceful transition" to socialism is, of course, the anti-Marxist-Leninist concept of the modern revisionists. And his concept of the capitalist class "peacefully growing" into socialism is that put forward in the late 1920s by the Soviet revisionist Nikolai Bukharin, on whose views Stalin commented:

"The dictatorship of the proletariat is needed for the purpose of waging a relentless struggle against the capitalist elements, for the purpose of suppressing the bourgeoisie and of tearing out capitalism by the roots. But if the capitalists of town and country . . are growing into Socialism, is the dictatorship of the proletariat needed at all? If it is, for the suppression of which class is it needed? . .

Either Marx's theory of the class struggle, or the theory of the capitalists growing into Socialism".
(J. V. Stalin: "The Right Deviation in the CPSU (B.)", in: "Leninism"; London; 1942; p. 254-5).

Mao's "Socialism"

One of the essential features of socialism is that it abolishes the exploitation of man by man. The capitalist class, which lives by exploiting the working class, naturally offers violent resistance to the abolition of exploitation, to the establishment of socialism:

"The capitalist elements do not want to depart from the scene voluntarily; they are resisting and will continue to resist Socialism. . .

There have been no cases in history where dying classes have voluntarily departed from the scene. There have been no cases in history where the dying bourgeoisie has not exerted all its remaining strength to preserve its existence".
(J. V. Stalin: "The Right Deviation in the CPSU (B.)", in: "Leninism"; London; 1942; p. 259).

If, therefore, the Chinese capitalist class, far from "resisting socialism", "approved, supported and worked for the cause of socialism", this is because the "socialism" proposed by the faction headed by Mao Tse-tung was not socialism, in which the exploitation of the working class by the capitalist class is abolished, but some form of capitalism in which the exploitation of the working class by the capitalist class is permitted to continue.

In fact, the programme of "socialist construction" proposed by Mao was the gradual, peaceful transformation of the enterprises owned by the national capitalists into state capitalist enterprises:

"The socialist transformation of capitalist industry and commerce by the state will be gradually realised over a relatively long period of time, through various forms of state capitalism. . .

The aim can be achieved by peaceful struggle".
(Liu Shao-chi: Report on the Draft Constitution of the People's Republic of China; Peking; 1962; p. 26, 27).

The share of the national capitalists in China's economy in 1949-50 was considerable:

"The number of industrial enterprises run by national capital in 1949 was 123,165, employing over 1,640,000 workers and other employees and producing a total value of over 6,800 million yuan in that year. In 1950 the number of commercial establishments, including the vast number of private individual small merchants, was about 4,020,000 . . . and the sales totalled over 18,200 million yuan. . .

In 1949 capitalist industry accounted for 63.3% of the gross output value of the country's industry. In 1950 the total volume of private trade occupied 76.1% and 85% of the country's wholesale and retail trade respectively. . .

China's national capitalists numbered over a million".
(Kuan Ta-tung: "The Socialist Transformation of Capitalist Industry and Commerce in China"; Peking; 1966; p. 24, 28-29).

The principal form of state capitalism adopted in "transforming" the enterprises of the national capitalists was the formation of joint state-private enterprises, in which the state invested in the enterprise and assigned officials to share the management with the capitalists concerned:

"The advanced form of state capitalism in China is called a joint state-private enterprise. This is the principal way through which the transition of capitalist industry and commerce into socialist enterprise is being effected.

A joint state-private enterprise is one in which the state invests and to which it assigns personnel to share in management with the capitalists. . .

At the end of 1956, 99% of the total number of capitalist industrial enterprises as of the beginning of the year came under joint operation. . . In commerce 400,000 private establishments were converted in the same period."

(Kuan Ta-tung: *ibid.*; p. 75, 84).

Under this form of state capitalism, the national capitalists received substantial salaries for their managerial functions:

"Capitalists who stay on the job will naturally receive salaries and positions commensurate with their ability".
(Chou Shu-tung: "Why We Capitalists Welcome Socialism", in: "People's China", March 1st, 1956; p. 13).

They also received 5% interest on their capital investment in the joint state-private enterprises:

"A fixed rate of interest was paid by the state for the total investment of the capitalists in the joint state-private enterprises. Irrespective of locality and trade, the interest was fixed at a rate of 5% per annum. . . Under the fixed interest system, the annual outlay from the state treasury was over 120 million yuan. There were 1,140,000 recipients in all".

(Kuan Ta-tung: *ibid.*; p. 86-87).

As Mao himself admitted, therefore, the national capitalists continued to exploit the working class under state capitalism:

"In joint state-private industrial and commercial enterprises, capitalists still receive a fixed rate of interest, that is to say, exploitation still exists".

(Mao Tse-tung: "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People"; Peking; 1964; p. 15).

The Chinese national capitalists thus not only offered no resistance to this "socialist transformation" of their enterprises, in which the state invested in those enterprises, they welcomed it:

"Why were there increasing numbers of capitalists who petitioned of their own free will to have their enterprises changed over to joint state-private operation? The answer lay in the fact that the superiority of many joint state-private enterprises became more and more obvious in their tremendous development. For example, the Shanghai Steel Works was changed over in 1950. Taking the value of its output in that year as 100, it was . . . 871 in 1954 The statistics of 64 factories in various parts of China which had gone over to joint operation earlier than others revealed that their profits were increasing. Taking their profits in 1950 as 100, it was . . . 306 in 1953. Still another example was the privately-owned Mingshong Steamship Company, the largest of its kind in China. . . . In the few years before 1952, . . . the deficit incurred reached five million yuan per year. . . . Profit was 1,600,000 yuan in the first four months of joint operation . . . and more than 10,000,000 yuan in 1954. . . . The capitalists paraded, with the beating of cymbals and drums, while sending in their petitions for the change-over of their enterprises".

(Kuan Ta-tung: *ibid.*; p. 78-79, 84).

"Between 1953 and 1955 China's capitalists drew dividends and bonuses on this system at an average of 3 to 4% per annum. . . .

Between 1953 and 1955 the silk industry in Shanghai paid out 103,000 yuan in dividends and bonuses. In 1956, when payment of fixed interest to capitalists began, they received 900,000 yuan, over eight times as much as the capitalists received in the three previous years. . . .

Not a few capitalists have a rather high standard of living. They live in big mansions and are proud of their gardens. They have their own cars, servants and chefs".

(Chao Ching-lun: "From Capitalism to Socialism", in: "People's China", February 1st, 1957; p. 6-7, 8).

In 1959 the Chinese government pledged that exploitation of the working class through the payment of high salaries and interest to the capitalist directors would continue at least until 1966:

"In early 1959 the People's Government reaffirmed certain of its policies towards the capitalists. No change would be made in the policy of paying them interest at a rate of 5% per annum for seven years; in the high salaries received by certain capitalists; in the positions assigned to the capitalists by the state".

(Kuan Ta-tung: *ibid.*; p. 107).

Nevertheless, this system of state capitalism, in which the capitalists continued to exploit the working class, was by 1957 being described by the faction headed by Mao Tse-tung as "socialism":

"Socialist relations of production have been established".
(Mao Tse-tung: *ibid.*; p. 16).

"The socialist revolution in the ownership of the means of production was fundamentally completed in 1956".
(Chou En-lai: Report on the Work of the Government, in: "Main Documents of the First Session of the Third National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China"; Peking; 1965; p. 26).

"The State of the Whole People"

"If the capitalists of town and country . . . are growing into Socialism, is the dictatorship of the proletariat needed at all?"
(J. V. Stalin: *ibid.*; p. 254),

asked Stalin.

Mao Tse-tung replies in the negative.

The "new-democratic state", in which (according to the official line) the capitalist class "share power" with the working class, can, according to the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung, build socialism. There is, says Mao, no need for the dictatorship of the working class, for a state in which the working class suppresses the capitalist class, since the capitalist class forms a part of "the people", it supports socialist construction:

"Ours is a people's democratic dictatorship. . .

The aim of this dictatorship is to protect all our people so that they can work in peace and build China into a socialist country. . . Dictatorship does not apply in the ranks of the people. The people cannot possibly exercise dictatorship over themselves; nor should one section of them oppress another section".

(Mao Tse-tung: *ibid.*; p. 4, 5).

Thus, Mao holds that socialism can be built in China under "a state of the whole people", a formulation later concretised by the Soviet revisionists.

The Attitude to Soviet Revisionism

The revisionist leaders of the Communist Party of China naturally welcomed the espousing of open revisionism by their counterparts in the Soviet Union.

In his opening address to the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of China in September 1956, Mao Tse-tung referred in glowing terms to the infamous 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which had been held in February of that year:

"At its 20th Congress held not long ago, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union formulated many correct policies and criticised shortcomings which were found in the Party. It can be confidently asserted that very great developments will follow this in its work".

(Mao Tse-tung: Opening Address, in: "Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China", Volume 1; Peking; 1956).

And on the basis of discussions at enlarged meetings of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, two widely publicised articles were published in "Renmin Ribao" (People's Daily) which put forward the modern revisionist viewpoint on the 20th Congress, on the denunciation of Stalin and on the "rehabilitation" of the Yugoslav revisionists:

"The 20th Congress of the Soviet Union . . . took a series of momentous decisions . . . on the criticism of shortcomings within the Party. . .

The Congress very sharply exposed the prevalence of the cult of the individual which, for a long time in Soviet life, had given rise to many errors in work and had led to ill consequences. . . The Communist Party of the Soviet Union . . . made appalling mistakes, and, what is more, it was Stalin himself, that widely renowned and honoured leader, who made them! . . .

Stalin erroneously exaggerated his own role, and counterposed his individual authority to the collective leadership, and as a result certain of his actions were opposed to fundamental Marxist-Leninist concepts. . .

When any leader of the Party or the state places himself over and above the Party and the masses instead of in their midst, when he alienates himself from the masses, he ceases to have an all-round, penetrating insight into the affairs of state. As long as this was the case, even so outstanding a personality as Stalin could not avoid making unrealistic and erroneous decisions on certain important matters. Stalin failed to draw lessons from isolated, local and temporary mistakes on certain issues and so failed to prevent them from becoming serious mistakes of a nationwide or prolonged nature. During the latter part of his life, Stalin took more and more pleasure in the cult of the individual, and violated the Party's system of democratic centralism and the principle of combining collective leadership with individual responsibility. As a result he made some serious mistakes such as the following: he broadened the scope of the suppression of counter-revolution; he lacked the necessary vigilance on the eve of the anti-fascist war; he failed to pay proper attention to the further development of agriculture and the material welfare of the peasantry; he gave certain wrong advice on the international communist movement, and, in particular, made a wrong decision on the question of Yugoslavia. On these issues, Stalin fell victim to subjectivism and one-sidedness, and divorced himself from objective reality and from the masses. . .

The struggle against the cult of the individual which was launched by the 20th Congress is a great and courageous fight by the Communists and the people of the Soviet Union to clear away the ideological obstacles in the way of their advance. . .

The Chinese Communist Party congratulates the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on its great achievements in this historic struggle against the cult of the individual. . .

Stalin was . . . a Marxist-Leninist who committed gross errors without realising that they were errors. . .

True to the behest of Lenin, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is dealing in a serious way both with certain mistakes of a grave nature committed by Stalin in directing the work of building socialism and with the surviving effects of such mistakes. Because of the seriousness of the effects, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, while affirming the great contribution of Stalin, deemed it necessary to sharply expose the essence of his mistakes, to call upon the whole Party to take them as a warning, and to work resolutely to remove their ill consequences.

We Chinese Communists are firmly convinced that as a result of the sharp criticism made at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, all those positive factors which were previously suppressed as a result of certain mistaken policies will inevitably spring everywhere into life, and the Party and the people of the Soviet Union will become still more firmly united in the struggle to build a great communist society." ("On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat"; Peking, 1956; p. 3, 4, 9-10, 11, 13, 19, 20-21).

"Stalin made some serious mistakes in regard to the domestic and foreign policies of the Soviet Union. His arbitrary method of work impaired to a certain extent the principle of democratic centralism both in the life of the Party and in the state system of the Soviet Union, and disrupted part of the socialist legal system. Because in many fields of work Stalin ostranged himself from the masses to a serious extent, and made personal, arbitrary decisions concerning many important policies, it was inevitable that he should have made grave mistakes. These mistakes stand out most conspicuously in the suppression of counter-revolution and in relations with certain foreign countries. . . He wronged many local communists and honest citizens, and this caused serious losses. . . In relations with brother countries and parties, Stalin . . . showed a tendency towards great-nation chauvinism. . . Sometimes he even intervened mistakenly, with many grave consequences, in the internal affairs of certain brother countries and parties. . .

A series of victories and the eulogies he received in the latter years of his life turned his head. He deviated partly, but grossly, from the dialectical materialist way of thinking and fell into subjectivism. He began to put blind faith in personal wisdom and authority; he would not investigate and study the complicated conditions seriously or listen carefully to the opinions of his comrades and the voice of the masses. As a result, some of the policies and measures he adopted were often at variance with objective reality. He often stubbornly persisted in carrying out these mistaken measures over a long period and was unable to correct his mistakes in time.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has taken measures to correct Stalin's mistakes and eliminate the consequences. These measures are beginning to bear fruit. The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union showed great determination and courage in doing away with the blind faith in Stalin, in exposing the gravity of Stalin's mistakes and in eliminating their effects. . . Stalin committed some grave mistakes in his later years. . . His tragedy lies in the fact that, at the very time when he was doing things which were mistaken he believed they were necessary for the defence of the interests of the working people against encroachments by the enemy. Stalin's mistakes did harm to the Soviet Union. . . The Yugoslav comrades bear a particular resentment against Stalin's mistakes. In the past, they made worthy efforts to stick to socialism under difficult conditions. Their experiments in the democratic management of economic enterprises and other socialist organisations have also attracted attention. The Chinese people welcome the reconciliation between the Soviet Union and other socialist countries on the one hand, and Yugoslavia on the other. . .

One of the grave consequences of Stalin's mistakes was the growth of doctrinairism. . .

Stalin and the former leaders in some socialist countries committed the serious mistake of violating socialist democracy . . .

After the elimination of classes, the class struggle should not continue to be stressed as being intensified, as it was done by Stalin, with the result that the healthy development of socialist democracy was hampered. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is completely right in firmly correcting Stalin's mistakes in this respect. . .

As we have already said, Stalin displayed certain great-nation chauvinist tendencies in relations with brother parties and countries. . .

Stalin's mistakes aroused grave dissatisfaction among people in certain Eastern Europe countries. . .

The Soviet Government's efforts to improve relations with Yugoslavia. . . manifest the determination of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to thoroughly eliminate past mistakes in foreign relations."

("More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat"; London; 1957; p. 12, 14-16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 26, 27).

As late as 1958, when Mao Tse-tung met with Nikita Khrushchov, the communique recorded their mutual desire to uphold the "sacred unity" of the Soviet and Chinese Communist Parties, to safeguard "the purity of Marxism-Leninism" and to wage "uncompromising struggle against revisionism":

"The Communist Parties of China and the Soviet Union will spare no effort to uphold this sacred unity, to safeguard the purity of Marxism-Leninism, . . . to wage uncompromising struggle against revisionism, the chief danger in the communist movement".

(Communique on Meeting between Mao Tse-tung and Nikita Khrushchov, cited in: "Peking Review", August 12th, 1958; p. 7).

The Split in the Communist Party

As has been said, the "new-democratic" state of the People's Republic of China was a joint dictatorship of the national capitalist class and those sections of the landlord and comprador capitalist classes which had been from the outset dependent upon US imperialism.

During the anti-Japanese war, these classes had a common interest in defeating Japan, and this common interest could be expressed politically through a single political party, the Communist Party. With the defeat of Japanese imperialism, they ceased to have this common interest: a conflict developed within the ruling class alliance of the PRC between the national capitalist class (which was interested in completing the national-democratic revolution) and the sections of the landlord and comprador capitalist classes dependent upon US imperialism (which were interested in resisting completion of the national-democratic revolution and in its counter-revolutionary reversal).

This conflict within the ruling class alliance was bound eventually to be reflected in a factional split within the Communist Party. One faction, led by Liu Shao-chi, represented the interests of the national capitalist class; the other faction, led by Mao Tse-tung, represented the interests of the pro-US landlord (ex-landlord, after the land reform completed in 1953) and comprador capitalist classes.

Until 1966 this factional conflict was retained within the confines of inner-party struggle; in 1966 it burst into the open in the civil war known as "the great proletarian cultural revolution".

At the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of China, which opened on September 15th, 1956, the dominant role was played by the national capitalist faction. Liu Shao-chi gave the main political report, and a significant blow to the faction headed by Mao Tse-tung was struck by the omission from the new Party Constitution of all the references to "The Thought of Mao Tse-tung" which had been inserted in the 1945 Constitution. The new Constitution also provided for an honorary Chairman of the Central Committee -- a position clearly tailor-made for Mao.

The "Rectification Campaign"

The first shots in the counter-revolutionary campaign against the national capitalist class were fired by Mao Tse-tung in two unpublished speeches: "On the Ten Great Relationships" (delivered on April 25th, 1956 to the Political Bureau of the CPC) and "Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, Let a Hundred Schools Contend" (delivered on May 2nd, 1956 to the Supreme State Conference).

The ideas proposed by Mao in these speeches were developed and embodied in his speech "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People" (delivered to a national propaganda conference of the CPC on March 12th, 1957).

This put forward a policy of liberalism towards counter-revolutionary ideas: Classes should be free to put forward the ideology which serves their class:

"The bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie are bound to give expression to their ideologies. It is inevitable that they should stubbornly persist in expressing themselves in every way possible on political and ideological questions. You can't expect them not to do so. We should not use methods of suppression to prevent them from expressing themselves, but should allow them to do so and at the same time argue with them and direct well-considered criticism at them". (Mao Tse-tung: "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People"; Peking; 1964; p. 40).

