



*Chairman Mao addressing a meeting marking the third anniversary of the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese Military and Political College in 1938.*

## 'THE PARTY IS OUR HEROIC WARRIOR'

A summary of Mao Tsetung's revolutionary  
line on party-building

by a Chicago Marxist-Leninist study group

Mao Tsetung was the founder and leader of the Communist Party of China. Through more than 50 years, he charted the course for the Chinese communists on party building. Under his brilliant leadership, the party grew from a small circle of communists to a victorious vanguard party numbering over 30 million.

Under Chairman Mao's brilliant leadership, the Communist Party grew strong through the severe tests of the many two-line struggles and bouts with the revisionists and opportunists, both within the party and in other parties around the world. Chairman Mao's line on party building led to the defeats of the capitalist-roaders in the party, such as Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao, Teng Hsiao-ping and the recent victory over the "gang of four." All of these opportunists and bourgeois agents tried to smash the party from within in order to destroy socialism in China and restore capitalism.

For communists in this country and throughout the world, Chairman Mao's teachings and instructions on party building are a valuable and vital guide in building the party and combating revisionism. On this central question of building the Marxist-Leninist party, Chairman Mao carried out and deepened the teachings of Marxism-Leninism and made many valuable new contributions to the treasurehouse of communism.

Chairman Mao fully recognized the centrality of the party to China's revolution as well as to the worldwide revolutionary movement in this era. He stated, "If there is to be revolution, there must be a revolutionary party. Without a revolutionary party, without a party built on the Marxist-

Leninist revolutionary theory and in the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary style, it is impossible to lead the working class and the broad masses of the people to defeat imperialism and its running dogs."<sup>1</sup>

Mao viewed the party, along with armed struggle and the united front, as one of the "three principal magic weapons for defeating the enemy."<sup>2</sup> He showed that the three were related to each other in the following way: "The united front and armed struggle are the two basic weapons for defeating the enemy. The united front is a united front for carrying on armed struggle. And the party is the heroic warrior wielding the two weapons, the united front and the armed struggle, to storm and shatter the enemy's positions."<sup>3</sup>

Even in a country like semi-colonial China where the proletariat was a very small fraction of the Chinese people, he pointed out without hesitation, that the task of leading the liberation movement against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism fell first and foremost on the working class and its party. He showed that, while the peasantry was the most numerous and the "main forces"<sup>4</sup> in the revolutionary war, they were also small-scale producers, a fact which limited their political outlook, making them unable to play the role of vanguard of the revolution.

"Therefore," he said, "in an era when the proletariat has already appeared on the political stage, the responsibility for leading China's revolutionary war inevitably falls on the shoulders of the Chinese Communist Party. In this era, any revolutionary war will definitely end in defeat if it lacks, or runs counter to, the leadership of the proletariat and the Communist Party."<sup>5</sup>

But he also showed that the existence of the party alone was not enough to ensure victory unless that party followed a correct line. Following the founding of the CCP in 1921, this small group of little more than 50 communists began to fully integrate themselves with the struggles of the Chinese masses. Chairman Mao himself led several important strikes and uprisings, such as that of the Anyuan miners. Beginning in 1924, the revolutionary war against the reactionary landlords was fought in a united front with the Chinese national bourgeoisie. Lasting until 1927, this revolution ended in defeat in part because of the betrayal of a section of the bourgeoisie and also because of the right-opportunist line of Chen Tu-hsiu, the chairman of the CCP at the time. Chen voluntarily gave up the vanguard role of the working class, preaching reliance on the bourgeoisie. Out of this first two-line struggle and every struggle since then, Chairman Mao drew important lessons about the significance of inner-party struggle against opportunism. He asserted the truth that "The correctness or incorrectness of the ideological and political line decides everything."<sup>6</sup>

Summing up this early period of party building, Chairman Mao pointed out that, while the party's line was generally correct and the revolutionary zeal of the rank and file and of the cadres was exceedingly high, the inexperience of the party and lack of knowledge about the concrete conditions

of China led to some serious errors.

