First Published: Obreros En Marcha, Vol. 2, No. 3, March 1977.
Transcription, Editing and Markup: Paul Saba
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In the previous edition of OEM we pointed out that one of the alternatives of the left in Puerto Rico was the feasibility of creating a National Liberation Front in order to confront the proposed plans of statehood for Puerto Rico. Due to the character of the article we did not expand on the principles which would guide that structural formation. We will attempt to fill that void on this occasion.
A National Liberation Front (NLF), by definition, develops in countries where the struggle is geared toward the expulsion of an exploiting foreign force from the national territory, in our case the U.S. In occupied countries (colonies), the majority of the people manifest contradictions–at different levels–with the occupying forces (imperialism). These contradictions which take place at different levels, depend on the position that each class, group or sector has in relation to the dominant economic structure. The classes, sectors or groups in contradiction with imperialism are, in general, susceptible to be unified around the NLF. However, it is not sufficient to achieve unity. Fundamentally, the basis of the unity must be defined. If we affirm that national liberation struggles are manifestations of class struggles, we then must point out which is the leading force and which are the principal forces. In Puerto Rico, a colonized and bourgeoisified country, the leading class is objectively the working class. This reality, from the very beginning of our presentation presupposes that inevitably the liberation struggle in Puerto Rico will develop into an uninterrupted process toward socialism. Therefore, the NLF will not only struggle for independence but also for socialism. This characteristic of our struggle is determined by the leading role of the proletariat, unless this class or its vanguards were to betray its most vital interests.
We have spoken of the leading force; let us now touch on the principal force.
The principal force in the process of a struggle is quantitatively defined, in other words, a numerical character. In our country, the principal force is also constituted by the proletariat. In this respect, in Puerto Rico the leading force and the principal force are one and the same: the proletariat. We know that a few dogmatists are bumping themselves against the wall since our reality takes them away from their sacred scheme; unfortunately for them, that’s the way it is. In industrial colonies, therefore modern colonies, the experiences and schemes applied in non industrial colonies (classicals) do not apply no matter in whose name we pretend to defend such premises. Therefore, the Puerto Rican NLF will be guided by the ideology of the proletariat, and within its social composition, the workers will be a majority. Does this mean that the NLF will be composed solely by the proletariat? No! In our society there is another class which plays an important role in the production process and has objective contradictions with imperialism: the petty bourgeoisie. In fact, the only possibility of survival for this class is aligning itself with the proletariat. When we speak of the petty bourgeoisie in Puerto Rico, we do not include the whole class. There is a sector bf that class which is a shameful ally of imperialism: the Cuban “gusanos” petty bourgeoisie. This sector is composed of those that betrayed the Cuban nation and have succeeded in obtaining some capital which with yankee aid, they have invested in various enterprises of small scale in our nation. The other sector of the petty bourgeoisie, the Puerto Ricans, are susceptible to an alliance within the NLF. These in our view are the principal classes (proletariat and petty bourgeoisie) which would compose the NLF. There are other social sectors, which we give this name as they do not play a direct role in production, but more or less accessory, i.e. students, professionals and intellectuals. This group to a certain extent, and for different reasons, supports the national liberation struggle. Historically they have shown great militancy in the sporadic struggles that have developed in Puerto Rico. In summary, the composition of the NLF would be proletariat, petty bourgeoisie and other social sectors (students, intellectuals, professionals, etc.). In between these there are other progressive elements such as the Christian movements. These elements, although basically from an individualistic perspective, are in essence anti-imperialist.
Now we must respond to the original question, namely, What are the tasks of the front? Once the composition has been defined, we must outline its course of action. In stating that the ideology of the proletariat must guide the politics of this formation we are guaranteeing that: 1) the basic class objectives will not deviate 2) we reject the idea of the Popular Fronts. Due to the character of our society, we repeat that the NLF struggles both for independence and socialism. The Popular Front as defined by history, is composed of all sectors and classes in contradiction with imperialism or the local bourgeoisie, in this respect it does not differ with the NLF. However, as history illustrates, these Popular Fronts never have guaranteed that the leading role remains in the hands of the most advanced elements. Moreover, in the few occasions in which the proletariat has played the leading role, its control has been precarious. In moments of sharp tactical twists, when decisions are needed, conciliations have been made with the most backward elements in order to conserve a fragile unity leading to opportunism and defeat. This degenerative seed resides not only in the ideological plane but in the structure that animates it. Popular Fronts are often coordinated to achieve minimal objectives (for instance democratic rights, elections, unionization, etc.) or in the best of cases to struggle against an interventionist force. But in the best of cases the limitations are evident. Once imperialism has been expelled it does not provide an alternative. Further, product of its eclecticism at all levels, it is the bourgeoisie who remains in power after imperialism has been expelled. Needless to say, in the long run, the bourgeoisie reestablishes its alliances with imperialism. It’s precisely these Popular Fronts, which advocate alliance with the bourgeoisie, that allow for this class to assume the leading role. The NLF does not allow for such stupidity. It does not look for alliance with the bourgeoisie, nor does it conciliate its principles. We ask ourselves what was the experience of the Popular Front conceived in 1928 by the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang? What were the reasons that led in 1932 to the brutal massacre of the CCP by the Kuomintang the “great ally of the Chinese proletariat”? What were the experiences of the Popular Front in France? Closer yet, what has been the experience of Popular Unity in Chile? The organizations or parties that at this date call for the creation of a Popular Front have undoubtedly translated defeat into a virtue or are the greatest opportunists in the world.
The NLF is built on the basis of politically isolating imperialism. It serves the function of a Liberation Army in the political sphere. Its strength lies not only in its short range objectives but in its long range projections. The creation of this structure to a certain extent does not depend on whether or not the party exists, but it is precisely the party that gives reason to its existence. When we affirm that to a certain extent the NLF does not depend on the existence of the party, we make that statement in order to make it clear that the tasks of these two organizations are not the same. The NLF realizes tasks that the party, due to its own limitations, cannot accomplish. Then again, it is just not any party that gives significance to the NLF. In Vietnam the NLF assumed great significance when the Workers Party was leading the struggle. If this had not occurred the NLF would have been important but less significant. We affirm that the NLF develops as its politics the war, and the party develops the war as its politics, and it is this integral relationship of these formations that leads them to higher levels of achievements.
All the above, as we previously stated, has as a basis our own particular situation. The possibility of a National Liberation Front is not to be achieved or resolved in a day’s time. But it will definitely take years if we do not begin to at least discuss the matter. All too often we have allowed political opportunities to pass us by without taking advantage of them. The main reason for this, in our view, is that among other things in Puerto Rico the immediate urgent tasks–with all their noise–have not allowed for the fundamental tasks to be accomplished which necessarily are slower to develop although more solid. In the last edition of OEM we expressed how the statehood project provided an opportunity to initiate a series of necessary steps in our country. These steps were geared to investigate if such possibilities existed in our country. From our point of view the conditions are favorable, because the political juncture is favorable and, on the other hand, the social discontent is evident among the people. If the possibility for a Front is viable, it is a conclusion that must be reached after profound analysis, not before. We hope this article, although superficial due to limited space, serves as basis of serious discussion on this important aspect of our struggle.