This liberalism was to be particularly applied in cultural fields, where reactionary ideas may often serve to build up opposition groups which are essentially political opposition groups:

"The policy of letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend is designed to promote the flourishing of the arts and the progress of science. . . . Different forms and styles in art can develop freely and different schools in science can contend freely. We think that it is harmful to the growth of art and science if administrative measures are used to impose one particular style of art or school of thought and to ban another. Questions of right and wrong in the arts and sciences should be settled through free discussion in artistic and scientific circles and in the course of practical work in the arts and sciences. They should not be settled in summary fashion". . . .

These two slogans -- let a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend -- have no class character: the proletariat can turn them to account, so can the bourgeoisie and other people". (Mao Tse-tung: *ibid.*; p. 36, 41).

The most crucial point in Mao's speech was his reference to the disturbances which had been taking place in the previous months. He proceeded to declare that there were very few counter-revolutionaries in the country and that the cause of these disturbances was "bureaucracy" in the Communist Party and "new-democratic" state, "bureaucracy" which must be stamped out:

"There are still counter-revolutionaries, but not many. . . . Taking the country as a whole, there are certainly not many counter-revolutionaries. It would be wrong to say that there are still large numbers of counter-revolutionaries at large. Acceptance of that view will also breed confusion. . . .

CONCERNING DISTURBANCES CREATED BY SMALL NUMBERS OF PEOPLE . . .

The immediate cause of these disturbances was the failure to satisfy certain of their demands for material benefit, of which some should and could be met. . . . But a more important cause was bureaucracy on the part of those in positions of leadership. In some cases, responsibility for such bureaucratic mistakes should be placed on the higher authorities, and those at lower levels should not be made to

bear all the blame. . .

In order to get rid of the root cause of disturbances, we must stamp out bureaucracy. . .

In a big country like ours, it is nothing to get alarmed about if small numbers of people should create disturbances; rather we should turn such things to advantage to help us get rid of bureaucracy".

(Mao Tse-tung: *ibid.*; p. 21, 22, 45, 46, 47).

This view, that an offensive by counter-revolutionary forces was to be blamed on to the "failures" and "bureaucracy" of the progressive elements "in positions of leadership" was, of course, that put forward in the late 1920s by the Soviet revisionist Nikolai Bukharin -- the view on which Stalin commented:

"Bukharin's second mistake . . . consists in his wrong, non-Marxian approach to the question of the intensification of the class struggle, of the increasing resistance of the capitalist elements. . . Bukharin and his friends . . . approach the matter not in a Marxian, but in a philistine way, and try to explain the intensification of the class struggle by all kinds of fortuitous causes, as, for instance, the 'incompetence' of the Soviet apparatus, the 'incautious' policy of local comrades, the 'absence' of flexibility, 'excesses', etc. . .

Thus it follows that the intensification of the class struggle is to be explained by causes relating to the state of the Soviet apparatus, the competence or incompetence, the strength or weakness of our local organisations. It follows, for instance, that the wrecking activities of the bourgeois intellectuals in Shakhty, which are a form of resistance of the bourgeois elements to the Soviet government, and a form of intensification of the class struggle, are to be explained, not by the relation of class forces . . . but by the incompetence of our apparatus. . .

There have been no cases in history where dying classes have voluntarily departed from the scene. There have been no cases in history where the dying bourgeoisie has not exerted all its remaining strength to preserve its existence.

Whether our lower Soviet apparatus is good or bad . . . the dying classes will still carry on their resistance".

(J. V. Stalin: "The Right Deviation in the CPSU (B.)", in: "Leninism"; London; 1942; p. 257-58, 259).

On the basis of Mao Tse-tung's formulation, a "rectification campaign" was officially launched on April 30th, 1957, directed ostensibly against bureaucracy in Party and state organs.

In November 1957 it was officially announced that during the campaign 300,000 Party and state officials had been removed from their posts, most of these being in fact adherents of the national capitalist faction headed by Liu Shao-chi.

Taking advantage of the liberal policy embodied in the slogan "Let a hundred flowers blossom!" and of the "rectification campaign", the political representatives of the ex-landlords and comprador capitalists in the so-called "democratic parties" launched during the summer of 1957 a strong campaign against the Communist Party,

demanding greater powers for these so-called "democratic parties" to counteract the "bureaucratic tendencies" in the Communist Party.

The national capitalist faction within the Communist Party fought back vigorously against Mao's offensive. Publication of Mao's speech was held back, and took place only three months later (on June 18th, 1957) after Mao had been forced to make important and humiliating revisions, such as the introduction of criteria limiting the liberalism of the "hundred flowers" policy.

And by the end of June the national capitalist faction had succeeded in transforming the "rectification campaign" into a campaign directed against "bourgeois rightists", defined as the political representatives of the ex-landlords and comprador capitalists:

"There are two exploiting classes . . . in China today. One of the exploiting classes comprises the bourgeois rightists who oppose socialism, the landlord and comprador classes whose rule has been overthrown, and other reactionaries. The bourgeois rightists are to all intents and purposes agents of the imperialists, the remnant feudal and comprador forces, and Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang. The other exploiting class comprises the national bourgeoisie and their intellectuals who are accepting socialist transformation step by step".
(Liu Shao-chi: Report on the Work of the Central Committee, May 1958, in: "Second Session of the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China"; Peking; 1958; p. 21).

In January 1958 the national capitalist faction were able to force the dismissal of three rightist Ministers -- members of the Democratic League -- who had been most outspoken in their attacks upon the Communist Party: Chang Po-chun (Minister of Communications), Lo Lung-chi (Minister of the Timber Industry) and Chang Nai-chi (Minister of Food). And in February 1958 they were able to force the dismissal of the rightist General Lung Yun, a member of the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee, from the post of Vice-Chairman of the National Defence Committee, together with the expulsion of 38 rightist deputies from the National People's Congress.

Following the intervention of Mao, who demanded that rightists who "promised to reform" should be rehabilitated, at the June/July 1958 session of the People's Congress the dismissed rightist Ministers were permitted to make such promises. In December 1958 they were restored to leading positions in their party and by April 1959 they were taking part in meetings of the People's Political Consultative Conference -- the joint advisory body comprising the Communist Party and the so-called "democratic parties".

The "Great Leap Forward"

Having failed to achieve success in their attack on the faction representing the interests of the national capitalists by the "rightist" "rectification campaign" of 1957, in the following year the faction representing the interests of the pro-US ex-landlords and comprador capitalists, headed by Mao Tso-tung, launched an offensive under "leftist" slogans directed at alienating the peasantry, the most numerous class in Chinese society, from the regime, so seriously weakening its social base.

In the summer of 1958, therefore, on the inspiration of Mao Tse-tung, a campaign was launched to bring about the transformation of the collective farms into "people's communes".

In general, people's communes were formed by the merging of some 20-30 collective farms into a single people's commune, embracing 20,000 or more members and spread over 40-100 villages.

In the last six months of 1958 740,000 collective farms were merged into 26,000 people's communes embracing 120 million peasant households (99% of the number of such households).

Under the commune system, the peasants (who had experienced only for a few brief months the individual ownership of the land which they had been demanding for a century) were to be deprived of their personal plots of land, their small livestock and their homes (which they had retained under the collective farm system), these being transferred to the ownership of the commune:

"All land reserved for private use, private house sites, livestock and tree holdings owned by individuals are gradually turned over to common ownership".
("How to Run a People's Commune", in: "Renmin Ribao" (People's Daily), September 4th, 1958, in: "People's Communes in China"; Peking; 1958; p. 83).

The peasants themselves were to be transformed from cooperatively - working petty bourgeois into rural wage-workers:

"The people's commune . . . introduces a wage system whereby a basic wage is issued together with a certain amount of award (i.e., bonus -- Ed.), as is the current practice in most places".
("From Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives to People's Communes", in: "Hongqi" (Red Flag), September 16th, 1958, in: *ibid.*; p. 36).

and a collective, military-style life imposed upon them:

"Not only do they (i.e., the people's communes -- Ed.) have to collectivise labour further, but also to organise the collective way of life. . .

"Get organised along military lines, do things the way battle duties are carried out and live collective lives".

("Greet the Upsurge in Forming People's Communes", in: "Hongqi" (Red Flag), September 1st, 1958, in: *ibid.*; p. 11, 13-14).

In his speech of 1957, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People", Mao Tse-tung, in a passage deleted from later revised versions, had advocated the setting up of small industrial enterprises as a means of developing industrial production:

"We must gradually build a large number of large-scale modern enterprises as the mainstay of our industries. . . But the majority of our enterprises should not be built in this way; we should set up a far greater number of small and medium enterprises".

(Mao Tse-tung: "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People" (first published version leaked from Warsaw), in: "Keesing's Contemporary Archives", Volume 11; Bristol; p. 15683).

In accordance with this facet of "The Thought of Mao Tse-tung", therefore, the people's communes were directed to set up small blast-furnaces and other small industrial enterprises and to transfer some labour from agriculture to these:

"The commune must develop industry as rapidly as possible. The first things to be done in this field are to set up mines, iron and steel plants and factories for manufacturing ball-bearings, farm tools, fertiliser and building materials and for processing farm produce, repairing machinery, building hydro-electric power projects, installations for utilising methane, and other enterprises".
(Draft Regulations of the Weihsing (Sputnik) People's Commune, in: *ibid.*; p. 64).

"the growth of rural industry . . . demands the transfer of some manpower from agriculture".
(Central Committee, Communist Party of China: Resolution on the Establishment of People's Communes in the Rural Areas, in: *ibid.*; p. 2).

By October 1958 600,000 small blast-furnaces were officially stated to have been set up by the people's communes.

The faction headed by Mao Tse-tung presented the people's communes as vehicles for the gradual transition of Chinese society to "communism":

"The present people's commune offers our country a good form of organisation to accelerate . . . the transition to communism. It . . . will grow and become the primary unit of the future communist society".
("Greet the Upsurge in Forming People's Communes", in: "Hongqi" (Red Flag), September 1st, 1958; in: *ibid.*; p. 13).

"The establishment of people's communes . . . is the fundamental policy to guide the peasants to . . . carry out the gradual transition to communism".
(Central Committee, Communist Party of China: Resolution on the Establishment of People's Communes in the Rural Areas, in: *ibid.*; p. 2-3).

In fact, the people's communes were advised to introduce the distributive principle of communism -- "to each according to his needs" -- in certain spheres immediately:

"In Hunan, which more than any other province has given shape and substance to people's communes, all commune members get their food free, and many other free benefits as well. This is part of the new distribution system. . .
The income of commune members is thus divided into two parts: one part is received on the 'supply system', according to the principle 'to each according to his needs', the other part is received according to the principle 'to each according to his work' in the form of wages and bonuses".

("Transition to Communism", in: "Peking Review", Volume 1, No. 32, 1958; p. 5).

"The introduction of a distribution system of half supply (i.e., on the basis of 'to each according to his needs' -- Ed.) and half payment in wages in most of the people's communes is an inevitable result of the development of the people's communes".

(Li Hsien-nien: "What I saw in the People's Communes", in: "Peking Review", No. 37, 1958; p. 13).

Mao Tse-tung himself made a personal tour of North China to press the leaders of the communes to extend the supply system to a wider range of goods and services:

"Chairman Mao said to the Communist Party secretary of the province that if one commune can provide free meals to all its members, there is no reason why other communes can't do the same. And he added: 'If we can do this with food, by and by we can also do the same with clothes'".
("More on Chairman Mao's Visit", in: "Peking Review", No. 33, 1958; p. 4).

This policy was declared to be based on a few facets of "The Thought of Mao Tse-tung" -- the "uninterrupted transition to communism":

"The Chinese people have grasped the guiding ideology of the Communist Party's Central Committee and Comrade Mao Tse-tung on uninterrupted revolution"
("Greet the Upsurge in Forming People's Communes" in: "Hongqi" (Red Flag), September 1st, 1958, in: *ibid.*; p. 13).

"Chairman Mao did not restrict the application of the Marxist-Leninist theory of uninterrupted revolution to the one point of democratic revolution changing into socialist revolution but . . . fully extended the application of this theory in order to guide the complete revolutionary movement of our country, including . . . the transition from socialism to communism".

(Chih Liao-chou: "Disseminate the Ideology of Communism", in "Hsueh-hsi" (Learning), No. 19, October 10th, 1958).

But Marxism-Leninism, in fact, emphasises that before the transition can occur from socialism (in which distribution is based on the principle "to each according to his work") to communism (in which distribution is based on the principle "to each according to his needs") not only is it necessary for a socialist social system to have been constructed (which was not the case in China in 1958) but this must have developed to the stage where two pre-requisites have been met:

Firstly, a great increase in production; and
secondly, a changed outlook on the part of the working people towards work:

"The state will be able to wither away completely when society can apply the rule: 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs', i.e., when people have become so accustomed to observing the fundamental rules of

social life and when their labour is so productive that they will voluntarily work according to their ability".
(V. I. Lenin: "The State and Revolution", in: "Selected Works", Volume 7; London; 1946; p. 88).

At first it was officially claimed that very large increases in both agricultural and industrial production had been achieved by the "Great Leap Forward", but a communique of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, issued after its meeting at Lushan in August 1959 admitted that the figures issued had been greatly exaggerated. Only 250 million tons of grain had produced in 1958 instead of the target of 375 million tons; only 8 million tons of steel had been produced in the same year instead of the target of 11 million tons. The communique was particularly critical of the small-scale steel furnaces set up within the communes, the product of which was described as "suitable only for rural requirements", so that "backyard-produced metal" would not figure in future in the state economic plans. As a result of these deficiencies the grain target for 1959 was reduced from 525 million tons to 275 million tons, and the target for steel from 18 million tons to 12 million tons. It remains only to add that by 1961 China was having to import large quantities of grain from Australia, Canada and other countries.

That the results of the "Great Leap Forward" were not more economically disastrous and that it failed in its primary object of alienating the peasantry from the regime was due to the fact that the worst excesses (the introduction of the wage system and of communist principles of distribution) were reversed at a meeting of the Central Committee held from November 28th to December 10th, 1958, at Wuhan. The resolution adopted by the Central Committee declared:

"Every Marxist must soberly realise that the transition from socialism to communism is a fairly long and complicated process of development and that throughout this entire process society is still socialist in nature. . .

The communist system of distribution . . can be put into effect only when there is a great abundance of social products. In the absence of this condition, any negation of the principle 'to each according to his work' will tend to dampen the working enthusiasm of the people and is therefore disadvantageous to the development of production . . and hence to speeding the realisation of communism. . .

Any premature attempt to negate the principle of 'to each according to his work' and replace it with the principle of 'to each according to his needs', that is, any attempt to enter communism by over-reaching ourselves when conditions are not mature -- is undoubtedly a Utopian concept that cannot possibly succeed. . .

We should not groundlessly make declarations that the people's communes in the countryside will . . 'enter communism immediately', and so on. To do such things is not only an expression of rashness, it will greatly lower the standards of communism in the minds of the people, distort the great ideal of communism and vulgarise it, strengthen the petty-bourgeois trend towards equalitarianism and adversely affect the development of socialist construction. . .

We must not . . drop into the Utopian dream of skipping the socialist stage and jumping over to the communist stage".

(Resolution on Some Questions concerning the People's Communes, 6th Plenum CC, CPC, in: "Peking Review", No. 43, 1958; p. 12, 13).

Furthermore, at the meeting of the Central Committee the national capitalist faction, headed by Liu Shao-chi, was successful in removing Mao Tse-tung, the principal author of the theory of "uninterrupted transition to communism", from the position of President, i.e., Head of State, of the People's Republic of China.

In April 1959 the National People's Congress elected Liu Shao-chi, the leader of the national capitalist faction within the Communist Party, to succeed Mao as President of the PRC.

"The Great Debate"

By the beginning of 1960, therefore, the national capitalist faction headed by Liu Shao-chi occupied the dominant position in the Communist Party of China and were engaged in a degree of struggle with the pro-US landlord/comprador capitalist faction headed by Mao Tse-tung.

By this time, however, it had become clear that the Soviet revisionist leadership, headed by Nikita Khrushchov, had embarked on a foreign policy of collaboration with US imperialism.

This was the fundamental cause of the rift which now developed between the dominant Chinese revisionist faction, headed by Liu Shao-chi, and the Soviet revisionists. This was later admitted by the leaders of the CPC:

"In complete disregard of the common conclusion of the 1957 Declaration that US imperialism is the enemy of all the people of the world, the leadership of the CPSU passionately sought collaboration with US imperialism. . . Particularly around the time of the Camp David Talks in September 1959, Khrushchov lauded Eisenhower to the skies".
("The Origin and Development of the Differences between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves"; Peking; 1963; p. 24).

Accordingly, on April 22nd, 1960 the Chinese revisionist leadership opened a propaganda offensive against the Soviet revisionists at a special meeting in Peking organised by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to celebrate the 90th anniversary of the birth of Lenin. The reporter, Lu-Ting-yi, declared:

"We know that US imperialism is the most vicious and cunning enemy of the people's revolution in various countries, of the national liberation movement and of world peace. And Eisenhower is now the chieftain of US imperialism. Lenin pointed out long ago that US imperialism is the most vicious enemy of the people of the whole world playing the role of gendarme".

(Lu Ting-yi: "Unite under Lenin's Revolutionary Banner!", in: "Long Live Leninism"; Peking; 1960; p. 103).

Therefore, proceeded Lu, a position of struggle against US imperialism is the touchstone which determines whether a Party leader is a genuine or a spurious revolutionary:

"Whether or not one dares to expose the imperialists, and especially the US imperialists, whether or not one dares to struggle against them, is the touchstone of whether or not he wants to carry out the people's revolution, to win the complete emancipation of the oppressed nations and to win a genuine world peace".

(Lu Ting-yi: *ibid.*; p. 104).

