


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Black History Matters

The Congress of African People

Baraka, Brother Mao, and the Year of '74¹

Robeson Taj P. Frazier

The Congress of African People (CAP) in the 1970s expanded the scope of Black cultural nationalism. However, though CAP was founded as a cultural nationalist party, the organization ultimately discarded this ideology for Maoist theory and practice. This work situates 1974 as a decisive year in CAP's ideological transition. CAP's transformation displays the ideological heterogeneity of Black nationalist politics and provides a multifaceted illustration of the changing dynamics of Black radicalism.

Keywords: black consciousness, black Marxism, black power movement, Maoism, radicalism

As 3,000 black people met in Atlanta, Georgia, on Labor Day weekend in 1970 to found the Congress of African People, both black self-determination and Pan-Africanism were central themes. While the Atlanta Pan-African summit was aimed at black people in the African diaspora, the gathering also embraced other oppressed peoples in the spirit of the Bandung Conference.

—Komozi Woodard, *A Nation Within a Nation*

Komozi Woodard's *A Nation Within a Nation* examines the Modern Convention Movement, a 1970s Black social movement composed of nationalists, politicians, integrationists, and Marxists who aimed to create a unified Black political party; and the organization that spearheaded this movement, the Congress of African People (CAP). Led by its Newark branch and the branch's leader, Amiri Baraka, CAP, in the 1970s, established community-based cultural and political

organizations and expanded the scope of Black cultural nationalism and community organizing from the local to national.

Though it was founded as a Black cultural nationalist party, CAP within its first five years discarded this ideology for Marxist-Leninism-Mao Zedong theory and practice. CAP's transformation into a Black Maoist organization displays the ideological heterogeneity of Black nationalist politics. It also relays the complexities of the Black Power and Black Consciousness movements.

One issue left unanswered in Woodard's work is how and for what reasons did CAP alter its ideological stance in late 1974. I, like scholar Peniel Joseph, ask why "Woodard downplayed Baraka's shift to Marxism?"² Woodard's passage which introduces this article highlights that CAP's work and ideological relationships with Third World organizations connected CAP to a historic line of anti-colonial radicalism that is best symbolized by the Bandung Conference of 1955. With six African nations present—Ethiopia, Liberia, Egypt, Libya, the Sudan, and the Gold Coast³—the conference was dominated by twenty-three Asian delegations. Nevertheless, at Bandung China called for "peaceful co-existence," included all Afro-Asia in its conception of a "third force," and tacitly abandoned its alliance to the Soviet Union (the Sino-Soviet alliance would officially come to an end in 1959). These actions drew China deeper into the Asian and African orbits; created a bridgehead between Asia and Africa that stood outside the ideological conflict of the Cold War; and offered China as a possible development model for developing nations. Like many of the African nations present at the conference, future Black Maoists found China's proposals generously appealing.

A marginalized aspect of Black radical history, Black Maoists' conceptualization and analysis of Black life and political action differed from the Civil Rights and Black Power discourses. Robin Kelley and Betsy Esch provide the most valuable overview of Black Maoist history in their 1999 renowned article, "Black Like Mao." Bill Mullen also supplies useful analysis in his recent book, *Afro-Orientalism*. Black Maoist organizations such as the Reform Action Movement (RAM), the California Communist League, the Youth Organizations for Black Unity (YOBU), the League of Revolutionary Workers, and the African Liberation Support Committee (ALSC) to name a few, prized Mao's bending Marxism to fit the reality and needs of Chinese society. Mao adapted socialism to Chinese tradition, culture, and way of life. He celebrated the peasant masses, as opposed to the revolutionary intellectual vanguard or working class, as the creators of revolution. Mao also argued that the creativity and creative potential of this population best informed and cultivated a socialist revolution. This creativity carried the revolution into the superstructure, that is, the national culture. Mao moved away from Lenin and Trotsky's theory of "permanent revolution" and offered his own conceptualization of revolution, "the new democratic revolution."⁴ Most important, while Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin designated the Soviet Union as the leader of the world socialist revolution, Mao pointed to the Third World. Mao's "Theory of the Three Worlds," argued that it was up to the world's colonized populations, the Third World, to "combat imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism."⁵ Kelley and Esch point out that this conception of global relations "offered black radicals a 'colored,' or Third World, Marxist model that enabled them to challenge a white and Western vision of class struggle."⁶