"Hence," he said, "in the last phase of this stage, or at the critical juncture of this stage, those occupying a dominant position in the party's leading body failed to lead the party in consolidating the victories of the revolution and, as a result, they were deceived by the bourgeoisie and brought the revolution to defeat."<sup>7</sup>

The right-opportunist line of Chen Tu-hsiu during this early period of party building was also extremely damaging to the internal organization of the party. While the party organizations expanded in size, Chairman Mao pointed out, "They were not consolidated and they failed to help party members and cadres become firm and stable ideologically and politically."<sup>8</sup>

#### NEED TO TRAIN IN MARXISM-LENINISM

There were plenty of party members, but they weren't being trained adequately in Marxism-Leninism. Furthermore, there was an abundance of mass work, but it wasn't summed up properly. As a result, a number of careerists sneaked into the party while honest workers and peasants dropped out. The party "was caught in a maze of schemes and intrigues both of the enemies and of allies, but it lacked vigilance."<sup>9</sup>

In the second stage of party building, beginning in 1923, the party grew stronger and more consolidated from fighting the Agrarian Revolution and summing up the experiences of the first stage. As a result, the cadres gained a better understanding of conditions and better Marxist-Leninist training.

Chairman Mao wrote of this period: "Once again large numbers of cadres came forward in the party, and this time they became its mainstay. The party blazed the trail of people's political power and thus learned the art of government. The party created strong armed forces and thus learned the art of war. These were momentous advances and achievements."<sup>10</sup>

However, once again an opportunist line crept into the party leadership, the "left" opportunist line of Li Li-san in 1930. Li Li-san failed to understand the protracted nature of the civil war in China and also failed to take the enemy army seriously tactically. In an attempt to win a quick victory, he ordered the Red Army, which was still in its infancy, into a nationwide uprising, rather than mobilizing the peasantry and building base areas in the countryside. The defeats suffered because of the Li Li-san line precipitated the historic Long March.

It was on the Long March, at the historic Tsunyi Meeting (the meeting of the Political Bureau at Tsunyi, Kweichow, in January 1935), that the party definitively took the road of Bolshevization and laid the basis for its revolutionary victory. It was at this meeting that Mao Tsetung was elected chairman of the party.

From the Tsunyi meeting to the liberation of China in 1949, the CCP advanced from victory to victory under Chairman Mao's leadership. But no victory would come without struggle.

In all, Chairman Mao led the party and the Chinese people through ten

major two-line political struggles, including Chen Tu-hsiu, Chu Chiu-pai, Li Li-san, Lo Chang-lung, Wang Ming, Chang Kuo-tao, Kao Kang-Jao Shu-shih, and Peng Teh-huai. In addition, Chairman Mao would personally lead and initiate the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and the campaigns against the revisionist lines of Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao and Teng Hsiao-ping.

Through each of these political struggles, Chairman Mao sought to raise the political level of all the cadres in the party and deepen their iron unity. He never feared to criticize mistaken ideas in the party. At several important junctures in the party's development, he led campaigns against erroneous ideas and incorrect style and method of work.

In 1929, for example, the party was engaged in the work of building the People's Liberation Army (called the "New Fourth" and "Eighth Route" Army). Chairman Mao led the struggle against such mistaken ideas in the party as "The Purely Military Viewpoint," "Ultra-Democracy," "Disregard of Organizational Discipline," "Absolute Equalitarianism," "Subjectivism," "Individualism," "Roving Rebel Band Ideology" and "Putschism."<sup>11</sup>

In this movement to correct mistaken ideas in the party, Chairman Mao restated the basic tenets of party building laid down previously by Lenin. He said that: "One requirement of party discipline is that the minority should submit to the majority," and that "inner-party criticism is a weapon for strengthening the party organization and increasing its fighting capacity."<sup>12</sup>

## TWO TYPES OF CONTRADICTIONS

In carrying out this struggle, Chairman Mao stressed the necessity of handling the two types of contradictions correctly, that is, the contradictions among the people and the contradictions between the people and the enemy. In the party, he advanced the formula "unity, criticism, unity," meaning to start "from the desire for unity, resolving contradictions through criticism or struggle and arriving at a new unity on a new basis."<sup>13</sup> Mao firmly opposed the opportunist line of liberalism or no-struggle in the party as well as the "left" dogmatist line of resorting to "ruthless struggle and merciless blows" in inner-party struggle.

Other instructions of Chairman Mao's, such as "learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones," "cure the sickness to save the patient," and "blame not the speaker but be warned by his words," guided the crucial work of inner-party criticism and self-criticism which demonstrated to the masses the seriousness with which the party went about its work.