But the "modern revisionists" (as yet unspecified) are betraying revolutionary principles by preaching collaboration with US imperialism:

"The modern revisionists completely betray the revolutionary spirit of Marxism-Leninism, the interests of the people of the world, and submit and surrender to the bourgeoisie and the imperialists. They maintain that the imperialists have changed their nature and abandoned their war policy of their own accord. They are doing their utmost to camouflage the US imperialists' policies of aggression and war, to prettify imperialism and Eisenhower, the chieftain of the US imperialists. As described by them, Eisenhower has become a 'peace emissary', US imperialism is no longer the enemy of peace, no longer the enemy of the national liberation movements of the colonies and semi-colonies, and no longer the most vicious enemy of the people of the entire world".

(Lu Ting-yi: *ibid.*; p. 101).

Because the revisionism of the dominant faction in the Communist Party of China was a "left" revisionism which represented the interests of the Chinese national capitalists, whose interests required armed national-democratic revolutionary struggle against the remnants of the landlord and comprador capitalist classes, the Chinese revisionists were able to criticise correctly the Soviet revisionists for their illusory programme of "peaceful, parliamentary transition":

"Lenin repeatedly pointed out that the proletarian revolution must smash the bourgeois state machinery and replace it with the dictatorship of the proletariat. . .

The modern revisionists . . think that imperialism will step down from the stage of history of its own accord, without a revolution. . .

Under the pretext of a so-called 'historical, non-dogmatic' approach to the theoretical legacy left by Lenin, they have attacked the revolutionary content and revolutionary spirit of Marxism-Leninism".

(Lu Ting-yi: *ibid.*; 90, 98).

Thus it came about that the Chinese revisionists were able, in "the Great Debate" within the international communist movement to play an important progressive role in exposing the right revisionism of the leaders of the CPSU and of those parties which supported its position ideologically.

In June 1960 the Soviet revisionists made a counter-attack upon the Chinese revisionists at a meeting of representatives of various Communist Parties held in Bucharest:

"At Bucharest, to our amazement, the leaders of the CPSU unleashed a surprise assault on the Chinese Communist Party, turning the spearhead of struggle against us and not against US imperialism".
("The Origin and Development of the Differences between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves"; Peking; 1963; p. 29).

and in July carried this counter-attack into the sphere of state relations:

"In July the Soviet Government suddenly took a unilateral decision recalling all the Soviet experts in China within one month, thereby tearing up hundreds of agreements and contracts".
(Ibid.; p. 32).

The removal of Nikita Khrushchov as First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in October 1964, and his replacement by Leonid Brezhnev signified the coming to power of a revisionist faction representing the interests of the new class of Soviet neo-imperialists, of state monopoly capitalists who felt able to reject Khrushchov's foreign policy of, in effect, subordinating Soviet neo-imperialism to United States imperialism.

The Chinese revisionist faction headed by Liu Shao-chi were therefore justified in hoping that Khrushchov's replacement signified a change in foreign policy on the part of the Soviet revisionists to one in line with their own opposition to US imperialism:

"The collapse of Khrushchov is a great victory for the Marxist-Leninists of the world in their persistent struggle against revisionism. It marks the bankruptcy, the fiasco, of modern revisionism. . . .

Khrushchov . . . sought 'all-round cooperation' with US imperialism and fallaciously maintained that the heads of the Soviet Union and the United States would 'decide the fate of humanity', constantly praising the chieftains of US imperialism as having a sincere desire for peace'. . . .

Under the signboard of 'peaceful coexistence' he did his utmost to oppose and sabotage the national liberation movement and went so far as to work hand in glove with US imperialism in suppressing the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations. . . .

Beyond all doubt, the great Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the great Soviet people, with their revolutionary traditions, are fully capable of making new contributions in safeguarding the great socialist achievements, the lofty prestige of the first socialist power founded by Lenin, the purity of Marxism-Leninism and the victorious advance of the revolutionary cause of the proletariat.

Let the international communist movement unite on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism!"
("Why Khrushchov Fell"; Peking; 1964; p. 1, 3-4, 5, 11-12).

But the new Soviet revisionist leadership was determined to reorientate their foreign policy away from the former collaboration with US imperialism gradually, and it was not for several years that this reorientation became clear.

(See: Report of the Central Committee of the Marxist-Leninist Organisation of Britain on THE ROLE OF "CENTRIST REVISIONISM", in: "RED FRONT", March 1970; p. 23-25).

Thus, in November 1965 the Chinese national capitalist faction were saying:

"Have the new leaders of the CPSU . . . changed from being a force allied with US imperialism to one opposing it?

The facts show they have not. . . .

The replacement of Khrushchov by these new leaders has been merely a change of personalities in the revisionist dynasty".

("Refutation of the New Leaders of the CPSU on 'United Action', in: "Peking Review", November 12th, 1965; p. 13, 19).

And in the following year the anti-US imperialist national capitalist faction headed by Liu Shao-chi came under the counter-revolutionary attack of the pre-US landlord/comprador capitalist faction headed by Mao Tse-tung.

THE GRAND STRATEGY OF COUNTER-REVOLUTION

By 1959, therefore, the pro-US landlords and comprador capitalists had seen their positions seriously weakened as a result of the developing national-democratic revolution carried out within the framework of the "new-democratic" state under the leadership of the national capitalist class.

The land reform had liquidated the landlord class, and capitalism had made rapid development (and with it, the position of the national capitalist class) as is shown from the official figures for the increasing numbers of the working class:

"Before liberation in 1948, there were only 2.4 million employees and workers. After liberation, in 1957, the number rose to 23,973,000 about ten times as many".

("Workers and Trade Unions in China", in: "Peking Review", Volume 1, No. 9; April 29th, 1958; p. 13).

The attempt to weaken the position of the political representatives of the national capitalists in the "rectification campaign" of 1957 had miscarried and been turned against its authors. The attempt to alienate the collectivised peasantry by the measures of the "Great Leap Forward" of 1958 had also failed, and had led to the removal of the leader of the faction of the Communist Party representing the interests of the pro-US ex-landlords and comprador capitalists, Mao Tse-tung, from the position of Head of State and his replacement by the leader of the faction of the Communist Party representing the interests of the national capitalists, Liu Shao-chi.

Clearly, if the national-democratic revolution were to be checked and, if possible, reversed, A FULL-SCALE COUNTER-REVOLUTION WOULD BE NECESSARY.

What form, to have a reasonable chance of success in the existing conditions of China, must this counter-revolution take?

China was a huge country of 700 million people, the majority being peasants and workers deluded, for the moment, into believing that they shared in political power in the "new-democratic" state which had now, in some unexplained manner, become a "socialist state", the "dictatorship of the working class". It had the largest Communist Party in the world which, although revisionist in character, was in the main controlled by the faction representing the interests of the national capitalists, headed by Liu Shao-chi.

Clearly, therefore, to be successful, a counter-revolution would have to take the form of a large-scale civil war, a counter-revolution designed to smash the Communist Party and the organisations of the working class and establish the dictatorship of the pro-US ex-landlords and comprador bourgeoisie, ONE WHICH COMBINED FASCIST-TYPE VIOLENCE WITH UNPARALLELED "LEFTIST" DEMAGOGY.

The situation, indeed, had elements in common with the situation which led to the offensive against the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the period up to 1927, that led by Trotsky and others, exhibiting similar "leftist" demagogy. As Stalin commented at the 7th Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International:

"What do all these facts show?

The 'Left' camouflage of opportunist actions has been one of the most characteristic features of all the various opposition trends in our Party during the period since the seizure of power.

What is the explanation of this phenomenon?

The explanation lies in the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat of the USSR, the profound revolutionary traditions that are deep-seated in our proletariat. The explanation lies in the downright hatred in which anti-revolutionary and opportunist elements are held by the workers of the USSR. The explanation lies in the fact that our workers will simply not listen to an open opportunist, and that therefore the 'revolutionary' camouflage is a bait designed to attract, if only by its outward appearance, the attention of the workers and to inspire them with confidence in the opposition".
(J. V. Stalin: "Once More on the Social-Democratic Deviation in our Party", in: "Works", Volume 9; Moscow; 1954; p. 18-19).

Thus, the counter-revolutionaries, utilising the campaign "against revisionism" launched by the faction headed by Liu Shao-chi, sought to present their counter-revolutionary offensive as A STRUGGLE "FOR MARXISM-LENINISM AGAINST REVISIONISM", as A STRUGGLE "AGAINST THOSE IN HIGH PLACES TAKING THE CAPITALIST ROAD", as "A GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION".

And since, in the circumstances then existing in China, the ex-landlords and comprador capitalists could not hope to exert their rule through any form of "parliamentary democracy", with the "civil liberties" appropriate to it, the aim of the counter-revolutionaries could only be THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A REPRESSIVE MILITARY DICTATORSHIP DISGUISED UNDER RED FLAGS.

The Seizure of the Army High Command

The first aim of the counter-revolutionaries was to gain control of the High Command of the People's Liberation Army, with the aim of transforming it into the main instrument of force for the imposition and maintenance of their military dictatorship.

The main obstacle which stood in the way of this plan was Marshal Peng Teh-huai, who had been Minister of Defence since 1949 and who had commanded the Chinese volunteer forces in the Korean War of 1950-53.

Peng had for some years taken his stand on the side of the national capitalist class, and had opposed the attempts of the counter-revolutionary faction headed by Mao Tse-tung to make the revisionist "Thought of Mao Tse-tung" -- now the ideology of the pro-US ex-landlord and comprador capitalists -- the guiding principle in the work of the Party and, in particular, of the armed forces:

"As far back as the Seventh National Congress of the Party (in 1945 -- Ed.), Peng Teh-huai openly opposed the laying down in the Party Constitution of Mao-Tse-tung's thought as the guiding thought of the Party. . . The 'Regulations of Committees of the Chinese Communist Party in the Army (Draft)', prepared in 1953, originally included the following article: 'The Party committees take Mao Tse-tung's Thought -- which integrates Marxist-Leninist theory with the practice of the Chinese revolution -- as the guiding principle of all their work'. This article constituted the core of the draft regulations but Peng Teh-huai cut it out when he revised the draft".

(Lin Hsin-kung: "Settle Accounts with Peng Teh-huai for his Heinous Crimes . . .", in: "Peking Review", No. 36, 1967; p. 14).

"Peng Teh-huai has long been making vicious attacks and spreading slanders inside the Party and the armed forces against Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the leader of the Party, and against other leading Comrades of the Central Committee and its Military Commission".
(Resolution of the 8th Plenary Session of the 8th, Central Committee, August 16th, 1959, in: "Peking Review", No. 34, 1967; p. 9).

Peng Teh-huai was one of the more outspoken critics of

". . . certain transient and partial shortcomings in our great movements the great leap forward and the people's communes"

(Resolution . . ., in: *ibid.*; p. 8).

at the 6th Plenum of the Central Committee held in Lushan in November-December 1958, but wished to carry the repudiation of Mao's line of "uninterrupted transition to communism" to the point of a public denunciation of Mao. At the Plenum he

". . . came out in opposition to the . . . leadership of the Central Committee and Comrade Mao Tse-tung"
(Resolution . . ., in: *ibid.*; p. 10).

The majority of the national capitalist faction, headed by Liu Shao-chi, were, however, unwilling to bring about an irrevocable split in the Communist Party and the state apparatus, since this would force them to mobilise the working class in a revolutionary struggle, and preferred to take up a compromising position.

Commenting in October 1959 on the Lushan meeting of the Central Committee, Liu Shao-chi wrote merely:

"There have been controversies between different views within our Party on the questions of . . . the big leap forward and people's communes". . .
(Liu Shao-chi: "The Victory of Marxism-Leninism in China", in: "Peking Review", Volume 2, No. 39; October 1st, 1959; p. 11).

The majority of the national capitalist faction therefore sided with the ex-landlord/comprador bourgeois faction against the minority of the national capitalist faction headed by Peng Teh-huai in resisting a public denunciation of Mao who, as a face-saving gesture, was permitted to "propose his own resignation" from the position of Head of State, i.e., President of the People's Republic, in order to:

". . . set aside more time for Marxist-Leninist theoretical work"
(Decision Approving Comrade Mao Tse-tung's Proposal on Chairmanship, 6th Plenum CC, CPC, cited in: "Peking Review", Volume 1; No. 43; p. 9).

and the Central Committee approved

". . . this proposal of Comrade Mao Tse-tung . . . not to renominate him again as candidate for Chairman of the People's Republic of China".
(Ibid.; p. 9).

And Peng Teh-huai, who had demanded the denunciation of Mao, was removed from his post as Minister of Defence and replaced by Marshal Lin Piao, who later became known as "Chairman Mao's closest comrade-in-arms".

While this represented a victory for the ex-landlord/comprador capitalist faction headed by Mao Tse-tung, the national capitalist faction headed by Liu Shao-chi were able to score two victories: the appointment of their adherent Lo Jui-ching, the Minister of Public Security, as Chief of Staff (announced in September 1958) and the election by the National People's Congress in April 1959 of their leader, Liu Shao-chi, as President of the PRC in succession to Mao.

Furthermore, the national capitalist faction headed by Liu Shao-chi opened a campaign within the Party to reverse the removal of Peng Teh-huai:

"The top Party person in authority taking the capitalist road (a term used by the counter-revolutionaries to denote Liu Shao-chi-- Ed.) . . . whipped up the evil wind of reversing

the correct verdict passed on the Right opportunists. . . .
He vainly tried to help Peng Teh-huai rise again and resume
command of the armed forces".

("Peng Teh-huai and his Behind-the-Scenes Boss Cannot Shirk
Responsibility for their Crimes", editorial in: "Renmin
Ribao" (People's Daily), August 16th, 1967, in: "Peking
Review", No. 35, 1967; p. 7).

"Later he (i.e., Liu Shao-chi -- Ed.) openly attacked the
Lushan Meeting and made absurd allegations such as that
'the Lushan Meeting made a mistake!.'
("Along the Socialist or the Capitalist Road?", in: "Peking
Review", No. 34, 1967; p. 15).

"China's Khrushchov (another term used by the counter-
revolutionaries to denote Liu Shao-chi -- Ed.) . . . openly tried
to reverse the verdict on Peng Teh-huai at the enlarged Work
Conference of the Party's Central Committee held in January
1962. He said in Peng Teh-huai's defence that in Peng's
anti-Party programme 'much is in conformity with the facts'
and 'it shouldn't be regarded as a mistake'. He viciously
attacked the struggle led by Chairman Mao against Peng Teh-huai's
anti-Party clique as 'an erroneous struggle that over-stepped
the limits'. With powerful support and encouragement from
China's Khrushchov, Peng Teh-huai brought out in June 1962
a document running into a full 80,000 words aimed at reversing
the verdict passed on him".
("From the Defeat of Peng Teh-huai to the Bankruptcy of
China's Khrushchov", in: "Peking Review", No. 34, 1967; p. 20).

On December 24th, 1966 Peng Teh-huai was "arrested" by
"Red Guards" at Chengtu, but in August of 1967 the counter-revolutionaries
were still demanding:

"Let us thoroughly settle accounts with Peng Teh-huai
for his crimes against the Party, against socialism and against
Chairman Mao".
(Ibid.; p. 35).

However, a further obstacle had now to be removed in order
to place the High Command of the army securely in the hands of the
counter-revolutionary faction headed by Mao Tse-tung. This obstacle
was the Chief of Staff, General Lo Jui-ching.

Lo ceased to appear in his official capacity after November
1965, but no official announcement of his removal was made and
it was not until August 1966 that this was implied in the official
reference to General Yang Cheng-fu as Acting Chief of Staff. It
was Yang who later put forward the slogan:

"Thoroughly establish the absolute authority of the
Great Supreme Commander Chairman Mao . . . !"
(Yang Cheng-wu: "Thoroughly Establish . . . , etc.", in:
"Peking Review", No. 46; 1967; p. 17-24).

Lo Jui-ching, a member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee
of the Party, had been Minister of Public Security from 1949 until his
military appointment in 1959, and had become in that position a
particular target of hatred on the part of the counter-revolutionary
faction headed by Mao Tse-tung. On December 20th 1966 Lo Jui-ching

was "arrested" by "Red Guards", and on January 4-5th, 1967 was paraded and denounced, along with other leading representatives of the national capitalist faction, before mass rallies in Peking.

The charges against Lo which were published later by the faction headed by Mao Tse-tung were that, after the removal of Pong Teh-huai as Minister of Defence,

"Lo Jui-ching became the foremost champion of the reactionary bourgeois military line".
(Proletarian Revolutionaries of the Headquarters of the General Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army: "Basic Differences between the Proletarian and Bourgeois Military Lines", in: "Peking Review", No. 48, 1967; p. 11).

What was this "bourgeois military line" alleged to have been championed by Lo Jui-ching?

Firstly, it was alleged that

". . . the military thinking of Lo Jui-ching is founded on the theory that weapons decide everything".
(Ibid.; p. 13).

Yet Lo Jui-ching is on record as emphasising that

". . . THE HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE OF THE ANTI-FASCIST WAR ALSO TEACHES US THAT WEAPONS ARE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN WAR BUT NOT THE DECISIVE FACTOR, AND THAT PEOPLE AND NOT THINGS ARE THE FUNDAMENTAL FACTOR DETERMINING THE OUTCOME OF WAR".
(Lo Jui-ching: "Commomorate the Victory over German Fascism!"; Peking 1965; p. 16).

Secondly, it was alleged that

"Lo Jui-ching frenziodly opposed Chairman Mao's strategic principle of active defence and made every effort to push the strategic principle of passive defence for no other purpose than that of meeting the political needs of imperialism and modern revisionism".
(Proletarian Revolutionaries . . . ; ibid.; p. 15).

Yet Lo Jui-ching is on record as emphasising that

". . . THE HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE OF THE ANTI-FASCIST WAR ALSO TEACHES US THAT THE STRATEGY OF ACTIVE DEFENCE IS THE ONLY CORRECT STRATEGY FOR THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IN FIGHTING AGAINST IMPERIALISM".
(Lo Jui-ching: ibid.; p. 13).