Additionally, China's developing and altering relationship with Africa played a role in Black radicals' support, and sometimes lack thereof, and critique of China. From 1956–1965 and from 1969 onward, Chinese foreign policy emphasized as a high priority the establishment of stronger ties with Africa. Egypt's 1956 opening

of the first Chinese embassy in Africa began a period of increased economic and diplomatic relations between China and the emerging independent African nations. Sino–African relations flourished over the course of the next twenty years resulting in African support for the admission of Communist China to the United Nations in 1971. The seating of the Chinese delegation removed Taiwan from the UN and “contributed substantially to the defeat of the long-standing American procedural strategy for keeping Communist China out of the United Nations.”⁷ China’s key initiatives via Africa were maintaining the Chinese policy of “personal diplomacy,” supporting and training African revolutionary groups, and financing loans for extravagant African infrastructure projects requiring no conditionality relating to fiscal probity or governance. These policies were devised to sway African states away from the influence of the Soviet Union and the United States.

In this work I investigate 1974 as a decisive year in CAP’s ideological transition. I do this with two goals: first, to examine the complexities of the 1970s, a period often ignored in modern historical writing about Black social movements. The complexity of this period has not been accurately or sufficiently dealt with:

The division between black nationalist and civil rights advocates must be applied with greater caution during that period; and for historical analysis today, they simply will not do. In other words the lines between forces in the freedom movement of the 1970s were increasingly more complex.⁸

Second, I assess how one Black organization came to identify with Maoist thought. Twentieth-century Black radicals and theorists have not only produced and enacted revolutionary and reformative responses but more importantly have worked to acutely understand them. What is important is not just their “identity formation”—how the ideology, theory, or organization endorsing the ideology/theory played a part in these radicals’ developing identity—but also how radicals came to identify with certain political and cultural platforms and how they negotiated this identification thereafter. CAP’s ideological transformation in 1974 provides a unique and multifaceted illustration of this and the changing dynamics of Black radicalism.

CAP’s Founding and Its Role in the Modern Black Convention Movement

The Congress of African People (CAP) was established in 1970 to organize and engineer the impending Black Power Conference. It developed into a national organization for several reasons, primarily out of the impetus of the declining Black Power movement. The lack of follow-up after each of the previous four annual Black Power Conferences from 1966–1969 motivated Black nationalists and radicals to create alternative institutions for America’s Black communities. CAP was founded on Labor Day Weekend at an Atlanta summit convening Black activists and politicians representing a range of political ideologies.⁹ With a young Harvard scholar, Hayward Henry, as its first elected chairman, CAP obtained life and vivacity by drawing from a variety of already established Black cultural and nationalist organizations and associations. The group to frame CAP’s development, future work, and ideology was the Committee for a Unified NewArk

(CFUN), led by the former Beatnik poet, playwright, social critic, and then Black cultural nationalist, Amiri Baraka.

Baraka, formerly LeRoi Jones, became deeply radicalized in the early 1960s. His July 1960 travel to Cuba with Richard Gibson, Harold Cruse, John Henri Clarke, Sara Wright, and Robert F. Williams to see the Cuban Revolution was a turning point in his radicalization and in inducing his cultural nationalist stance. Baraka's cultural nationalism was informed and molded by the writings and activism of Third World leaders Fidel Castro, Mohammed Babu, Patrice Lumumba, Robert F. Williams, and Malcolm X. Another influence on Baraka's expanding transnational view and commitment to the Black liberation struggle was the African independence movement. The rise to power of Black governments in the Sudan in 1956, Ghana in 1957, Nigeria and the Congo in 1960, Sierra Leone in 1961, Algeria in 1962, Kenya in 1963, Zambia in 1964, and Gambia in 1965, to name a few, increased Baraka's faith in achieving Black power and Black self-determination.

As a leading figure in the Black Arts Movement, Baraka critiqued the cultural imperialism instituted on the Black arts and Black artists by the American literary and popular cultural establishments. He argued that art is integral to any revolutionary movement and that Black art was not and could not be created simply for art's sake. In contrast, art is political, didactic, and polemic and should be employed to inform politics and culture. Although Baraka did not yet utilize Maoist theory for creating a methodology for Black liberation, he found high value in Mao's writings on the role of culture and art in politics. He often referenced Mao's 1942 "Talks at the Yenan Forum on Art and Literature." In the essay, Mao points to the importance of artists in national struggles and their duty to unify motive and effect, that is, ideology and practice. Bill Mullen explains the essay's importance and impact:

There Mao raised two questions regarding national cultural struggles directly relevant to participants in the U.S. Black Arts movement. The first, "For whom are our art and literature intended?" was fundamental to efforts of Black Arts entrepreneurs like Amiri Baraka in New Jersey and Woodie King in Detroit to develop independent black theater companies for the staging of black authored plays, as well as for publishers like [Dudley] Randall aspiring to black owned publishing ventures. Mao's second question, "How to serve," was fundamentally one of aesthetics.¹⁰

After the assassination of Malcolm X, Baraka worked to galvanize Malcolm X's project of modernizing Black nationalism by "bridging the old with the new, developing a secular nationalism in tune with the many of the innovations of the civil rights movement."¹¹ He aimed to cultivate a political culture that embraced the diverging Black social and political groups of the period. Only a Black united front that aligned the various classes could effectively promote such an outlook. Important were the grassroots, whose significance as an integral part of any social movement was made apparent by the Civil Rights Movement. Baraka envisioned a movement that cross-aligned them and the Black political establishment. This force could challenge the white political establishment by rallying the Black masses behind a Black political party that supported Black candidates.

The political and social environment of the mid-late 1960s was an intense and fiery period in America's urban communities. From 1960–1976, there were three hundred twenty-nine major rebellions in two hundred fifty-seven cities, two hundred of which occurred in one hundred seventy-two cities after the 1968

assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Baraka in 1967 moved back to his birthplace of Newark, New Jersey after failing to build a political base in Harlem with the Black Arts Repertory Theater/School (BARTS). Soon after, he was pulled into the violence of the period during the 1967 Newark summer rebellions when he was severely beaten by the Newark police and falsely accused of carrying unregistered weapons. The Newark rebellions prompted Baraka to reposition his line of attack. As an artist and social critic, he was invested in delegitimizing America's interpretation and valuation of the Black arts. After the rebellions, it was clear that this same challenge had to be made in the direction of American politics. After Black Power conferences in Washington, D.C., Newark, Philadelphia, and Bermuda from 1966 through 1969, what was needed was a Black political party.

Baraka attempted to do this on a micro level. In late 1967, he helped establish the United Brothers, an organization that aimed to unify Newark's emerging and different Black political and cultural organizations. The United Brothers aligned Baraka with the emerging Newark grassroots movement and with several politically ambitious Blacks. United Brothers focused their initial efforts on organizing Black voter registration and campaigning for the upcoming November 1968 Newark election. They helped establish an umbrella organization, the Committee for a Unified Newark/New Ark (CFUN), that coordinated political activities among the different local Essex County Black organizations. CFUN was composed predominantly of three organizations—Baraka's performing arts group, the Spirit House Movers and Players; United Brothers; and the East Orange-based Black Community Defense and Development (BCD). As CFUN, they mobilized broad and formerly apoliticized sections of Newark including young people and Newark's Puerto Rican community. CFUN's work and organizing led to the 1970 election of Newark's first Black mayor, Kenneth Gibson. They also helped elect several other Blacks, including Newark's former mayor, Sharpe James, into city council positions.

Riding high on their wave of political success, CFUN along with several national Black organizations approved the creation of a national Black institution that would foster and cultivate the "growing tensions between the reality of black diversity and calls for African American unity."¹² The institution, the Modern Black Convention Movement, and its leading organization, the Congress of African People (CAP), would serve as a bridge for the Black freedom movement. They would facilitate working coalitions between its various wings. Many hoped that the congress could alter America's political discourse by establishing a Black political party that appealed to the Black masses. CAP's Newark branch, formerly CFUN, felt that their model of cadre development could serve as a progressive model for CAP's own cadre development on a national level.¹³ Consequently, the Newark CAP came to dominate CAP's national leadership.

CAP's seven work councils focused on politics, education, economics, community organizing, social organizing, communications, and law. As "the programmatic arm" of the congress, they established at least twenty-five branches of CAP in a variety of locations including Newark, Brooklyn, Oberlin, San Diego, Boston, New York City, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Detroit, Chicago, East Orange, NJ, and Camden, NJ. Komozi Woodard points out that because of the council's hard work, "The Congress of African People galvanized many of the local leaders and organizations into a new generation of men and women who would become national leaders in the Modern Black Convention Movement."¹⁴ Also important to the work councils was their participation in international projects. CAP raised

funds for the building of the Tanzania-Zambia railroad and sent boots and other supplies to rebel soldiers in African countries such as Angola.¹⁵

At their 1972 San Diego convention, CAP elected Baraka as its national chairman. The organization was also made the key organizer of the 1972 National Black Political Convention in Gary, Indiana. The convention would be their site to launch a Black national strategy for the looming 1972 Presidential election. On March 10, 1972, more than 2,500 delegates attended the convention to debate and discuss issues relating to schools, social welfare, housing, and health care. Their recognition that many local issues were in actuality national issues pushed them to support the idea of an autonomous national Black political community. There, the delegates established the National Black Political Assembly, which they emphatically nicknamed the National Black Assembly (NBA). CAP produced a fifty-five-page document, the National Black Agenda, which conceptualized the alternative institutions needed in and for America's different Black communities.