Summing up the correct view of struggle within the party, Chairman Mao wrote: "If there were no contradictions in the party and no ideological struggles to resolve them, the party's life would come to an end."<sup>14</sup> He added that, "so long as classes exist, contradictions between correct and incorrect ideas in the Communist Party are reflections within the party of class contradictions."<sup>15</sup>

In this correct thesis on the question of class struggle in the party presented so clearly in 1937, Chairman Mao was actually laying the groundwork for the struggle that was to take place nearly 30 years later under conditions of socialism, where the representatives of the bourgeoisie nestle in the upper ranks of the party and try to seize power.

Chairman Mao showed that, "without struggle, there is no progress," and that a proletarian party is the product of the class struggle waged by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie as well as a tool in the hands of the proletariat for waging this struggle.

In the course of the new-democratic revolution and the struggle against foreign imperialism, Chairman Mao led the party in constructing itself on firm proletarian grounds with a high level of unity, strong democratic-centralism and close ties to the masses. He staunchly opposed the small-circle mentality and localism that existed in the ranks of the party.

## PARTY OF CLASS FIGHTERS

Chairman Mao warned that "In the party organizations in the villages, it often happens that a branch meeting virtually becomes a clan meeting, since branches consist of members bearing the same family name and living close together. In these circumstances, it is very hard indeed to build a 'militant Bolshevik Party.' Such members do not quite understand when they are told that the communists draw no sharp line of demarcation between one nation and another or between one province and another, or that a sharp line should not be drawn between different counties, districts and townships."<sup>16</sup>

In the difficult conditions of struggle in the Ching-kang Mountains during the First Civil War, Chairman Mao combated pessimism and stressed building the party on a firm basis among the most dedicated and self-sacrificing class fighters. He opposed those careerists who had taken advantage of the party's earlier open recruitment policies in order to infiltrate the party's ranks during the revolutionary upsurge. In the face of fascist terror in 1927-8, these careerists began to defect. Chairman Mao stressed the proletarian line on recruitment policy, saying: "The proportion of workers and poor peasants should also be increased in the leading organs of the party at all levels."<sup>17</sup>

While building the party chiefly among the workers and peasants, Chairman Mao opposed the sectarian attitude of excluding the revolutionary intellectuals from the party. He called on party organizations to "recruit large numbers of intellectuals" and to "assign appropriate work to all intellectuals who are reasonably loyal and useful." He pointed to the need to "earnestly give them political education and guidance so that in the long course of the struggle, they gradually overcome their weaknesses, revolutionize their outlook, identify themselves with the masses, and merge with the older party members and cadres and the worker and peasant members of the party."<sup>18</sup>

The fact that many of China's intellectuals were divorced from the production work, as well as the lack of any book-learning among many of the peasants in the party, led to problems of subjectivism. Chairman Mao waged a campaign to root out these errors. In the Rectification Movement which began in Yen-an in 1942, Mao struck a blow at the two kinds of subjectivism that had developed within the party, dogmatism and empiricism.

Dogmatism and empiricism, while originating from opposite poles, are the same in essence, Mao warned. Both types of subjectivism failed to link Marxism-Leninism with the practice of the Chinese revolution. "The arrow of Marxism-Leninism," he pointed out, "must be used to shoot at the target of the Chinese revolution. Unless this point is made clear, the theoretical level of our party can never be raised and the Chinese revolution can never be victorious."

"Some comrades, he pointed out, 'are shooting without a target' (empiricism) while 'others merely stroke the arrow fondly, exclaiming, 'What a fine arrow! What a fine arrow!' but never want to shoot it (dogmatism)."<sup>19</sup>

#### BOLSHEVIZE THE PARTY

The Rectification Movement also opposed the errors of narrow departmentalism, stereotyped party writing, sectarianism in inner-party relations in general, and took aim at the "left" opportunist line of Wang Ming, although Wang would later become a right opportunist.

This movement called on the intellectuals to integrate themselves with the peasantry and to take part in production and social practice, while calling on the peasantry to raise their theoretical level through careful study of Marxism-Leninism and learning from the intellectuals.

Chairman Mao issued a whole series of directives aimed at bolshevizing the party and insuring that the party would not be usurped by a handful of revisionists. He called for the strengthening of the party committee system to insure collective leadership and "preventing any individual from monopolizing the conduct of affairs."<sup>20</sup> "Furthermore," he added, "we must take care that neither collective leadership nor personal responsibility is overemphasized to the neglect of the other."<sup>21</sup>

He also fought to insure democratic-centralism and combat inner-party tendencies of anarchy and indiscipline. In 1938, Mao Tsetung summed up the essential features of democratic-centralism, saying, "We must affirm anew the disciplines of the party, namely: 1) the individual is subordinate to the organization; 2) the minority is subordinate to the majority; 3) the lower level is subordinate to the higher level; and 4) the entire membership is subordinate to the Central Committee. Whoever violates these articles of discipline disrupts party unity."<sup>22</sup>

Chairman Mao's instructions of "Setting Up a System of Reports" and consolidating the party were of vital importance. This was true especially during the revolutionary civil war against the Chiang Kai-shek reaction-

aries when many of the liberated areas were separated from each other and the communications between them were often disrupted.