Thirdly, it was alleged that

". . . Lo Jui-ching wanted to subordinate politics to military affairs, to make military affairs command politics".
(Proletarian Revolutionaries . . . ; ibid.; p. 13).

Yet Lo Jui-ching is on record as holding the exact opposite:

"What gave the Soviet Army the strength to stand up to and defeat Hitler's fascist army? . . . It was because the Soviet Union relied on the people, the socialist system, revolutionary political work in the Red Army and the Marxist-Leninist leadership of the Communist Party".
(Lo Jui-ching: *ibid.*; p. 17).

It is clear, therefore, that the real reason for the campaign against Lo Jui-ching was that, as an adherent of the national capitalist faction headed by Liu Shao-chi, he opposed the introduction into the People's Liberation Army of the cult of Mao Tse-tung's personality and the revisionist "Thought of Mao Tse-tung", which had now become the ideology of the counter-revolutionary ex-landlord and comprador capitalist classes. He was "guilty" of

". . . opposing the thorough establishment by our army of the absolute authority of the great thought of Mao Tse-tung. Comrade Lin Piao said that Mao Tse-tung's thought is 'living Marxism-Leninism at its highest in our time! Lo Jui-ching, the counter-revolutionary revisionist, asserted nonsensically: 'We cannot say that''.
(Yang Cheng-wu: "Thoroughly Establish . . .", in: "Peking Review", No. 56, 1967; p. 21).

With the High Command of the People's Liberation Army in their grip, the counter-revolutionaries were ready for the next step in their strategical plan.

The Transformation of the Army

Of course, the seizure of the High Command of the People's Liberation Army was not sufficient for the purpose of the counter-revolutionary faction headed by Mao Tse-tung. This purpose required the ideological transformation of the army, down to the lowest ranks, into an obedient tool of the counter-revolutionary faction.

Following the appointment of Lin Piao as Minister of Defence in 1959, in 1960 the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Party (Chairman: Mao Tse-tung; Vice-Chairman: Lin Piao) issued to the People's Liberation Army a call for the study of Mao Tse-tung's thought.

In May 1964 the Political Department of the People's Liberation Army published the first edition of the "Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung" for issue to, and study by, every member of the army.

In January 1966 the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army held a twenty-day conference on political work in the army. This conference endorsed Lin Piao's five-point principle guiding the PLA, the first point of which was to:

". . . creatively study and apply Chairman Mao's works, and, in particular, make the utmost effort to apply them; regard Chairman Mao's works as the highest instructions on all aspects of the work of the army".
(*"PLA Conference on Political Work"*, in: "Peking Review", No. 4; 1966; p. 5).

But the conference went further. It went on record as holding that the broad masses of the army had now been ideologically remoulded to accept the guidance, not of the Communist Party, which was still under the leadership of the national capitalist faction headed by Liu Shao-chi, but of Mao Tse-tung personally:

"The conference . . . noted that the broad masses of cadres and fighters showed . . . greater political consciousness in remoulding their ideology and directing their activities in accordance with the guidance given by Chairman Mao Tse-tung". ("PLA Conference on Political Work", in: *ibid.*; p. 5).

Thus, by the beginning of 1966 the counter-revolutionary conspirators had confidence that the People's Liberation Army was an instrument of force which they could use in their offensive against the national capitalist faction headed by Liu Shao-chi, against the Communist Party which this faction led, and against the organisations of the working people who would support this faction against a counter-revolution on the part of the ex-landlords and pro-US comprador bourgeoisie.

Events showed, however, that this confidence was not completely justified.

The Initiation of the "Cultural Revolution"

The "leftist" propaganda campaign to prepare the road for the counter-revolutionary offensive was opened by Mao Tse-tung himself in 1962:

"At the Tenth Plenary Session of the Party's Eighth Central Committee in 1962, our great leader Chairman Mao issued his call to battle:

'NEVER FORGET CLASS STRUGGLE!'

("From the Defeat of Peng Teh-huai to the Bankruptcy of China's Khrushchov", in: "Honqi" (Red Flag), cited in: "Peking Review", No. 34, 1967; p. 20).

It will be noted that Mao does not call upon the working people of China to prepare themselves for class struggle against the remnants of the landlord and comprador capitalist classes in order to complete the national-democratic revolution, nor against the national capitalist class in order to carry through the socialist revolution. The vague slogan "Never forget class struggle" left open by which class and against which class this never-to-be-forgotten class struggle was to be waged. This this became clearer later.

The next step in the strategical plan for counter-revolution came in May 1963 when the Central Committee of the CPC adopted Mao's call for a "socialist education movement":

"The 'Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Some Problems in Current Rural Work (Draft)', that is, the first 'Ten Points' mapped out under the personal direction of Chairman Mao in May 1963, issued the great call for the launching of a socialist education movement. In this extremely important document, Chairman Mao told the whole Party and the entire Chinese people that if the existence of classes and class struggle in socialist society were forgotten:

'THEN IT WOULD NOT TAKE LONG, PERHAPS ONLY SEVERAL YEARS OR SEVERAL DECADES AT MOST, BEFORE A COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY RESTORATION ON A NATIONAL SCALE INEVITABLY OCCURRED, THE MARXIST-LENINIST PARTY WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BECOME A REVISIONIST PARTY, AND THE WHOLE OF CHINA WOULD CHANGE ITS COLOUR. COMRADES, JUST THINK OF IT -- WHAT A DANGEROUS PROSPECT!'" ("A Theoretical Weapon for Making Revolution under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", in: "Hongqi" (Red Flag) cited in: "Peking Review", No. 26, 1967; p. 28-29).

In this passage the essentials of the counter-revolutionary strategy -- the strategy of the thief who calls "Stop thief!" -- are revealed. The "socialist education movement" was to be directed ostensibly against "counter-revolutionary revisionism".

In his report on the work of the government to the National People's Congress in December 1964, Premier Chou En-lai referred to this "social education movement" as a "cultural revolution" directed primarily against "bourgeois ideology":

"Speaking on the tasks of the cultural revolution, the Premier pointed out that in the period of socialism the overriding task on the ideological and cultural fronts is thoroughly to combat capitalism, to promote the proletarian ideology and eradicate the bourgeois ideology". (Chou En-lai: Report on the Work of the Government, in: "Main Documents of the First Session of the Third National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China"; Peking; 1965; p. 29).

The presentation of the "cultural revolution" as directed against "bourgeois ideology" opened the door to its direction against the representatives of the national capitalist class in leading positions in the Party and state.

This step was taken by Mao Tse-tung in January 1965, when he declared that the main target of the "cultural revolution" was "those within the Party who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road". In

". . . 'Some Current Problems Raised in the Socialist Education Movement in the Rural Areas', that is, the '23-article document' drawn up under the personal guidance of Chairman Mao in January 1965, . . . CHAIRMAN MAO PUT FORWARD FOR THE FIRST TIME THIS VERY IMPORTANT THEORY:

"THE MAIN TARGET OF THE PRESENT MOVEMENT IS THOSE WITHIN THE PARTY WHO ARE IN AUTHORITY AND ARE TAKING THE CAPITALIST ROAD".

("A Theoretical Weapon for Making Revolution under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", in: "Hongqi" (Red Flag), cited in: "Peking Review", No. 26, 1967; p. 30).

The Attack on the Peking Party

This formulation aroused the strong opposition of the national capitalist faction in the leadership of the Communist Party and when, at the September and October 1965 meetings of the Central Committee, Mao Tse-tung pressed for an offensive against a leading member of the national capitalist faction, Wu Han, writer and deputy-mayor of Peking, the Central Committee refused.

"Between September and October 1965, Chairman Mao suggested that Wu Han who opposes the Party and socialism should be criticised and repudiated. But the handful of top Party persons in authority taking the capitalist road refused to carry this out and used every means to counter it". ("Two Diametrically Opposed Documents", in: "Hongqi" (Red Flag), cited in "Peking Review", No. 23, 1967; p. 22).

In October 1965 Mao Tse-tung accordingly went to Shanghai, where members of his counter-revolutionary landlord/comprador capitalist faction held leading positions in the Party apparatus.

On November 10th, 1965 the first shot was fired at the Peking Party leaders in an article by Yao Wen-yuan published in the Shanghai press:

"The proletarian revolutionaries in Shanghai resolutely implemented Chairman Mao's instruction. Under the direct guidance of Comrade Chiang Ching (Mao's wife -- Ed.), Comrade Yao Wen-yuan wrote 'On the New Historical Drama "Hai Jui Dismissed from Office"', and the publication of this article began in the ideological sphere the criticism and repudiation of Wu Han and other anti-Party, anti-socialist representatives of the bourgeoisie". (Ibid.; p. 22).

"Hai Jui Dismissed from Office" was a play set in the 16th century written by Wu Han and first published in 1961. In December 1965 Mao Tse-tung made it clear why his counter-revolutionary faction found the play so objectionable:

"On December 21, 1965, Chairman Mao once again pointed out explicitly that 'THE CRUX OF 'HAI JUI DISMISSED FROM OFFICE' WAS THE QUESTION OF DISMISSAL FROM OFFICE. . . IN 1959 WE DISMISSED PENG TEH-HUAI FROM OFFICE, AND PENG TEH-HUAI IS 'HAI JUI'". (Ibid.; p. 22).

The Peking Party leaders strongly resisted the attack upon Wu Han:

"The Peng Chen counter-revolutionary clique, under the connivance of and shielded by the top Party person in authority taking the capitalist road (i.e., Liu Shao-chi -- Ed.) abused its powers, forbade the Peking press to reprint the article by Comrade Yao Wen-yuan, and . . . did all in their power to prevent Chairman Mao's directive on the crux of 'Hai Jui Dismissed from Office' from being known. They flagrantly resisted the directive". (Ibid.; p. 22).

Having failed to break into the Peking or the national press, which was controlled by the national capitalist faction headed by Liu Shao-chi, the counter-revolutionaries began, from April 1966, to make use of the newspaper of the army "Jiefangjun Bao" (Liberation Army Daily) as their national organ.

On April 18th, 1966 this paper published an editorial entitled: "Hold High the Great Red Banner of Mao Tse-tung's Thinking: Actively Participate in the Great Socialist Cultural Revolution". This declared:

"There exists in our literary and art circles an anti-Party, anti-socialist black line running counter to Mao Tse-tung's thinking. . . We must . . . take an active part in the great socialist revolution on the cultural front, thoroughly eradicate this black line and completely liquidate its influence. . .

We must not mind being blamed for 'brandishing the stick'. . .

We must carry out Chairman Mao's instruction and . . . take an active part in the socialist cultural revolution, unswervingly carrying it through to the end".

("Editorial in "Jiefangjun Bao" (Liberation Army Daily), cited in: "Peking Review", No. 18, 1966; p. 6, 9, 10).

On May 10th, 1966 Yao Wen-yuan wrote another article in the "Jiefang Ribao" (Shanghai Daily) entitled "On 'Three Family Village!'" This extended the attacks on the Peking Party to include two other leading members, Teng To and Liao Mo-sha who, along with Wu Han, were described as running a "gangster inn" which had made the three journals controlled by the Peking Party -- "Beijing Ribao" (Peking Daily), "Beijing Wanbao" (Peking Evening News) and the fortnightly "Qianxian" (Front Line) into

". . . instruments for opposing the Party and socialism".

(Yao Wen-yuan: "On 'Three Family Village'", in: "Jiefang Ribao" (Shanghai Daily), May 10th, 1966, cited in: "Peking Review", No. 22, 1966, p. 5).

It was later announced that Wu Han and Teng To had "committed suicide" on September 26th, 1967.

The Seizure of the Central Committee

Up to May 1966 the faction representing the national capitalists, headed by Liu Shao-chi, had been able to persuade a majority of the members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party to resist the demands of the faction headed by Mao Tse-tung that the "cultural revolution" should be directed against leading members of their faction.

But when the Central Committee met in May 1966 the propaganda campaign against the leaders of the Peking Party was at its height, and in these circumstances some members of the Central Committee who had previously sided with the national capitalist faction shifted their position when Mao Tse-tung and his supporters opened an attack upon the "Group of Five in Charge of the Cultural Revolution", which was led by Peng Chen, First Secretary of the Peking Party, Mayor of Peking and a member of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPC, who had played a leading role in the exposure of Soviet revisionism.

The leaders of the "Group of Five" were accused of seeking to protect

". . . those representatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked into the Party, the government, the army and various cultural circles".

(Circular of Central Committee, CPC, May 16th, 1966, cited in: "Peking Review", No. 21, 1967; p. 9),

and of trying

"... to place restrictions on the proletarian left, to impose taboos and commandments in order to tie their hands, and to place all sorts of obstacles in the way of the proletarian cultural revolution".
(Ibid.; p. 9).

By majority decision, the Central Committee approved a resolution along these lines, together with the dissolution of the "Group of Five". The same meeting set up a new "Cultural Revolution Group", under the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. In July Chen Po-ta, Mao's former secretary and editor of "Hongqi" (Red Flag) since 1958, was appointed leader of the "Cultural Revolution Group".

The Attack on the Peking Party Continues

On May 25th, 1966 seven students at Peking University put up a "big-character poster" attacking Lu Ping (President of the University and Secretary of its Party Committee), Sung Shih (Deputy Head of the department in charge of university affairs of the Peking Municipal Party Committee) and a woman comrade Peng Pei-yun (Deputy Secretary of the University Party Committee). Following the line of the counter-revolutionary faction at the Central Committee meeting a few days earlier, these leading Party members were accused of following the line put by Sung Shih at an emergency meeting at the university on May 14th, when he was alleged to have said:

"When the masses arise, they need to be led on to the correct path".

("What are Sung Shih, Lu Ping and Peng Pei-yun Up To in the Cultural Revolution", in: "Peking Review", No. 37, 1966; p. 19).

while Lu Ping and Peng Pei-yun were alleged to have said:

"Leadership is urgently needed to guide the movement towards a correct orientation".
(Ibid.; p. 19).

It was thus clear, declared the big-character poster, that these Party leaders at Peking University were guilty of

"... suppressing the masses' revolution".
(Ibid.; p. 20).

The poster concluded with the call:

"Revolutionary intellectuals, now is the time to go into battle! Let us unite, . . . thoroughly, totally and completely wipe out all ghosts and monsters and all Khrushchovian-type counter-revolutionary revisionists and carry the socialist revolution through to the end".
(Ibid.; p. 20).

On June 2nd, 1966 "Remnin Ribao" (People's Daily) now controlled by a Central Committee dominated by the counter-revolutionary faction headed by Mao Tse-tung, carried the attack upon the Peking Party leaders further:

"Peking University . . . is a key point of the 'Three-Family Village' sinister gang, a stubborn bastion used by them to oppose the Party and socialism. . . The people of the whole country will rise up, oppose and knock down all those who oppose Chairman Mao. . . The whole nation will smash their sinister gang, sinister organisation and sinister discipline to pieces".

("Hail a Big Character Poster at Peking University", in: "Renmin Ribao (People's Daily)", cited in: "Peking Review", No. 37, 1966; p. 21, 22).

On the following day, June 3rd, the ground being now well prepared, the Central Committee "reorganised" the Peking Municipal Committee of the Party, appointing Li Hsueh-feng as its First Secretary in place of Peng Chen.

On the same day the "reorganised" Peking Party Committee dismissed the editorial boards of its journals "Beijing Ribao" (Peking Daily), "Beijing Wenbao" (Peking Evening News) and "Qianxian" (Front Line) -- the daily papers continuing under new editorial boards while publication of the fortnightly journal was suspended.

The "reorganised" Peking Municipal Committee also "reorganised" the Peking University Party Committee, dismissing Lu Ping and Peng Pei-yun from their posts.

On June 15th, 1966 the leadership of the Peking Communist Youth League was "reorganised".

On June 24th, the first direct attack upon Peng Chen appeared in "Renmin Ribao" (People's Daily).

On December 4th, 1966 Peng Chen was dragged from his bed and "arrested" by "Red Guards" during the night. On December 12th he was displayed before a rally of 100,000 "Red Guards" in a Peking stadium and before further such rallies on January 4-5th, 1967.

"The Masses"

Having won control of the High Command of the People's Liberation Army and the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the counter-revolutionary faction headed by Mao Tse-tung required a mass movement of a fascist character to act as the spearhead of their counter-revolutionary offensive.

The force to which they turned in this connection was what they described as "the masses":

"PUT DARING BEFORE EVERYTHING ELSE AND BOLDLY AROUSE THE MASSES.

The outcome of this great cultural revolution will be determined by whether the Party leadership does or does not dare boldly to arouse the masses".

(Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, August 8th, 1966, cited in: "Peking Review", No. 33, 1966; p. 7).

One is reminded forcefully of the tactics of the trotskyites in the Soviet Union in the last stages of their open struggle against the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, tactics to which Stalin referred at the 15th Congress of the CPSU (B.) in December 1927:

"Lastly, the opposition organised an anti-Party, anti-Soviet demonstration, appealing to the 'street', appealing to non-proletarian elements. How can one talk about Bolshevik traditions when one appeals to the 'street' against one's own Party, against one's own Soviet regime? Who has ever heard that Bolshevik traditions permitted such an outrageous act, which borders on direct counter-revolution? . . .

What if the opposition had had a little more strength behind it? Is it not obvious that its appeal to the 'street' would have turned into an open putsch against the Soviet regime?" (J. V. Stalin: Reply to the Discussion on the Political Report of the Central Committee, 15th Congress, CPSU, in: "Works", Volume 10; Moscow; 1954; p. 375-6).

When the representatives of the national capitalist faction pointed out that unless the "boldly aroused masses" were led by the organs of the Party at all levels, leadership of them would inevitably be taken over by reactionary, counter-revolutionary elements, the faction headed by Mao Tse-tung replied:

"LET THE MASSES EDUCATE THEMSELVES IN THE MOVEMENT.

In the great proletarian cultural revolution, the only method is for the masses to liberate themselves. . . .