Baraka employed cultural nationalism and a variety of political organizations—United Brothers, CFUN, and, CAP—to chart a new political direction for America's Black urban communities. However, after the 1972 National Black Political Convention, CAP internally found itself in the midst of an ideological conflict over which theory, nationalism or socialism, was most applicable for Black liberation. Baraka had begun studying the works of Amir Cabral, Kwame Nkrumah, and Mao. CAP would soon follow suit. In 1974 they relinquished Black nationalism and within a year's time became the Revolutionary Communist League (RCL), a Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong (M-L-M) organization.

To accurately conceptualize CAP's ideological transformation, we must return to 1974, CAP's "Year of Ideological Clarity." The dispute that took place in CAP's rank and file during the months of 1974 elucidated a historic and highly controversial debate between nationalists and the left. John Bracey points to the atmosphere of this period:

What was needed was an ideology and analysis that would offer a coherent theory of the history of Afro-Americans as it related to U.S. history; the relationship of the contemporary struggle of Afro-American to those Africans and other peoples of the Bandung world; the development of a class stratified Black America; and the relevance of Marxist-Leninist views on the revolutionary process to the situation of Black Americans.¹⁶

CAP from 1973–1976 worked as an organization to answer this call for an applicable theory and ideology.

The Congress of African People's Ideological Stance 1970–1973

To comprehend CAP's developing rejection of nationalism and turn to socialism, it is important to first briefly examine the ideological milieu in which they were dealing. A prominent issue during the five-year period prior to the 1972 National Black Political Convention was the debate over which nationalism, revolutionary or cultural, provided a better model for revolution. Cultural nationalists declared that Blacks and whites had separate values, histories, lifestyles, and intellectual traditions. Therefore, America was essentially made up of two countries, one Black and one white, and this required Black Americans to unify and create

a Black national community based on a common language and descent. Many cultural nationalists adopted African social, cultural, and religious practices and argued that Blacks could not successfully cultivate a political revolution in America without first revolutionizing their minds culturally. Revolutionary nationalists, on the other hand, prioritized armed struggle and political mobilization as more principal than a cultural revolution.

Yet the two sides ideologically were not that distant. While cultural nationalists like Maulana Karenga's US organization did practice self-defense and value armed struggle, revolutionary nationalists like the Black Panther Party for Self Defense also valued the importance of creating a revolutionary culture among its members and the Black community. The ideological division between the two is often times exaggerated. With regard to several historians' placement of the Panthers and US's nationalist ideologies at opposing ends, Scot Brown asserts, "US's experience with armed struggle invariably challenges a historical view invested in the bifurcation of the two organization's respective approaches to violent resistance."¹⁷ Clayborne Carson agrees: "I believed there was no necessary conflict between the so-called 'revolutionary nationalism' of the Black Panthers and the cultural nationalism of US. I knew from my conversations with Karenga that he had wanted to become the cultural arm of SNCC and the Panthers."¹⁸ In fact, it was not the ideologies that conflicted, but the two prominent organizations that endorsed them, US and the Black Panther Party, who found themselves at odds. In July of 1969, US member Claude Hubert-Gaidi murdered Black Panther Party leaders Alprentice "Bunchy" Carter and John Huggins during a UCLA Black Student Union meeting. Though they were already critical of US, this provoked the Panthers to perceive US as an enemy of the Black revolution. They critiqued US's endorsement of Afrocentricity as a fad and purposeless endeavor.¹⁹ Blacks, they argued, could not simply return to Africa, physically or mentally. African Americans had their own identity and national culture. The Panthers also labeled US's cultural nationalism "pork-chop nationalism," implying that the organization collaborated with the white power structure.

From 1969 onwards, this dispute over cultural nationalism versus revolutionary nationalism would continue. Nationalist organizations such as the Republic of New Afrika (RNA) aligned themselves with the Panthers in 1969 and accused Karenga of orchestrating the murders. Ultimately, the Black Power Conferences in Bermuda and Philadelphia were conceived as opportunities to amend this disjuncture. It was this environment and Karenga's relationship to the Committee for a Unified Newark/New Ark (CFUN) that also spurred Baraka's aim to create a united front, a political party that aligned nationalists of different positions.