He gave brilliant instructions to the cadres in order to strengthen their leadership of the party committees, saying: "To lead means not only to decide general and specific policies but also to devise correct methods of work."<sup>23</sup> He called on cadres to "learn to play the piano," meaning to coordinate all the tasks of the party together, keeping a "firm grasp" on the central task and unfolding work in other fields. Furthermore, he instructed the cadres to sum up strengths and weaknesses correctly, drawing a clear distinction between "Yen-an and Sian" (the symbols of revolution and counter-revolution and between right and wrong).

He pointed out that it was not adequate for leading cadres to give only general leadership and general calls, and that: "If they do not personally, in some of the organizations, go deeply and concretely into the work called for, make a breakthrough at some single point, gain experience and use this experience for guiding other units—then they will have no way of testing the correctness or of enriching the content of their general call, and there is the danger that nothing may come of it."<sup>24</sup>

Chairman Mao's instructions on methods of leadership served to guarantee that the party remained closely linked to the masses and that revisionism didn't set in. The "mass line" as articulated by Chairman Mao became the guiding light for all party members to insure that they didn't become isolated.

Chairman Mao pointed out: "In all the practical work of our party, all correct leadership is necessarily 'from the masses, to the masses.' This means: take the ideas of the masses (scattered and unsystematic ideas) and concentrate them (through study turn them into concentrated and systematic ideas), then go to the masses and propagate and explain these ideas until the masses embrace them as their own, hold fast to them and translate them into action, and test the correctness of these ideas in such action."<sup>25</sup>

#### WINNING THE ADVANCED IS KEY

As to the concrete means of practicing the mass line, he pointed out that: "The masses in any given place are generally composed of three parts, the relatively active, the intermediate and relatively backward. The leaders must therefore be skilled in uniting the small number of active elements around the leadership and must rely on them to raise the level of the intermediate elements and to win over the backward elements."<sup>26</sup>

In this way, Chairman Mao showed that winning the advanced elements to communism and the party was the key to rallying the broad masses of the people. He also showed that this advanced group would not and could not remain the same through the entire revolutionary struggle. He called for promoting the activists who came forward in the course of the struggle to replace those who were weaker leaders by comparison or who had degenerated or lost their revolutionary will.

Chairman Mao always placed great emphasis on the care and training of party cadres. He pointed out that "Cadres are a decisive factor once the political line is determined."<sup>27</sup> In 1937, he called on the communists to build the party organization throughout the country and to train tens of thousands of cadres and hundreds of first-rate leaders.

He set the criteria for these party cadres, saying "They must be cadres and leaders versed in Marxism-Leninism, politically far-sighted, competent in work, full of the spirit of self-sacrifice, capable of tackling problems on their own, steadfast in the midst of difficulties and loyal and devoted in serving the nation, the class and the party."

He added: "Such cadres and leaders must be free from selfishness, from individualistic heroism, ostentation, sloth, passivity, and sectarian arrogance, and they must be selfless national and class heroes..."<sup>28</sup>

Later in the struggle against Khrushchev revisionism which had already taken hold of the party of Lenin and turned the USSR into a social-imperialist country, Mao Tsetung deepened the Marxist-Leninist line on cadre training. He pointed out that the training of worthy successors to the party is crucial in guaranteeing that the party and the country don't follow the Khrushchev path. He said that the requirements for worthy successors for the party include: "They must be genuine Marxist-Leninists and not revisionists like Khrushchev wearing the cloak of Marxism-Leninism."

"They must be revolutionaries who wholeheartedly serve the overwhelming majority of the people..."

"They must be models in applying the party's democratic-centralism, must master the method of leadership based on the principle of 'from the masses, to the masses,' and be good at listening to the masses..."