Trust the masses, rely on them and respect their initiative. Cast out fear. Don't be afraid of disorder. . . . Let the masses educate themselves in this great revolutionary movement". (Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, August 8th, 1966, cited in: "Peking Review", No. 33, 1966; p. 7-8).

Against whom were the masses to direct their "revolutionary struggle"?

"The main target of the present movement is those within the Party who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road". (Ibid.; p. 8).

"It is essential to hold fast to this main orientation in the struggle".

(Lin Piao; cited in: "Hold Fast to the Main Orientation in the Struggle", in: "Hongqi" (Red Flag), cited in: "Peking Review", No. 39, 1966; p. 22).

"The masses" must, of course identify "those within the Party who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road":

It is imperative that those within the Party who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road should first be identified, and that the utmost should be done to identify them without error and to unmask them completely".

("A Programmatic Document of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution", in: "Hongqi" (Red Flag), cited in: "Peking Review", No. 34, 1966; p. 20).

But how are the "masses" to identify without error "those who are within the Party who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road"?

Not, of course, by what they say, for they will claim to be revolutionaries and not counter-revolutionaries:

"Their speciality is to wave 'red flags' to oppose the red flag"

("Oppose Economism and Smash the Latest Counter-Attack by the Bourgeois Reactionary Line", in: "Renmin Ribao" (People's Daily), cited in "Peking Review", No. 4, 1967; p. 13).

"The masses" can identify "those within the Party who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road" by their opposition to "The Thought of Mao Tse-tung", i.e., the ideology of the counter-revolutionary landlord/comprador capitalist faction headed by Mao Tse-tung:

"The attitude towards Mao Tse-tung's thought, whether to accept it or resist it, to support it or oppose it, to love it warmly or be hostile to it, this is the touchstone to test and the watershed between true revolution and sham revolution, between revolution and counter-revolution".

("Mao Tse-tung's Thought is the Telescope and Microscope of our Revolutionary Cause", in: "Jiofangjun Bao" (Liberation Army Daily), cited in: "Peking Review", No. 24, 1966; p. 7).

"The masses" can also identify "those within the Party who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road" from the fact that they resist the "spontaneous" movement of the masses directed at them:

"Those who have wormed their way into the Party and are taking the capitalist road . . . are extremely afraid of being exposed by the masses and therefore seek every possible pretext to suppress the mass movement".

(Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution", August 8th, 1966, in: "Peking Review", No. 33, 1966; p. 7).

"The masses" can identify "those within the Party who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road" from the fact that they present the "cultural revolution" as a counter-revolutionary movement and strive to divert "the masses" against the leadership of the "cultural revolution":

"They call white black and switch the target of the struggle by turning its spearhead against the proletarian revolutionary line, the proletarian revolutionary headquarters and the revolutionary masses".

("Oppose Economism and Smash the Latest Counter-Attack by the Bourgeois Reactionary Line", in: "Renmin Ribao" (People's Daily), cited in: "Peking Review", No. 4, 1967; p. 13).

"Making use of that portion of political power they exercise in those departments and localities under their control, this handful of persons . . . want to brand as a 'counter-revolutionary' anyone who rises up and rebels against them and even dismiss or imprison him".

("Proletarian Revolutionaries, Unite", in: "Hongqi" (Red Flag), cited in: "Peking Review", No. 4, 1967; p. 16).

The Call to Rebellion

The Central Committee of the Party, now dominated by the pro-US landlord/comprador faction headed by Mao Tse-tung, met from August 1st-12th, 1966 and on August 8th approved a resolution confirming the orientation of the "cultural revolution" already outlined.

On August 5th Mao Tse-tung personally issued a big-character poster giving the call to rebellion: "BOMBARD THE HEADQUARTERS!"

"'Bombard the Headquarters' . . . was a great call to battle to the whole Party and the people of the whole country".
("Completely Smash the Bourgeois Headquarters", in: "Hongqi" (Red Flag), cited in: "Peking Review", No. 33, 1967; p. 6-7).

One of the main slogans made use of in the propaganda of the counter-revolutionaries was taken from a speech made by Mao Tse-tung in 1939:

"Rebellion is justified".
(Mao Tse-tung: Speech at a Meeting of People from Various Walks of Life Celebrating Stalin's 60th Birthday Anniversary, cited in: "Peking Review", No. 15, 1967; p. 9).

Whatever the usefulness of this slogan in particular circumstances, "rebellion" is not a term used in the slogans of Marxist-Leninists. "Rebellion" signifies a rising, usually of a spontaneous character, against a state. But whether such a rising is progressive or reactionary depends on the class character of the state concerned and on the class character of the forces rising against it. Clearly where, as in China in 1966, there existed no political party representing the interests of the working class, the call to "rebellion" against the "new-democratic" state, dominated by a faction representing the interests of the national capitalists, could only be a call to counter-revolution.

The "Red Guards"

However, the counter-revolutionary pro-US landlord/comprador capitalist faction headed by Mao Tse-tung needed a vanguard shock force to lead "the masses" along the desired path.

On June 13th, 1966 schools and colleges were closed indefinitely to enable students and pupils to take part in the "cultural revolution". From them the first units of "Red Guards" were formed in June/July 1966

"The Red Guards are the shock force of the great proletarian cultural revolution".
("In Praise of the Red Guards", in: "Hongqi" (Red Flag), cited in: "Peking Review", No. 39, 1966; p. 15).

The youth of the "Red Guards" were distinguished from those of the Communist Youth League (which was still under the leadership of the national capitalist faction headed by Liu Shao-chi) by their fanatically committed role as "young soldiers of Mao":

"The Red Guards say, and say it well: Chairman Mao is our red commandor and we are the young, red soldiers of Chairman Mao. . . .

They carry with them copies of 'Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung. . . .

The young Red Guard fighters are concentrating all their forces to strike at the handful of bourgeois rightists, and their main target is those in power within the Party who are taking the capitalist road".
(Ibid.; p. 15, 16).

At first the "Red Guards" were generally seen correctly as young reactionary hooligans. But at a mass meeting in Peking on August 18th, 1966, Mao Tse-tung signified his approval of the movement by donning the red armband worn by the "Red Guards":

"When the Red Guards first appeared in June and July 1966, they consisted only of several score people and were smeared as a 'reactionary organisation'. . . they were attacked and assaulted from all sides. However, the great proletarian revolutionary Chairman Mao . . . sang the praise of the Red Guards for their proletarian revolutionary rebel spirit and gave them firm and warm support. Chairman Mao's voice was like a clap of spring thunder. In a very brief time, Red Guards developed in schools all over the country, in many factories and rural areas, and became an enormous and powerful cultural revolutionary army. . . They have served as the vanguard".
("Carry the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution through to the End", in: "Renmin Ribao" (People's Daily), cited in: "Peking Review", No. 1, 1967; p. 9).

From August to November 1966, "Red Guards" were encouraged to come to Peking and some 9 million took advantage of free rail transport and accommodation to come to the capital. Between August 18th and November 26th eight mass demonstrations were held in Peking at which Mao Tse-tung reviewed a total of 11 million "Red Guards".

During their sojourn in Peking, the "Red Guards" from the provinces were accommodated in army barracks, and were given ideological and military training, before being sent back to their home towns and villages to "spread the flames of the great proletarian cultural revolution throughout the country":

"Last year, when millions of young revolutionary fighters came to Peking, PLA men received them warmly and trained them. They saw to it that these youngsters had proper meals and warm lodgings and passed on to them the glorious traditions of the PLA. They enabled these young revolutionary fighters to take part in at least one of the great Tien An Men square reviews by Chairman Mao and later saw them all safely off to spread the flames of the great proletarian cultural revolution throughout the country".
("PLA's New Contributions in Serving the People", in: "Peking Review", No. 36, 1967; p. 6).

The reactionary class background of the leaders of the "Red Guards" was tacitly admitted by "Renmin Ribao" (People's Daily) in January 1967, when it took to task those who drew attention to this on the grounds that they were "advertising the reactionary 'theory of family lineage'":

"This very small number of persons who stubbornly cling to the bourgeois reactionary line made use of the slogan: 'A hero's son is a real man! A reactionary's son is no damned good!' to bewilder a number of students, create factions and

confuse the class fronts. . . The way these people with ulterior motives have made use of the slogan is in essence to advertise the exploiting classes' reactionary 'theory of family lineage'".

("Carry the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution through to the End", in: "Renmin Ribao" (People's Daily), cited in "Peking Review", No. 1, 1967; p. 10).

Inspired by their glimpse of "the greatest genius of all time", and by the military and ideological training given to them, the "Red Guards" proceeded to "spread the flames of the great proletarian cultural revolution throughout the country" by attacking the offices of the Communist Party, by beating, torturing and killing its officials, and by smashing records of such "bourgeois" composers as Bach and Beethoven.

The attack upon the Communist Party of China, the lower organs of which were still controlled by the national capitalist faction headed by Liu Shao-chi, had begun.

The Assault on the Cultural and Propaganda Organs

At the end of June 1966, the counter-revolutionaries began a press campaign against a leading member of the national capitalist faction, Chou Yang, Deputy Director of the Propaganda Department of the Communist Party, who had played a prominent role in the campaign against the Chinese "rightists" and against Soviet revisionism:

"Chou Yang . . . was the ringleader of the black line against the Party, socialism and Mao Tse-tung's thought in literary and art circles. . . What a black-hearted, hideous character he is, . . . the lord of hell in literary and art circles".

(Wu Chi-yen: "Repudiate Chou Yang's Revisionist Programme for Literature and Art", in: "Peking Review", No. 34, 1966; p. 29, 37).

In July 1966 Lu Ting-yi (Minister of Culture and Director of the Propaganda Department of the Party), together with Lin Mo-han (Deputy Minister of Culture) were dismissed from their posts for having been responsible for the appointment of Chou Yang. Tao Chu was appointed Director of the Party's Propaganda Department and General Hsiao Wang-tung Acting Minister of Culture.

On December 20th, 1966 Lu Ting-yi was "arrested" by "Red Guards", and on January 3rd, 1967 the arrest of Chou Yang was officially announced.

Meanwhile Tao Chu had taken a stand against the counter-revolutionary "cultural revolution", and on January 10th, 1967, a special rally was held in Peking to denounce him.

"After he took charge of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee, Tao Chu became the faithful agent of the top Party person in authority taking the capitalist road in suppressing the revolutionary masses. He did his utmost to oppose Chairman Mao's great big-character poster 'Bombard the Headquarters'. He tried his best to protect the monsters. . . He shouted himself hoarse that 'in the great cultural revolution it is correct to doubt everyone'".

(Yao Wen-yuan: "Comments on Tao Chu's Two Books, in: "Renmin Ribao" (People's Daily), cited in "Peking Review", No. 38, 1967; p. 16).

Tao Chu was also charged with having spoken disparagingly of Mao Tse-tung, "the great red sun", in an article entitled "The Sun's Radiance" by saying:

"The sun itself has black spots on it".
(Tao Chu: "The Sun's Radiance", cited by: Yao Wen-yuan: ibid.; p. 13).

On February 13th, 1967 it was announced that Wang Li (Acting Editor of "Renmin Ribao") had been appointed Director of the Propaganda Department of the Party in place of Tao Chu.

The Assault on the Press

In August 1966 the "Chinese Youth Daily", the organ of the Communist Youth League, was closed down.

On September 3rd, 1966 the "Beijing Ribao" (Peking Daily), the editorial board of which had been "reorganised" in June, suspended publication. It reappeared on January 20th, 1967, when it carried an editorial denouncing the "crimes" of its former editors.

During November 1966 about half the staff of "Renmin Ribao" (People's Daily) were transferred to other duties. This signalled a general "reorganisation" of the editorial boards of newspapers throughout the country -- "Jiefangjun Bao" (Liberation Army Daily) and "Hongqi" (Red Flag) being the only major organs unaffected.

The Assault on the Young and Trade Union Organisations

In August 1966 the Communist Youth League was dissolved and its members advised to join "Red Guard" organisations. In September an exhibition was opened at the former headquarters of the League to illustrate the "crimes" of its former leadership.

On January 3rd, 1967 the All-China Trade Union Federation was dissolved and its functions transferred to a new organisation, the "Chinese Association of Red Rebels".

These moves proved unacceptable to the majority of the members, and both organisations continued to operate illegally:

"By ordering the dissolution of the conservative organisations, we had simply deepened their members' antagonism towards us. . . As a result, not only did the conservative organisations remain intact, but those individuals who had been wavering rejoined them". (The Red Rebel Column of the North China Structural Metals Plant: "How We Achieved Unity Against the Enemy", in: "China Reconstructs"; October, 1967; p. 48).

Accordingly, in March 1967 the Communist Youth League and the All-China Trade Union Federation were permitted to function legally under "reorganised" leaderships.

"Proletarian Discipline"

As the "Red Guards" began their assaults upon the organs of the Communist Party in all areas where these were controlled by the national capitalist faction headed by Liu Shao-chi, these organs directed their members to resist these attacks and called upon the workers, peasants and soldiers in their areas to defend the organs of the Party.

The counter-revolutionaries were, therefore, compelled to wage a propaganda offensive against such clauses of the Party Constitution as that which laid down:

"Each individual Party member shall submit to the decisions of the Party organisation to which he belongs".
(Constitution of the Communist Party of China, cited in: Liu Shao-chi: "On the Party"; Peking; 1950; p. 171),

denouncing such principles as "bourgeois discipline" and "counter-revolutionary discipline":

"Diehards who take the capitalist road have absurdly identified the leadership in their own units with the Party's Central Committee and the entire Party. Making use of the great love which the broad masses of workers, peasants and soldiers have for the Party, and making use of some among the masses who did not know the truth, they have raised such slogans as: Defend the Party committees in your own locality, and of your own department; and if there were revolutionary students who criticised them and rose in rebellion against them, these revolutionary students were said to be 'anti-Party'".

("Workers, Peasants and Soldiers Must Firmly Support the Revolutionary Students", in: "Renmin Ribao" (People's Daily), cited in: "Peking Review", No. 35, 1966; p. 18).

"An important weapon of these reactionary elements for preserving their reactionary rule is to illegally use the name of the Party and turn Party discipline into bourgeois discipline to repress the masses and oppose revolution. This counter-revolutionary discipline must be thoroughly smashed".
("On Revolutionary Discipline and Revolutionary Authority of the Proletariat" in: "Hongqi" (Red Flag), cited in: "Peking Review", No. 7, 1967; p. 18).

"Obedience! Absolute obedience! Unconditional obedience! The minority, though correct, must subordinate to the majority that is wrong; the subordinate, though correct, must submit to the superior who is wrong; the individual though correct, must absolutely submit to the organisation that is wrong. This is nothing but counter-revolutionary discipline imposed on the revolutionary masses by the No. 1 Party person in authority taking the capitalist road in order to maintain his reactionary rule".

(Red Guards' Regiment in the Mao Tse-tung's Thought Philosophy and Social Sciences Department of the Chinese Academy of Sciences: "Bury the Slave Mentality advocated by China's Khrushchov", in: "Renmin Ribao" (People's Daily), cited in: "Peking Review", No. 16, 1967; p. 14).

Thus, declared the counter-revolutionaries, Party members and the "masses" must reject this "bourgeois discipline" and accept "proletarian discipline", "revolutionary discipline", that is, obedience to the "Central Committee" of the Party (controlled by the counter-revolutionary faction headed by Mao Tse-tung) and to Mao Tse-tung personally:

"As for us proletarian revolutionary fighters, . . . what we accept unconditionally is the correct leadership of the Party's Central Committee headed by Chairman Mao".
(Red Guards' Regiment . . . etc.: *ibid.*; p. 14).

"The proletarian revolutionary line that Chairman Mao represents is the highest authority in the greatest proletarian cultural revolution. All provisional organs of power that carry out this correct line in directing the struggle to seize power should have authority and do have it as a matter of course. Proletarian revolutionaries should take it as their obligation to assume such authority. This is the authority of the proletariat".

("On Revolutionary Discipline . . . , op. cit.; p. 19).

"Strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat. Those who oppose Chairman Mao, Vice-Chairman Lin Piao, the Party Central Committee's Cultural Revolution Group, and those who undermine the great cultural revolution or sabotage production shall be immediately arrested by the Public Security Bureau". (The Shanghai Workers' Revolutionary Rebel General Headquarters and 31 Other Revolutionary Rebel Organisations: "Urgent Notice", cited in: "Peking Review", No. 4, 1967; p. 9).

The "Weltanschauung" of the Chinese Counter-Revolutionaries

The German monopoly capitalists, in imposing and maintaining their fascist dictatorship, found it desirable to foster an official "Weltanschauung" (World outlook) which only "traitors" would dare to question.

The Chinese pro-US ex-landlord/comprador capitalist classes, in striving to impose their military dictatorship, also found it desirable to foster an official "Weltanschauung" -- the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung" -- based on such extracts from the writings and speeches of Mao as they found useful to their needs at a particular moment:

"China . . . needs unified thinking. . . That is Mao Tse-tung's thought".

(Lin Piao: Letter on the Creative Study and Application of Chairman Mao's Works on the Industrial and Communications Front, cited in: "Peking Review", No. 46, 1967; p. 20).

"The absolute authority of the great thought of Mao Tse-tung must be thoroughly established throughout the Party, the army, the country and the world".

(Yang Cheng-wu: "Thoroughly Establish the Absolute Authority of the Great Supreme Commander Chairman Mao", in: "Peking Review", No. 46, 1967; p. 21).

The Cult of Mao's Personality

In imposing their terrorist dictatorship through the fascist party, the German monopoly capitalists found it useful to build up a "cult of personality" around the fascist leader Adolf Hitler, presenting him as "an infallible genius" whose every word must be obeyed as "patriots".

In seeking to impose their military dictatorship, the Chinese pro-US ex-landlords and comprador capitalists also found it useful to build up a "cult of personality" around the revisionist leader who represented their interests, Mao Tse-tung, presenting him as "an infallible genius" whose every word must be obeyed by patriots.