"They must be modest and prudent and guard against arrogance and impetuosity; they must be imbued with the spirit of self-criticism and have the courage to correct mistakes and shortcomings in their work. They must never cover up their errors like Khrushchev and claim all the credit for themselves and shift all the blame on others."<sup>29</sup>

#### CLASS STRUGGLE WITHIN THE PARTY

Chairman Mao also struggled to keep the party cadres closely integrated with the masses and with productive labor to insure that both before and after the revolution, they did not become like new "overlords sitting on the backs of the people."<sup>30</sup> This linking of cadres with the masses and with production has been one of the decisive factors in keeping the Chinese Communist Party red during the whole course of the revolution.

After the liberation of China, and the victory of the revolution, Chairman Mao would begin to deal with a whole set of questions—those relating to a communist party under the conditions of socialism. Especially through the Cultural Revolution, Chairman Mao would make still greater contributions to the world Marxist-Leninist movement by

analyzing the reflections of class struggle within the party.

To carry out his revolutionary line on cadres, Chairman Mao initiated many important "socialist new things." Among these were the May 7th Cadre Schools which grew out of the Cultural Revolution. On May 7, 1966, Chairman Mao issued an important directive which said that: workers, peasants, Peoples Liberation Armymen, students as well as party cadres should take part in agricultural work in the countryside and at the same time, and most importantly, "criticize and repudiate the bourgeoisie."<sup>31</sup>

#### TWO LINES AND TWO ROADS

The May 7th Cadre Schools were developed because Chairman Mao recognized that even under socialism class struggle raged inside as well as outside the party. Because throughout the period of socialism, there is still inequality in the wage system, in distribution and other aspects of the economy and because there is still the struggle between two lines and the capitalist and socialist road, Chairman Mao pointed out the danger of capitalist restoration based upon the rise of a new bourgeoisie within the very ranks of the party itself.

Summing up both the positive and negative experiences of the dictatorship in other countries as well as China, and especially the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union, Chairman Mao linked the question of party building closely to the struggle to defend and strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat in China. From 1949 until the present, the two-line struggle in the party, centering around the question of taking the socialist road or the capitalist road, has never ceased. It is a struggle that will never stop as long as classes exist.

Under the conditions of socialism, Chairman Mao pointed out the inner-party struggle is mainly a struggle between the Marxists in the party and the capitalist-roads (the representatives of the bourgeoisie within the party). This is a struggle between the two major antagonistic classes—the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Regarding these bourgeois elements in the party, Chairman Mao wrote in 1964: "Those leading cadres who are taking the capitalist road have turned, or are turning, into bourgeois elements sucking the blood of the workers; how can they possibly realize fully the imperative need for socialist-revolution? These people are the target of the struggle, the target of the revolution, and we must never rely on them in the socialist education movement. We can rely only on those cadres who are not hostile to the workers and are imbued with revolutionary spirit."<sup>32</sup>

Later through the course of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which he led and initiated, Chairman Mao summed up the brilliant truth that under socialism the bourgeoisie exists "right inside the Communist Party."

Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao and Teng Hsiao-ping were all members of the bourgeoisie who nestled in the leadership of the party. Because of this,

they held in their hands a considerable portion of party and state power and pushed a revisionist line, a program from above designed to restore capitalism in much the same way that Khrushchev had done from inside the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

During his inspection tour in August and September 1971, Chairman Mao summed up this experience saying, "We have been singing 'The Internationale' for 50 years, yet on ten occasions certain people inside our Party tried to split it. As I see it, this may happen another ten, twenty or thirty times. You don't believe it! You may not believe it. Anyhow I do. Will there be no more struggle when we get to Communism? I just don't believe it. There will be struggles even then, but only between the new and the old, between what is correct and what is incorrect. Tens of thousands of years from now, what is wrong still won't get by, it won't stand up."<sup>33</sup>

Chairman Mao paved the way forward in carrying out class struggle within the party's ranks to carry out the proletarian revolution and to defend the gains of socialism and prevent capitalist restoration after victory. Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao and Teng Hsiao-ping, in their efforts to turn China back down the capitalist road, all tried their best to split the party.

#### ATTEMPTS TO SPLIT THE PARTY

Opposing Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, they all conspired and hid their views from the masses, violating democratic-centralism. Teng Hsiao-ping went so far as to organize a counter-revolutionary incident at Peking's Tien An Men Square (April 1976) and attempted to split the party's central committee. Lin Piao used the method of a secret coup d'etat and tried to assassinate Chairman Mao.

Chairman Mao called on the whole party to, "Practice Marxism, and not revisionism; unite, and don't split; be open and aboveboard, and don't intrigue and conspire."<sup>34</sup> These three principles serve as a strong criterion for distinguishing the correct line from the erroneous line within the party and must be observed by all communists. They demonstrate the great faith Chairman Mao placed in the masses themselves.