The cult of Mao's personality began to take an extreme form in July, 1966, when great prominence was given to reports that Mao had swum nine miles in the Yangtse.

In the autumn of 1966 Mao reviewed some 11 million "Red Guards" in Peking, prior to their return home to "spread the flames of the cultural revolution". At the same time all the propaganda organs controlled by the counter-revolutionaries began to publish large photographs of Mao in every issue, he being described as:

". . . the great teacher, great leader, great supreme commander and great helmsman".
("Peking Review", No. 38, 1966; p. 3).

On August 8th, 1966 it was announced that the country's entire printing industry would be mobilised to print 35 million copies of Mao's writings by the end of 1967.

In the spring of 1967, as it became obvious that the "cultural revolution" was failing to achieve its planned "blitzkrieg", the counter-revolutionaries proceeded to raise to ever more exaggerated heights the cult of Mao Tse-tung, to whom the obedience of everyone in China -- and in the world! -- was due:

"Chairman Mao is the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our era. Every sentence uttered by Chairman Mao is truth. . . . Therefore we must act according to Chairman Mao's instructions whether or not we have already fully grasped its significance. . . .

A proletarian party must have its own true outstanding leader and it is necessary to establish his absolute revolutionary authority throughout the party".
(Lin Chieh: "Down with Slavishness", in: "Renmin Ribao" (People's Daily), cited in "Peking Review", No. 27, 1967; p. 30).

"If you are a revolutionary, a Marxist-Leninist, you will inevitably support the great leader Chairman Mao . . . ; if you are a counter-revolutionary, an anti-Marxist-Leninist, you will inevitably oppose Chairman Mao. . . .

Chairman Mao is the very red sun that shines most brightly in our hearts. He is the great teacher, great leader, great supreme commander and great helmsman selected by the proletariat and the revolutionary people of China and the world in the course of their protracted revolutionary struggles. He is the authority of the world proletarian struggle in the present era. . . .

He has the most profound Marxist-Leninist wisdom and the richest experience in struggle. . . .

Comrade Lin Piao says that a genius like Chairman Mao appears in the world only once in hundreds of years, or in China only once in thousands of years. Chairman Mao is the world's greatest genius. . . . Chairman Mao will always be our supreme leader, our supreme commander and the red sun shining brightly in our hearts. Without him, there would not be the great Party we now have, nor our great army and great country; the Chinese people would have nothing, and the people of the world would find it impossible to achieve their liberation. . . . We will always follow him closely and thoroughly establish the absolute authority of our great supreme commander Chairman Mao. We pledge our lives to defend Chairman Mao's position as the supreme leader. Anyone who opposes Chairman Mao stands condemned by all of us, the whole Party; he will be denounced by all of us, the entire nation. . . .

None of the earlier Marxist-Leninists personally, at the very forefront, directed as many important political and military campaigns as Chairman Mao. And none of them experienced such protracted sharp and diverse struggles as Chairman Mao has". (Yang Cheng-wu: "Thoroughly Establish the Absolute Authority of the Great Supreme Commander Chairman Mao", in: "Peking Review", No. 46, 1967; p. 17-18, 19, 20).

In May 1967

". . . a huge statue of Chairman Mao was unveiled at Tsinghua University in Peking". ("Peking Review", No. 20, 1967; p. 5),

and in the same month the Military Commission of the "Central Committee" of the Communist Party announced that, from the middle of the month, a badge bearing the profile of Mao Tse-tung would be issued to every member of the army:

"The General Political Department of the PLA points out that the issue of the badges is an important event in the political life of the entire army. Wearing the badges will remind the PLA men that their great leader, the reddest red sun in their hearts, is always with them. . .

The General Political Department urges all commanders and fighters, after receiving badges, to be still more loyal to Chairman Mao. . . , act according to his instructions and be his good fighters". ("Peking Review", No. 21, 1967; p. 13).

And it was announced in July 1967 that

". . . more than 840 million copies of portraits of Chairman Mao . . . were printed in the 11 months from July 1966 to the end of May 1967". ("Peking Review", No. 31, 1967; p. 5).

"Mass Study"

In order to foster the illusion that the counter-revolution was a "revolution" led by Marxist-Leninists", as well as to boost the leader of the counter-revolution as "the world's greatest Marxist-Leninist", a campaign was instituted by the counter-revolutionaries for the "mass study" of the writings of Mao Tse-tung.

Naturally, the study of the classics of Marxism-Leninism -- the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin -- was not encouraged, on the grounds that

". . . in our era, the study of Mao Tse-tung's thought is the best way to study Marxism-Leninism".

(Yang Cheng-wu: "Thoroughly Establish the Absolute Authority of the Great Supreme Commander Chairman Mao", in: "Peking Review", No. 46, 1967; p. 22).

On the other hand, the deep study and analysis of Mao Tse-tung's works, which might reveal the revisionist content of some of the more important of these works, was equally discouraged as

"... the academic study of theory behind closed doors".
(Kuang Hsuan: "Basic Assurance for Consolidating the
Proletarian Dictatorship", in: "Peking Review", No. 35, 1967;
p. 10).

Thus, in place of the deep study and analysis of Mao's works,
the counter-revolutionaries demanded a form of "mass study" which
would yield the "quick results" they wanted:

"Comrade Lin Piao . . . showed amazing courage and determination
in unswervingly and actively initiating the mass movement for the
creative study and application of Chairman Mao's works throughout
the army, the Party, and the country. . . . He has stressed the
necessity of using Mao Tse-tung's thought to unify the thinking
of the entire Party and of the people of the whole country. .
First study what must be urgently applied so as to get quick
results".
(Yang Cheng-wu: op. cit.; p. 22).

The book recommended above all others for the "mass study" of "the
Thought of Mao Tse-tung" was "Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung",
and the "mass study" of this book of isolated quotations consisted
primarily of learning them by heart and reciting, chanting or singing
them collectively in the manner of a religious ritual:

"China's hundreds of millions are absorbedly studying the
'Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung'. . . The red, plastic-
covered pocket edition of the 'Quotations' has become the basic
most constantly read book of the masses. . .

You will hear people reading them aloud collectively at their
work places, during work breaks, before a meeting, play or movie,
while travelling by train, bus or ship. . . They are determined
to imprint every word on their minds, infuse every sentence into
their blood".

("All China Studies 'Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung'", in:
"Peking Review", No. 2, 1967; p. 14).

The masses are taking Comrade Lin Piao's advice: 'In order
really to master Mao Tse-tung's thought, it is necessary to study
many of Chairman Mao's basic concepts over and over again, and
it is best to memorise some of his important passages.' . .
Workers, peasants, soldiers, revolutionary cadres and intellectuals,
and young Red Guard fighters are . . . committing many of Chairman
Mao's instructions to memory. Hence the public demand for
Chairman Mao's instructions to be set to music so that they can
be sung every day and at any time, the better to imprint them
in one's mind more deeply. . .

The workers say: . . . 'Singing these songs is as good as
attending a political class.' . ."
("Quotations from Chairman Mao Set to Music", in: "Peking Review",
No. 2, 1967; p. 27).

As a result of this intense propaganda, the "little red book"
came to acquire some of the characteristics of a "sacred object", a
"charm" against "ghosts, demons and monsters":

"Waving their red-covered 'Quotations from Chairman Mao
Tse-tung', the revolutionary masses shouted again and again:
'Long Live the People's Republic of China!' . .

Holding 'Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung' in their
hands, Comrades Chou En-lai, Kang Sheng, . . went up, shook
hands with them and embraced them. . .

A group of Red Guard fighters then . . . presented them with copies of the treasured revolutionary book 'Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung' . . .

The Indonesian fighters friends waved their copies of 'Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung' to express their high respect".

("Chairman Mao's Red Diplomatic Fighters Return Gloriously from Indonesia to Peking", in: "Peking Review", No. 46, 1967; p. 36, 37).

"A handful of ruffians . . . went so far as to burn a copy of 'Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung' which is most treasured by the revolutionary people of the world and regarded by them as a powerful weapon against imperialism, revisionism and all reactionaries. Staff members of the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires Office, who have enormous love for the great leader Chairman Mao, immediately rushed out to stop the ruffians' shameless crime, and managed to seize evidence of the crime on the spot. . .

On July 5, Chinese Chargé d'Affaires ad interim Shen Ping lodged the most serious and most emphatic protest with the British Foreign Office".

("Peking Review", No. 29, 1967; p. 40).

A Further "Purge" in the Army High Command

On November 26th, 1966 it was announced at a Peking rally of "revolutionary workers in the field of literature and art" that the Peking opera and ballet companies, together with the Philharmonic Orchestra, had been incorporated into the army, and that Chiang Ching (Mao's wife) had been appointed adviser to the army on cultural work.

On January 12th, 1967 a new committee was set up to take responsibility for the "cultural revolution" in the army. It was headed by Marshal Hsu Hsiang-chien, and included General Yang Cheng-wu (Acting Chief of Staff and author of the previously-quoted article "Thoroughly Establish the Absolute Authority of the Great Supreme Commander Mao Tse-tung"), General Hsaio Hua, and Chiang Ching.

On January 13th, 1967 the newspaper "Jiefangjun Bao" (Liberation Army Daily) called for a "purge" in the army.

On February 8th, following widespread strikes in the province of Szechwan said to have been "encouraged by the local authorities", Peking Radio denounced the Chengtu Military District, commanded by Marshal Ho Lung, (a member of the Military Commission of the "Central Committee" of the Party) as "a den of reactionary forces".

On February 10th a poster attributed to Lin Piao appeared in Peking accusing another member of the Military Commission, Marshal Chu Teh, of "ambition" and of being "an associate" of Peng Teh-huai.

On February 11th it was announced in Peking that Marshals Ho Lung and Chu Teh had been dismissed from the Military Commission.

On April 16th, 1967 it was announced that Marshal Hsu Hsiang-chieh had been removed from his post as director of the "cultural revolution" in the armed forces for having opposed Lin Piao at a recent meeting of the Military Commission and for having ignored Chiang Ching (Mao's wife) in her role as "adviser" to the army on "cultural work".

The Attack upon Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping

In November 1966 posters appeared in Peking denouncing the leading members of the national capitalist faction -- Liu Shao-chi, President of the People's Republic of China, and Teng Hsiao-ping, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China.

In April 1967 "Hongqi" (Red Flag) opened an attack upon Liu Shao-chi, identifying him with the "No. 1 Party person in authority taking the capitalist road". The main theme of these attacks was to present Liu as a supporter of capitalism within China. The facts that support for the continuance of capitalism in China after the victory of the national-democratic revolution in China had long been the policy of the Communist Party of China and that the principal author of this policy had been Mao Tse-tung, were, of course, not referred to. On the contrary, Mao was presented as having fought this policy in opposition to Liu Shao-chi:

"Chairman Mao has said that THE FOUNDING OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON OCTOBER 1, 1949, MARKED THE BASIC COMPLETION OF THE STAGE OF NEW-DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION AND THE BEGINNING OF THE STAGE OF SOCIALIST REVOLUTION. The top Party person in authority taking the capitalist road, however, harped on a contrary tune, painstakingly preached 'consolidation of the new-democratic order', and campaigned for the development of capitalism in China".
(Chi Pen-yu: "Patriotism or National Betrayal?", in: "Hongqi" (Red Flag), cited in: "Peking Review", No. 15, 1967; p. 14).

In April/May 1967, as part of the mounting propoganda campaign against Liu Shao-chi, the press organs controlled by the counter-revolutionary faction headed by Mao Tse-tung, opened an attack upon Liu's book "How to be a good Communist". The book, which consists of a series of lectures delivered by Liu in July 1939 in Yen-an, had, over the twenty-eight years since its first publication, been widely used by the Communist Party of China as a textbook for the training of Party members and had been republished several times in new editions. In May 1967, however, it was suddenly discovered to be

". . . a big poisonous weed opposed to Marxism-Leninism"
(Editorial Depts. of "Hongqi" and "Renmin Ribao": "Betrayal of Proletarian Dictatorship Is an Essential Element in the Book on 'Self-Cultivation'", in: "Hongqi" and "Renmin Ribao", cited in: "Peking Review", No. 20, 1967; p. 7).

The "Revolutionary Committees"

By the beginning of January 1967, the shock troops of the counter-revolution, the "Red Guards", had succeeded in building around them a section of "the masses" composed of open counter-revolutionaries, anarchists and trotskyites, together with some petty bourgeois and working people who had been deceived by the demagogic propoganda of the counter-revolutionaries.

And in January 1967 these forces, calling themselves the "Revolutionary Rebels", responded to Mao Tse-tung's call and launched their "January Revolution".

The aim of the "Revolutionary Rebels" was to destroy the organs of the Communist Party and of the "pseudo-democratic" state still under the control of the national capitalist faction headed by Liu Shao-chi, and to replace them by new organs of power representing the class interests of the Pro-US ex-landlord and comprador capitalist classes. These new organs of power were named "Revolutionary Committees".

The first "Revolutionary Committee" was established on January 14th, 1967, in the province of Shansi.

The proclamation of the Heilungkiang "Revolutionary Committee" on January 31st, 1967 was typical:

"The proclamation solemnly declared that all Party government, financial and cultural power of the former Provincial Party Committee and Provincial People's Council belongs to the Revolutionary Committee as from the date of its founding. The leadership of the Provincial Party Committee and the Provincial People's Council was thereby put to an end".
("Peking Review", No. 7, 1967; p. 12).

The obligatory constitutional structure of such "Revolutionary Committees" was that of the "Three-in-One" combination:

"Chairman Mao has pointed out that in those places and organisations where power needs to be seized, the policy of the revolutionary 'three-in-one' combination must be carried out in establishing a provisional organ of power. . . This organ of power should preferably be called a revolutionary committee".
("On the Revolutionary 'Three-in-One' Combination", in: "Hongqi" (Red Flag), cited in: "Peking Review", No. 17, 1967; p. 14).

The most important constituent of this "three-in-one" combination was to consist of

". . . the representatives of the People's Liberation Army units situated in the area".
(Ibid.; p. 14).

The second constituent was to consist of representatives of the counter-revolutionary "Revolutionary Rebels" (which now included the "Red Guards") described as

". . . leaders of revolutionary mass organisations that truly represent the broad masses".
(Ibid.; p. 14).

The third constituent was to consist of Party and former Party and state officials who had come over to the side of the counter-revolutionaries, described as

". . . revolutionary leading cadres".
(Ibid.; p. 14).

The necessity of winning over such "revolutionary leading cadres" was emphasised by the counter-revolutionary leaders:

"Revolutionary cadres should be drawn into the revolutionary provisional organ of power because they have greater experience in the struggle, are more capable in organisational and other work and have a relatively high level of understanding of policy. A pressing, important task is now to draw a large number of revolutionary cadres, including those who have committed mistakes but who are correcting them in earnest, into the 'three-in-one' provisional organs of power at all levels and to use them boldly. Only in this way can revolutionary organs of power with proletarian authority be established".

("Implement Chairman Mao's Cadre Policy Correctly", in: "Renmin Ribao" (People's Daily), cited in: "Peking Review", No. 44, 1967; p. 9)

In practice, the representatives of the army occupied the dominant positions in the "Revolutionary Committees".

The Struggle Against "Economism"

One result of the damagocic "anti-capitalist" propaganda of the counter-revolutionaries was to mislead some sections of the working class into believing that the "cultural revolution" represented a stage in the socialist revolution. Where the Party and state organs remained under the control of the national capitalist faction, they attempted to win and hold the support of the working class (as well as to expose the demagogic nature of the propaganda put out by the counter-revolutionaries) by granting increases in wages, by shortening working hours and by improving social services.

The counter-revolutionaries were compelled to attack this policy under the guise of attacking "economism":

"The handful of persons in the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee who are in authority . . . tried to . . . shift the general orientation of the revolutionary struggle by increasing wages and material benefits".

("Firmly Support the Revolutionary Peasant Movement, Thoroughly Smash Counter-Revolutionary Economism", in: "Peking Review", No. 5, 1967; p. 15).

"The reactionary elements freely squander the wealth of the state, arbitrarily increasing wages and benefits. . .

This economism is opposed to Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought".

("Oppose Economism and Smash the Counter-Attack by the Bourgeois Reactionary Line", in: "Renmin Ribao" (People's Daily), cited in: "Peking Review", No. 4, 1967; p. 13-14).

"We hope that you will become models and . . . opposing . . . economism and selfishness.

You should strengthen labour discipline. . .

You should, in accordance with the regulations laid down by the Party's Central Committee, firmly uphold the eight-hour work day".

(Central Committee, CPC: Letter to Revolutionary Workers and Staff and Revolutionary Cadres in Industrial and Mining Enterprises, cited in: "Peking Review", No. 13, 1967; p. 5).

In contrast, the counter-revolutionary "Revolutionary Committees" were enjoined to shun "rash expenditure", to cut social services and to transform education into fascist-type indoctrination:

"Thrift and frugality are the qualities of the proletariat, and extravagance and waste are characteristics of the bourgeoisie.

When the proletarian revolutionaries take financial power into their own hands, they must be thrifty and must not authorise expenditure rashly".

("Practise Economy in Carrying out Revolution", in: "Renmin Ribao" (People's Daily), cited in: "Peking Review", No. 6, 1967; p. 15).

"Chairman Mao has said that: 'THE PERIOD OF SCHOOLING MUST BE SHORTENED. . .'

The lessons will consist mainly of the conscientious study of Chairman Mao's works and of quotations from his writings, of documents relating to the great proletarian cultural revolution and the criticism and repudiation of bourgeois teaching materials and methods -- all being linked with the great proletarian cultural revolution".

("Re-Open Classes and Make Revolution in Primary and Secondary Schools", in: "Renmin Ribao" (People's Daily), cited in: "Peking Review", No. 11, 1967; p. 13, 14).

And as for

". . . houses confiscated from capitalists"

(Shanghai Workers' Revolutionary Rebel General Headquarters and 31 Other Revolutionary Organisations: "Urgent Notice", cited in: "Peking Review", No. 4, 1967; p. 8),

by people who had thought the "cultural revolution" to be a stage in the socialist revolution,

"Those who have moved into houses seized by force must move back to their original lodgings within one week".
(Ibid.; p. 9).

The Call to the Army

By January 21st, 1967, the offensive of the counter-revolutionary "Revolutionary Rebels" had been beaten off in every city and province in the People's Republic of China with the solitary exception of Shansi.

On this day the counter-revolutionaries were compelled to repudiate their original propaganda to the effect that the "cultural revolution" was a movement of "the masses" against "a handful", and to order the People's Liberation Army actively to intervene on the side of the rebels, "even though they may be just a minority":

"The People's Liberation Army . . . must . . . firmly stand on the side of the proletarian revolutionaries. The PLA must firmly support and assist them, for this is a great call from our great leader Chairman Mao. We must follow Chairman Mao's teachings and enthusiastically, unequivocally and wholeheartedly support the proletarian revolutionary rebels in rising to seize power. Even though they may be just a minority temporarily, we must support them without the slightest hesitation".

("The People's Liberation Army Firmly Backs the Proletarian

Revolutionaries", in: "Jiefangjun Bao" (Liberation Army Daily), cited in: "Peking Review", No. 5, 1967; p. 10).

The "Red Guards" being in these circumstances of little further use to the counter-revolutionaries, primary schools were reopened in February 1967, secondary schools in March 1967, and colleges in July 1967.

Civil War

But even the order to the army to intervene actively on the side of the counter-revolutionaries failed to bring about the planned "blitzkrieg".

ONLY AFTER ALMOST TWO YEARS OF BITTER STRUGGLE -- REACHING IN MANY AREAS OF THE COUNTRY THE LEVEL OF A FIERCE ARMED CIVIL WAR -- DID THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY FACTION HEADED BY MAO TSE-TUNG SUCCEED IN ESTABLISHING ITS POWER THROUGHOUT CHINA.

As the counter-revolutionaries expressed it euphemistically in June 1967:

"At present, the development of China's great proletarian cultural revolution is uneven".

("A Theoretical Weapon for Making Revolution under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", in: "Hongqi" (Red Flag), cited in: "Peking Review", No. 26, 1967; p. 32).

The most important factor in the failure of the "blitzkrieg" was the fact that a large proportion of Party members and organs at all levels were not deceived by the demagogic propaganda of the counter-revolutionaries but waged a determined struggle to expose it and to arouse the working people, and in particular the working class, actively to resist the counter-revolution:

As Mao Tse-tung himself put it in a big-character poster in August 1966:

"Some leading comrades from the central down to the local levels have . . . struck down the surging movement of the great cultural revolution of the proletariat".

(Mao Tse-tung: "Bombard the Headquarters", in: "Peking Review", No. 33, 1967; p. 5).

This gave the national capitalist faction headed by Liu Shao-chi "very deep and far-reaching influence" (as the propaganda organs of the counter-revolutionaries admitted) in their progressive struggle against the counter-revolution, resulting not merely in "desperate resistance" but "frenzied counter-attack".

"The most important plot and scheme of the very small number of persons who stubbornly persist in the bourgeois reactionary line is to incite the masses to struggle against each other. They have secretly organised and manipulated some people and mass organisations, whom they have hoodwinked, to suppress the revolution, protect themselves, and to provoke conflicts in which coercion and force are used in a vain attempt to create confusion. They spread rumours, turned black white and shifted the blame for the evil they had done behind people's backs on to the proletarian revolutionaries, labelling the latter with the 'bourgeois reactionary line'".

("Carry the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution through to the End", in: "Renmin Ribao" (People's Daily) cited in: "Peking Review", No. 1; 1967; p. 10).

"Some of these scoundrels have been overthrown, but they still stubbornly refuse to admit their heinous crimes against the Party and socialism. They seize every opportunity to hit out wildly in a vengeful counter-attack. . .

In order to save themselves from imminent destruction they invariably manipulate and make use of a number of conservative or reactionary organisations, mislead a section of the people and wage desperate last-minute struggles against the revolutionary forces. They come out into open, bare their fangs and do not even scruple to lay their murderous hands on proletarian revolutionaries". ("Carry Revolutionary Mass Criticism through to the End", in: "Renmin Ribao" (People's Daily), cited in: "Peking Review", No. 31, 1967; p. 6).

Though the bourgeois headquarters has been stripped of its organisational and administrative power, the pernicious influence of the bourgeois reactionary line pushed by them over a long period is very deep and far-reaching. . .

Are not these stubborn class enemies still putting up a desperate resistance and frenzied counter-attack?" ("Bombard the Bourgeois Headquarters", in: "Renmin Ribao" (People's Daily), cited in: "Peking Review", No. 33, 1967; p. 10).

"There are now a handful of counter-revolutionaries who are . . . bombarding the proletarian headquarters, creating dissension and exploiting confusion". (Yao Won-yuan: "Comments on Tao Chu's Two Books", in: "Peking Review", No. 38; 1967; p. 16).

The leading force in the resistance to, and counter-offensive against, the counter-revolution was the industrial working class, and widespread protest strikes took place in the factories.

This strike action developed in most areas of China into armed struggle, and in many areas army units disobeyed the orders of their officers and either refused to intervene or joined forces with the working people in resistance to the counter-revolutionaries. Not unnaturally, comment was scarce in the propaganda organs of the counter-revolutionaries on these mutinies within the armed forces:

"This counter-revolutionary organisation has two aims: one is to undermine and split the leadership of the Party's Central Committee headed by our great leader Chairman Mao and the other is to undermine and split the main pillar of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the great Chinese People's Liberation Army". (Yao Won-yuan: "Comments on Tao Chu's Two Books", in: "Peking Review", No. 38, 1967; p. 16).

"Owing to the extreme complexity of the class struggle, the arduousness of the tasks and lack of experience, it is inevitable that a few leading members of the PLA units in some places suffered from certain shortcomings or made certain mistakes".

("The Great Chinese PLA", in: "Hongqi" (Red Flag), cited in: "Peking Review", No. 36, 1967; p. 5).

"In certain places, some comrades in the local army units may commit temporary mistakes in giving their support because of the intricate and complex conditions of the class struggle". ("On the Revolutionary 'Three-in-One' Combination", in: "Hongqi" (Red Flag), cited in: "Peking Review", No. 12, 1967; p. 16).

"In case they (i.e., the commanders and soldiers of the army -- Ed.) supported the wrong side for a time, this should be corrected promptly". ("Warmly Respond to the Call to Support the Army and Cherish the People", in "Hongqi" (Red Flag), cited in: "Peking Review", No. 19, 1967; p. 22).

And even in the areas where the counter-revolutionary forces were firmly in control -- such as Peking, under martial law -- underground opposition activity took place:

"This counter-revolutionary organisation dare not come out into the open. It has hidden itself underground in Peking for the last few months. We have as yet not fully identified most of its members and leaders. For they send their people out to paste up broadsheets and paint slogans only in the silence of the night". (Yao Wen-yuan: op. cit.; p. 16).

The Victory of the Counter-Revolution

In the face of this determined resistance, the process of setting up counter-revolutionary organs of power in the form of "revolutionary committees" proceeded slowly, as follows:

January 14th, 1967:	Shansi
January 25th, 1967:	Kweichow
January 31st, 1967:	Hoilungkiang
February 25th, 1967:	Shanghai municipality
March 2nd, 1967:	Shantung
April 20th, 1967:	Peking municipality
August 12th, 1967:	Tsinghai
November 1st, 1967:	Inner Mongolia
December 6th, 1967:	Tientsin municipality
January 5th, 1968:	Kiangsi
January 14th, 1968:	Ninghsia
January 25th, 1968:	Kansu
January 27th, 1968:	Honan
February 3rd, 1968:	Hopeh
February 5th, 1968:	Hupoh
February 21st, 1968:	Kwangtung
March 6th, 1968:	Kirin
March 23rd, 1968:	Kiangsu
March 24th, 1968:	Chokiang
April 9th, 1968:	Hunan
April 18th, 1968:	Anhwei
May 1st, 1968:	Shensi
May 10th, 1968:	Liaoning
May 31st, 1968:	Szechwan
August 13th, 1968:	Yunnan
August 19th, 1968:	Fukien
August 26th, 1968:	Kwangsi
September 5th, 1968:	Sinkiang Tibet

On September 7th, 1968 it was officially announced that the "great proletarian cultural revolution" had been victorious throughout the country:

"Revolutionary committees have now been set up in all the provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions of the country with the exception of Taiwan Province".
("Long Live the All-Round Victory in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution", in: "Peking Review", No. 37, 1968; p. 3).

"Now we can declare that through repeated struggles during the past 20 months we have finally smashed the plot of the top Party persons in authority taking the capitalist road -- counter-revolutionary revisionists, ronegades, enemy agents and traitors, headed by China's Khrushchov -- to restore capitalism, and fulfilled the great call issued by our great leader Chairman Mao".
(Chou En-Lai: Speech at Peking Rally, September 7th, 1968, in: "Peking Review", No. 37, 1968; p. 6).

By this time the majority of the former leaders of the Communist Party had been eliminated:

"Of the 21-strong Political Bureau at the top, eight survive. . . Of the 90 members of the Central Committee, no more than a third are still active. Even worse at the lower levels: out of 270 provincial and regional Party secretaries . . . , 38 only are active. Of the six Central Committee bureaux governing all China only two first Secretaries survive".
("The Times", April 18th, 1968).

From October 13th to 31st, 1968, the Twelfth Session of the "Central Committee" of the Communist Party of China (the first since 1966) was held in Peking. It resolved to remove Liu Shao-chi from all his positions and to expel him from the Party, as well as to hold a Party Congress "at an appropriate time".

The "reorganisation" of the Communist Party -- the lower organs of which had virtually ceased to exist during the "cultural revolution" -- then began, with careful screening to eliminate all but dedicated supporters of the faction headed by Mao Tse-tung. The first Provincial Party Committee of the "reorganised" party was formed in November 1969.

In 1970 organs of the similarly "reorganised" Communist Youth began to be reconstituted in the provinces.

Meanwhile the 9th Congress of the Communist Party had been held in Peking from April 1st to 24th, 1969, under conditions of strict secrecy. The only information released about the activities of the congress was given in communiques. These recorded that the main report had been given by Lin Piao; that the congress had approved a new Party Constitution naming Lin Piao as Mao's "close comrade-in-arms and successor"; that a Central Committee of 170 members had been elected; and that this, at its first meeting on April 28th, had elected a Political Bureau of 21, headed by Mao Tse-tung as Chairman and Lin Piao as Vice-Chairman, and containing a high proportion of high-ranking officers -- including Marshal Yeh Chion-ying, Marshal Chu Teh, Colonel-General Hsu Shih-yu, General Chen Hsi-lien, Admiral Li Tso-peng, General Wu Fa-hsien, General Chiu Hui-tso, General Huang Yung-sheng, General Hsioh Fu-chih and Marshal Liu Po-cheng.

The Rapprochement with US Imperialism

With the victory of the "cultural revolution" and the establishment of new organs of power, the ruling class alliance in China now consisted of the pro-US ex-landlords and comprador capitalists, represented politically by the faction headed by Mao Tse-tung.

A RAPPROCHEMENT WITH UNITED STATES IMPERIALISM WAS THUS THE LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE OF THE VICTORY OF THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY "CULTURAL REVOLUTION".

From 1969 onwards, therefore, a rapid change took place in the attitude of the dominant section of the US imperialists towards the People's Republic of China.

On February 25th, 1971 US President Richard Nixon told Congress:

"We are prepared to establish a dialogue with Peking. . .
The United States is prepared to see the People's Republic of China play a constructive role in the family of nations".

On July 15th, 1971 it was announced in Washington that Nixon had accepted an invitation to visit China, and the visit took place, amid much publicity, from February 21st to 28th, 1972. In his first speech in Peking Nixon put the new policy of the US imperialists towards China plainly:

"What brings us together is that we have common interests.
So let us in these next five days start a long march together".

The Attempted Coup of 1971

The victory of the pro-US ex-landlord and comprador capitalist classes in the counter-revolutionary "cultural revolution" had turned back the clock of the national-democratic revolution. The revolutionary forces which had brought about the partial victory of the national-democratic revolution had suffered a set-back, but they were far from destroyed or permanently defeated. In the absence of a Marxist-Leninist party of the working class, the leadership of the national-democratic revolutionary forces lay, for the time being, without challenge in the hands of the national capitalists, who saw a possible ally in their struggle in the most powerful rival to US imperialism, Soviet neo-imperialism.

The national capitalists sought, in the first place, to build up a chain of supporters in the armed forces and in the higher echelons of the reconstituted Communist Party.

The moves within the Central Committee of the Communist Party to bring about a rapprochement with the US imperialists -- moves which began in 1969 -- brought the contradictions within the general staff of the armed forces and within the Central Committee of the Party to a head. By 1970 the national capitalists had succeeded in winning over to their side none other than Mao's "close comrade-in-arms and successor", Lin Piao.

At a meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC held in Lushan from August 23rd to September 6th, 1970 Lin Piao led an attack on the faction headed by Mao Tse-tung for "betraying the cultural revolution" by moving towards rapprochement with United States imperialism, and was supported by 7 members of the Political Bureau: Chen Po-ta (Mao's former secretary), General Huang Yung-sheng (the Chief of Staff), General Wu Fa-hsien, Admiral Li Tso-peng, General Chiu Hui-tso and Yeh Chun. The attack was successfully beaten off by a majority of the Central Committee.

In March 1971 the conspirators drew up "Document 571" which delineated plans to seize power in a military coup in which Mao (referred to in the document as "not a true Marxist-Leninist, but the greatest feudal tyrant in Chinese history") was to be assassinated.

The attempted coup was launched, after an intense propaganda campaign eulogising Lin Piao, during the summer of 1971, on September 8th, 1971. It failed, and on September 13th Lin fled by air to the Soviet Union with some of his leading co-conspirators, being (according to the official account) killed in an air crash in the People's Republic of Mongolia.

From August 23rd to 28th, 1973 the 10th Congress of the Communist Party was held. The main report was now given by Chou En-lai, the congress resolving to expel Lin Piao (posthumously) and Chen Po-ta from the Party, and revising the Party Constitution adopted in 1969 to remove reference to Lin Piao.

Among those elected to the Central Committee at this congress was the former General Secretary, Teng Hsiao-ping, who had been a major target during the "cultural revolution" but had now "confessed his errors". Teng was made a Vice Premier and soon began to play a prominent role in state affairs, particularly after the illness of Premier Chou En-lai.

In January 1974 a propaganda campaign against the philosophy of Confucius (Kung Fu-tzu), which had been launched in the summer of 1973, was linked with a propaganda campaign against Lin Piao:

"The bourgeois careerist, conspirator, double-dealer, renegade and traitor Lin Piao was an out-and-out disciple of Confucius".

("Carry the Struggle to Criticise Lin Piao and Confucius through to the End", in: "Peking Review", No. 6, 1974; p. 5).

Foreign Policy

The main reorientation in foreign policy of the People's Republic of China after the victory of the pro-US ex-landlord and comprador capitalist classes -- that is, the rapprochement with US imperialism -- has already been mentioned. Nixon's visit of February 1972 was followed by visits by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in February and November 1973.

Consequent upon this development, the Chinese government established the closest relations with states within the developing US-dominated bloc, such as Pakistan and Romania. And in March 1973 diplomatic relations were established with fascist Spain.

The antagonism with the Soviet neo-imperialists -- pursuing, since the call of Khrushchov an independent foreign policy, reached new heights, breaking out in 1969 into armed frontier clashes.

The new regime has sought to make use of the "anti-imperialist" image of "The Thought of Mao Tse-tung" to bring about economic, political and military penetration into colonial-type countries, as well as into the still socialist People's Republic of Albania. Among the more lavish measures of financial "aid" to such countries were loans of

£18 million to Pakistan in December 1968;
£70 million to Pakistan in the summer of 1970;
£169 million to Tanzania in October 1970;
an unspecified amount to Albania in October 1970;
an unspecified amount to Romania in November 1970;
£9 million to Mauritania in April 1971;
£10 million to Ceylon in June 1971;
£3 million to Ceylon in October 1971;
£14 million to Sudan in December 1971;
£10 million to Guyana in April 1972;
£17 million to Malta in April 1972;
£17 million to Syria in May 1972;
£40 million to Somalia in May 1972;
£24 million to Togo in September 1972;
£3 million to the Malagasy Republic in January 1973;
£20 million to Dahomey in January 1973;
£5 million to Cameroon in March 1973;
£20 million to Chad in May 1973; and
£20 million to Senegal in November 1973.

Among the more ambitious schemes for technical "aid" to colonial-type countries was the agreement of 1970 to send 13,000 Chinese technicians to Tanzania and Zambia to assist in the construction of a railway (financed by China) from the Zambia copper belt to Tanzania. And schemes for military "aid" were typified by the agreement of April 1971 for Chinese officers to train the Congolese army.

But where the foreign policy requirements of the new regime made it necessary, the "anti-imperialist" mask of support for "revolutionary movements of national liberation" was quickly dropped. Among the distinguished foreign visitors feted in Peking were General Ne Win of Burma (in August 1971), Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia (since deposed) (in October 1971), General Sese Mobutu of Zaïre (in January 1973), and Tun Abdul Razak, Prime Minister of Malaysia (in May 1974). And when in 1971 the national liberation movement of the Bengali people came into conflict with China's ally, the Pakistan military dictatorship headed by Yahya Khan, the Chinese government gave full support to the oppressors of the Bengali people.

(For a full analysis of the latter, see: "THE PAKISTANI REVOLUTION", in "RED VANGUARD", No. 3, 1972).

In many countries the counter-revolutionary Chinese military dictatorship has supported "left" revisionist parties and groups calling themselves "Marxist-Leninist" but basing themselves in fact on the revisionist "Thought of Mao Tse-tung".