Following Chairman Mao's death, the reactionary "gang of four"—Wang Hung-wen, Chang Chun-Chiao, Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-yuan—formed an anti-party faction and intrigued and conspired to seize power. These tactics served only to expose their own counter-revolutionary stand against the party and the masses. They rejected Chairman Mao's line and violated the principles of the "three do's and three don'ts."

Even in his sickbed, Chairman Mao warned the "gang of four" to carry out these principles on inner-party struggle, warning them "Don't function as a gang of four, don't do it any more, why do you keep doing it?" This warning had been repeated on several occasions by Chairman Mao, who pointed out on the eve of the Fourth National Peoples Congress in 1975: "Chiang Ching has wild ambitions. She wants

Wang Hung-wen to be Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and herself to be Chairman of the Party Central Committee."

Of all these "three do's and three don'ts" put forward by Chairman Mao, the most important is to "practice Marxism and not revisionism." Those who practice Marxism and serve the vast majority of the people will always work for party unity and be open and aboveboard. On the other hand, those who practice revisionism, which serves the small number of capitalists, will always opt for splits, intrigues and conspiracies in the party.

Even when Chairman Mao's line was in a minority position in the party central committee, as it was often up until 1935, he never lost his faith in the masses and his comrades in the party. He never feared opposing wrong tendencies which had temporarily gained a majority but instead called on his comrades to struggle in the communist style saying: "Going against the tide is a Marxist-Leninist principle."<sup>35</sup>

Because Chairman Mao dared to "go against the tide," the Chinese Communist Party, along with other communists, was able to break from the revisionist line of Khrushchev when it had taken hold of a majority of the world's parties.

Chairman Mao has pointed out: "This party of ours has a bright future."<sup>36</sup> The victories of the Chinese Communist Party under the leadership of Mao Tsetung encourage all communists to carry out their party-building work with confidence. Following the teaching of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought, our party also will have a bright future.


In his fight to keep the party in the hands of the working class and free from revisionism, Chairman Mao also led the way forward for the millions of working and oppressed people in the capitalist countries. His teachings on party building are a compass for those communists who are just in the process of constructing their parties and for breaking from the revisionist parties like the Communist Party USA.

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
#### FOOTNOTES

1. "Revolutionary Forces of the World Unite, Fight Against Imperialist Aggression!," *Selected Works of Mao Tsetung*, Vol. 4, p. 284, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1967.
2. "Introducing *The Communist*," S.W., Vol. 2, p. 288.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 295.
4. "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," S.W., Vol. 1, p. 192.
5. *Ibid.*
6. Quoted in Chou En-lai's "Report to the 10th National Congress of the CPC," p. 17.
7. "Introducing *The Communist*," S.W., Vol. 2., p. 292.
8. *Ibid.*

9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*, p. 293.
11. "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party," *S.W.*, Vol. 1, p. 105.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 110.
13. "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," *Selected Readings*, p. 355.
14. "On Contradiction," *S.W.*, Vol. 1, p. 317.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 344.
16. "Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains," *S.W.*, Vol. 1, p. 93.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 97.
18. "Recruit Large Numbers of Intellectuals," *S.W.*, Vol. 2, p. 302.
19. "Rectify the Party's Style of Work," *S.W.*, Vol. 3, p. 42.
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21. *Ibid.*, p. 268.
22. "The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War," *S.W.*, Vol. 2, pp. 203-4.
23. "Methods of Work of Party Committees," *S.W.*, Vol. 4, pp. 377-81.
24. "Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership," *S.W.*, Vol. 3, p. 117.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 119.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 118.
27. "The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War," *S.W.*, Vol. 2, p. 202.
28. "Win the Masses in Their Millions," *S.W.*, Vol. 1, p. 291.
29. Quoted in "On Khrushchov's Phony Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the World," (July 14, 1964), pp. 72-4.
30. *Ibid.*
31. "Chairman Mao's May 7th Directive," *Peking Review*, May 14, 1976.
32. Quoted in *Peking Review* article "Inner Party Struggle and Party Development," by Chih Heng, August 20, 1976, p. 11.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
34. Quoted in Chou En-lai's "Report to the 10th National Congress of the CPC," p. 18.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
36. Quoted in *Peking Review* article "Inner Party Struggle and Party Development," by Chih Heng, August 20, 1976.



*Chairman Mao at the Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China held in 1973.*



*Mao Tsetung leading early study circle of Chinese communists.*