In the developed capitalist countries those Maoist parties and groups have objectively served imperialism by diverting from the cardinal task of building genuine Marxist-Leninist parties aspiring revolutionary socialists who have broken with right revisionism, and by supporting diversionary movements such as spurious "black nationalism", "Scottish nationalism", "Welsh nationalism", etc.

CONCLUSION

"THE THOUGHT OF MAO TSE-TUNG", AS IT DEVELOPED UP TO 1949, FAR FROM BEING "CREATIVE MARXISM-LENINISM", REPRESENTED A FORM OF "LEFT" REVISIONISM.

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ESTABLISHED IN 1949, FAR FROM BEING A "SOCIALIST" STATE, WAS ONE IN WHICH NATIONAL CAPITALIST EXPLOITATION CONTINUED. A STATE IN WHICH THE NATIONAL CAPITALIST CLASS SHARED ACTUAL POWER WITH THE PRO-US LANDLORDS AND COMPRADOR CAPITALISTS, WITH THE FORMER IN THE LEADING ROLE.

AS THE SPLIT IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA DEVELOPED IN THE YEARS AFTER 1949, THE FACTION HEADED BY LIU SHAO-CHI CAME TO REPRESENT THE INTERESTS OF THE NATIONAL CAPITALISTS, WHILE THE FACTION HEADED BY MAO TSE-TUNG CAME TO REPRESENT THE INTERESTS OF THE PRO-US EX-LANDLORDS AND COMPRADOR CAPITALISTS.

THE "GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION" LAUNCHED BY THE FACTION HEADED BY MAO TSE-TUNG IN 1966 WAS A COUNTER-REVOLUTION ON THE PART OF THE PRO-US EX-LANDLORDS AND COMPRADOR CAPITALISTS, BY WHICH THESE CLASSES TURNED BACK THE DEVELOPING NATIONAL-DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION LED BY THE NATIONAL CAPITALISTS AND ESTABLISHED THEIR REPRESSIVE MILITARY DICTATORSHIP.

THE REVOLUTIONARY FORCES IN CHINA HAVE, AS A RESULT OF THE VICTORY OF THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" SUFFERED A SEVERE SET-BACK, BUT THEY HAVE NOT BEEN DESTROYED OR PERMANENTLY DEFEATED. THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS IN CHINA WILL CONTINUE TO DEVELOP. IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES THE REVIVAL OF THE NATIONAL-DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION CAN BE LED ONLY BY THE NATIONAL CAPITALISTS, LEADING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL CAPITALIST STATE.

BUT THE OBJECTIVE INTERESTS OF THE CHINESE WORKING CLASS REQUIRE THE RECONSTITUTION OF A MARXIST-LENINIST PARTY, PURGED OF ALL REVISIONIST TRENDS, WHICH CAN LEAD THE WORKING CLASS TO WIN FROM THE NATIONAL CAPITALIST CLASS THE LEADING ROLE IN THE NATIONAL-DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION AND SO TRANSFORM IT WITHOUT INTERRUPTION INTO A SOCIALIST REVOLUTION WHICH WILL ESTABLISH THE POLITICAL POWER OF THE WORKING CLASS AND ENABLE IT TO CONSTRUCT A GENUINE SOCIALIST SOCIETY.

THE MAOIST PARTIES AND GROUPS WHICH EXIST IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES REPRESENT, NOT THE NUCLEI OF GENUINE MARXIST-LENINIST PARTIES, BUT "LEFT" REVISIONIST ORGANISATIONS WHICH OBJECTIVELY SERVE THE INTERESTS OF WORLD IMPERIALISM. THE BUILDING OF GENUINE MARXIST-LENINIST PARTIES, WHICH ARE ESSENTIAL IF THE WORKING CLASS IN THE VARIOUS COUNTRIES IS TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT ADVANCES, THEREFORE REQUIRES THE EXPOSURE NOT ONLY OF SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY AND THE RIGHT REVISIONISM OF THE SOVIET TYPE, BUT ALSO OF THE "LEFT" REVISIONISM OF "THE THOUGHT OF MAO TSE-TUNG".

APPENDIX

DISCUSSION IN INDIA

(An abridged version of the preceding report was given in the spring of 1975 by a member of the Communist League at the University of Delhi, before an audience consisting largely of maoist lecturers and students. We print below the questions and discussion which took place at that meeting).

QUESTION: The new Constitution of the People's Republic of China, adopted this year, makes it clear that the bourgeoisie and private property in the means of production have been abolished. How does the speaker reconcile this fact with the picture he has presented?

ANSWER: The new Constitution was not available in London before I left, but I have no reason to doubt what you say. I would simply say that a Constitution is merely a piece of paper. As you know, the Constitution of India states . . .

INTERRUPTION: It is an insult to compare the Constitution of India with that of the People's Republic of China.

ANSWER: Well, I have no wish to insult anyone. Let us take the Constitution of the Soviet Union. This says that Soviet society is "socialist". Would you therefore present that as proof that the USSR is a socialist state? . . . Clearly, you would not! The abolition of the bourgeoisie and of private property in the means of production is a fundamental social step of supreme importance. Why was this step -- if it has taken place -- not been reported at any of the Party congresses held since the "cultural revolution", before which it was clearly stated that the bourgeoisie did exist. And I would remind you that when Mao himself admitted that the Chinese bourgeoisie existed and was exploiting the working class, he yet described China as a "socialist" society.

I repeat, therefore, that a Constitution is a piece of paper; it presents the picture of the state concerned which its drafters wish people to believe; this picture may or may not correspond to reality. In many states, including the Soviet Union and China, I suggest that it does not.

QUESTION: If Mao is a revisionist, as the speaker alleges, who are the Marxist-Leninists in China?

ANSWER: The disruption of the international communist movement brought about by right revisionists of the type of Khrushchov and Dange, and the further disruption brought about by "left" revisionists of the type of Mao, has left in most countries a mere handful of revolutionaries who remain loyal to the principles of Marxism-Leninism. From these Marxist-Leninist organisations have been formed in some countries, and will eventually be formed in all countries, which will develop into Marxist-Leninist parties. Whether such a Marxist-Leninist organisation exists at present in China I do not know; if it does -- and it is historically inevitable that it will -- then it is, of course, compelled to operate clandestinely.

QUESTION: If, as the speaker says, Mao represents pro-US landlords and comprador capitalists, how was it that Mao led the struggle against US imperialism in 1947-49?

ANSWER: The picture drawn in the report, which I believe is fully in accordance with the facts, is that in 1947-49 -- and indeed later -- the Chinese state was dominated by a class alliance between the national bourgeoisie and the pro-US landlords and comprador capitalists. The US imperialists strove to bring about a coalition government between this class alliance and their puppets, the Chiang Kai-shek clique, in which the latter would play the dominant role. This aim was unacceptable not only to the national bourgeoisie, but also to the pro-US landlords and comprador capitalists who had (unlike the Chiang Kai-shek clique) fought Japanese imperialism over many years. It was this situation which led to the elimination of the Chiang Kai-shek clique from the mainland of China.

QUESTION: The speaker said that the exposure of Soviet revisionism by the Communist Party of China began only in 1960, after Mao had lost effective leadership. It is true that the public exposure of Soviet revisionism began in 1960, but the struggle against Soviet revisionism within the international communist movement began in 1957, when Mao was, according to the speaker, in effective leadership of the party. I suggest that this shows how illogical is the "analysis" made by the speaker.

ANSWER: The fact is that Mao Tse-tung personally and publicly supported the 20th. Congress of the CPC in 1956, that the CPC delegation led by Mao signed the international declaration of 1957 which put forward the prospect of "peaceful, parliamentary transition to socialism", that in 1959 the CPC publicly supported the revisionist attacks upon Stalin and defended the Yugoslav revisionists as "good Communists". I do not accept that this line is one of "exposure of revisionism".

That a qualitative change in the attitude of the Communist Party of China towards Soviet revisionism took place after the removal of Mao from effective leadership of the party is reflected in the fact that it was in June 1960, in Bucharest, that Khrushchov opened his offensive against the CPC.

QUESTION: Did I understand the speaker to be saying that the concept of the encirclement of the town from the countryside is a "revisionist" concept?

ANSWER: Yes. Marxist-Leninist principles call for the revolution to be led by the working class, which is centred in the towns. The maoist concept of encirclement of the town from the countryside calls for the damping down of the class struggle of the urban working class, calls for the working class to play a relatively passive role, since it is to be "liberated" from the countryside by an army composed overwhelmingly of peasants. But Marxist-Leninist principles hold that the peasantry cannot play the leading role in the revolution; it can only either follow the lead of the national bourgeoisie or follow the lead of the working class. And if the working class is persuaded to abdicate struggle to gain the leading role, the peasantry can only follow -- and so serve the interests of -- the national bourgeoisie. Yes; the strategy of the encirclement of the town from the countryside is a revisionist strategy, which serves the interests, not of the working class but of the national bourgeoisie.

QUESTION: How does the speaker envisage the coming into being of a Marxist-Leninist party in India?

ANSWER: The first step is for those who remain loyal to Marxist-Leninist principles to get together and form a Marxist-Leninist organisation, based on democratic-centralist organisational principles. This will be the nucleus of a Marxist-Leninist party. It will publish journals giving a clear Marxist-Leninist analysis of social development in India and the world. It will establish fraternal relations and hold discussions on common problems with Marxist-Leninist organisations in other countries. Its members will work actively in those progressive mass organisations where the most politically conscious workers are to be found, will seek to work in close collaboration with them, to draw them into study circles on Marxism-Leninism and draw them into membership of the organisation.

I believe that members of the organisation will feel the need, as we in Britain do, of an international Marxist-Leninist organisation, and when a minimum number of Marxist-Leninist organisations have come into existence in various countries, I believe that they will feel it necessary to set up a Marxist-Leninist International on the lines of the Communist International.

QUESTION: There are Marxist-Leninist groups which reject peaceful transition but which base themselves on "Mao Tse-tung Thought". How does the speaker view such groups?

ANSWER: To reject peaceful transition and endorse the necessity of armed struggle does not mean that one has necessarily rejected revisionism. A revisionist ideology which serves the interests of the national bourgeoisie of a colonial-type country must endorse the necessity of armed struggle, because only by revolutionary armed struggle can the national bourgeoisie

gain political power and proceed to build a national capitalist state in which it exploits the working class on its own and does not have to see the lion's share of this exploitation going to some foreign imperialist power. I would maintain that those who seek to build a Marxist-Leninist organisation must have rejected all forms of revisionism, including "Mao Tse-tung Thought". Without that, whatever they may succeed in building, it will not be a Marxist-Leninist organisation.

QUESTION: I want to make four points:

firstly, the speaker shows by his criticism of the policies of Mao Tse-tung, that he is not a Marxist-Leninist but a dogmatist, that he fails to understand the flexibility that Marxism-Leninism requires in successful strategy and tactics;

secondly, the speaker fails to understand that the national bourgeoisie can play a progressive role in colonial-type countries;

thirdly, in a semi-colonial country like China with a large peasantry and a small working class, why cannot the peasantry play the leading role?

fourthly, the speaker proposes the formation of a new Marxist-Leninist International. But the old Communist International made many mistakes and at times held back the revolutionary movement. Today conditions in different countries are too diverse to permit a Marxist-Leninist International to serve any useful purpose.

ANSWER: With regard to your first point, of course it is essential to be flexible in strategy and tactics, but this flexibility must be within the framework of Marxist-Leninist principles or it becomes revisionism. It is because "The Thought of Mao Tse-tung" departs from Marxist-Leninist principles that I denounce it as revisionist. And it must be remembered that the practice of all revisionists is to seek to excuse their departure from Marxist-Leninist principles with terms like "flexibility" and to categorise all who remain loyal to those principles as "dogmatists".

With regard to your third point, for example, Marxist-Leninist principles hold that the peasantry, which is a rural petty-bourgeoisie, cannot play a leading role in the national-democratic revolution. This leading role can be taken only by the national bourgeoisie or by the working class, and the peasantry can only follow the lead of whichever of these classes gains the predominant influence over it. If the leadership of the national-democratic revolution is not taken by the working class, then it must fall to the national bourgeoisie.

Coming now to your second point, therefore, the national bourgeoisie can not only play a progressive role in a national-democratic revolution, it can play the leading role. But where it does so, as in China, there is no possibility of the national-democratic revolution being transformed into a socialist revolution. This can only be done when the working class has won the leadership of the national-democratic revolution in a process of class struggle which the revisionist "Thought of Mao Tse-tung" repudiates in the name of "national unity".

Finally, with regard to your fourth point: your statement is equivalent to the revisionist line of "national roads to socialism" which are so diverse in principle that an international Marxist-Leninist organisation is impracticable. It was indeed precisely on this spurious pretext that the revisionists dissolved the Communist International in 1943. But Marxist-Leninists hold, on the other hand, that the principles of the strategy of socialist revolution are of world-wide application, that the interests of the workers of all lands are fundamentally the same, that the Marxist-Leninist parties which will be formed in every state have much better opportunity of correcting mistakes quickly if they participate in an international Marxist-Leninist vanguard organisation whose members are drawn from all parties. The "mistakes" made by the Communist International were for the most part not mistakes at all, but perversions of Marxist-Leninist strategy and tactics imposed on it by the revisionists who dominated it at various times. I believe that a Marxist-Leninist International will be as essential to the development of the world socialist revolution in the next period as Lenin considered it to be in 1919.

QUESTION: How does the speaker view the position of the Albanian Party of Labour, which supports the People's Republic of China?

ANSWER: As a party which has remained loyal to Marxist-Leninist principles in its internal policy, which is constructing socialism in the People's Republic of Albania, but one which has made a serious mistake in its foreign policy in regarding the Communist Party of China as "a Marxist-Leninist Party" and the People's Republic of China as "a fraternal socialist state". The relations which have developed between the PRA and the PRC will, in our view, eventually lead to a crisis within the APL. This crisis will be resolved either by the APL exposing the revisionist character of the leadership of the CPC, just as it formerly led the way in exposing the revisionist character of the leadership of the CPSU, or by the APL leadership falling into the hands of revisionists -- in which case the APL will cease to be a Marxist-Leninist Party and the PRA will eventually cease to be a socialist state. Until and unless the situation is resolved in the latter way, we regard it as the cardinal duty of every socialist to give all possible support to the People's Republic of Albania as, at the moment, the world's only socialist state.

QUESTION: If Mao was, as the speaker says, a supporter of Soviet revisionism, how does he explain the criticism by the Chinese government of Soviet revisionism in relation to Cuba at the time of the missiles crisis?

ANSWER: The Cuba missiles crisis took place in 1962, at a time when Mao, according to his own testimony during the "cultural revolution", had been removed from effective leadership of the CPC.

QUESTION: The speaker implies that, since the "cultural revolution", the Chinese leadership has made concessions of principle to imperialism. I know of none. Can the speaker give any examples.

ANSWER: The Chinese government was almost alone in refraining from withdrawing its diplomatic representatives from Chile after the US-inspired counter-revolutionary coup there, recognising the military dictatorship immediately.

Again, the Chinese government gave full support to the pro-US military dictatorship in Pakistan when it tried to suppress the national-liberation movement of the Bengali people.

INTERRUPTION: We do not recognise Bengal as a nation!

ANSWER: But Bengal has all the characteristics which Marxist-Leninists recognise as constituting a nation, and the movement for autonomy -- later independence -- from Pakistan was undoubtedly a genuine movement of national liberation led by the national bourgeoisie. One has to choose here between accepting Marxist-Leninist principles on the national question and rejecting those principles in order to follow the line of the Chinese revisionists.

However, if you are dissatisfied with that example, let me give another. The Chinese government is giving full support to the Shaikh of Oman, who is waging with the help of British imperialist forces a war with the aim of destroying the national liberation movement of the Omani people. Is this the principled policy of "anti-imperialists", of "Marxist-Leninists"?

QUESTION: If Stalin could make an alliance with British and French imperialism, at the time of the Second World War, why is it necessarily wrong for Mao to make an alliance with US imperialism?

ANSWER: At the time when the Soviet government sought to bring about a collective security alliance with British and French imperialism in the period prior to the outbreak of World War II, the imperialist powers of the world were divided into two groups. One group, with a high productive capacity and limited markets and sources of raw materials, was relatively aggressive, in that it had a pressing economic need to redivide the world to its advantage: these powers were the Axis powers of Germany and Japan. Another group, with lower productive capacity and extensive markets and spheres of influence, was relatively peaceful, having more interest in maintaining the world status quo than in changing it: these powers were Britain and France.

The Soviet policy of attempting to prevent aggression by the Axis

powers by establishing a collective security alliance with these relatively peaceful imperialist powers was a principled one in these circumstances.

The alliance with British imperialism came into being at a time when British imperialism was already at war with Germany and after Germany had attacked the Soviet Union. The result of this alliance was the defeat of these relatively aggressive imperialist powers, Germany and Japan, the securing of the socialist state from external destruction, the establishment of the People's Democracies in Eastern Europe and the victory of the national-democratic revolution in China.

Can it seriously be suggested that today US imperialism is a "relatively peaceful" imperialist power comparable to Britain in 1938-9? On the contrary, the United States is the most aggressive imperialist power in the world, which is interfering -- militarily or through its intelligence organs -- in every corner of the globe. There can be no principled reason, such as the aim of maintaining world peace, which could induce Marxist-Leninists to ally a state under their leadership with US imperialism in the present period.

QUESTION: Do you see any resemblance between the attitude of the CPC under Mao's leadership towards the Kuomintang and the attitude of the Communist Party of India under Dange's leadership towards Congress?

ANSWER: I am only on a brief visit to your country and would not presume to analyse the political situation here in any depth. Clearly, however, there is a resemblance in so far as both the CPC and the CPI are both objectively serving the interests of a section of the landlords and comprador bourgeoisie dependent upon a foreign imperialist power. In the case of China, however, this imperialist power is the United States, while in the case of India it is the Soviet Union.