From 1970–1973, CAP was composed of Black nationalists representing a range of backgrounds and positions. Calls for "Black Power" among the Black masses were slowly declining after Black capitalists and President Nixon co-opted the term to imply Black capitalism as opposed to Black self-empowerment and self-determination. In Black power's replacement, at least in regards to nationalist rhetoric, was the resurgence of Pan-Africanism, which called for the liberation of all peoples of African descent across the Black diaspora. Pan-Africanism was the global expression of Black nationalism. It argued that it was Africa that connected the Third World independence movements and the Black struggle for national liberation in the United States. It was soon realized though that, "Pan-Africanism retained all of the ambiguities and contradictions which Black Power had come to symbolize."²⁰ Due to the diversity of its membership, CAP

aimed to formulate a methodology that could reduce the contradictions and ambiguities of Pan Africanist nationalist theory.

CAP promoted a comprehensive viewpoint and practice that was local, national, and international. They believed that Black self-determination, self-sufficiency, self-respect, and self-defense could induce Blacks' control and maintenance of their communities. CAP thus argued that it was essential to "develop power bases" locally, that could "help radically change the balance of power around the world."²¹ Their developing ideology was influenced by the international scope of Malcolm X and the Organization for Afro-American Unity (OAAU), and by US's doctrine of *Kawaida*.²² CAP adopted Karenga's seven principles, *Nguzu Saba*,²³ to serve as the foundation for their value system and ideology of cultural nationalism. They also subscribed to Ghanaian President Nkrumah's "general Afrikan revolutionary ideology" of nationalism, pan-africanism, and *ujamma-socialism*. Baraka argued that *ujamma-socialism's* diverged from orthodox socialism because it was a socialism based upon the Kiswahili doctrine of *ujamma*, or cooperative economics. Socialism he argued was an "attitude" and "way of addressing the world" and it was important that CAP's brand of socialist ideology address the world from an African episteme and viewpoint.

CAP's diverse membership compelled it to take an ideological position that attracted both nationalist and socialist communities since from the onset it intended to "set itself up to be a replica . . . of the nation becoming."²⁴ Yet, in practice its committee on ideology discounted socialism and centered itself around a mix of Pan-Africanism and nationalism because, as Baraka argued, "black people, in 1970, ain't going anywhere."²⁵ Baraka asserted that Marxist-Leninist scientific socialism was useless to CAP's mission. It represented an abstract concept that failed to come to terms with the reality of Black life and did not offer the Black community a viable plan of action. Baraka labeled Marxist-Leninism a "white boy" ideology that only provided the Black masses with "the Identity, Purpose and Direction of the white boy."²⁶ The parallels between Black folks' situation in the United States and that of the emerging socialist countries were few and far between:

The United States is not China nor 19th century Russia, nor even Cuba or Vietnam. It is the most highly industrialized nation ever to exist, a place where the slaves ride Cadillacs and worship their master's image, as God. . . . In the Lenin revolution, the masses, the majority, theoretically overthrew the minority, almost overnight. In America the "minority" i.e., oppressors, are the majority, and think they benefit by oppression.²⁷

Baraka also questioned Marxism's status as a scientific understanding of the world²⁸ and the left's fanatic embrace of China:

We are not the Chinese. Mao raised an army, a State within a State, then separated from the main and waged war on it until it capitulated. (But they were all Chinese!) But even today, the Chinese are just emerging from the almost constantly continuing Cultural Revolution, which seeks to win the minds of the people, so that the overall development of the Chinese nation can continue without being interrupted by externally and internally inspired coups.²⁹

Ultimately, it was mainly the white left that troubled Baraka. He therefore argued that, "It was more important to make alliances with black civil rights organizations than with the white New Left organizations."³⁰ To him, Black nationalists, socialists, and integrationists had to unify and move away from the Black political traditions of the past. It was vital for them to collectively embrace a

revolutionized Black culture and politics that like Black music, was manifested in Black folk culture.

Baraka was not against developing alliances with the Black left. Of chief interest to him was the consolidation of CAP with Black organizations such as the League of the Revolutionary Workers, the Black Panther Party, and the Republic of New Africa.³¹ Moreover, CAP was faced with this dilemma: “Increasingly, in discussions with the African liberation movements of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and Zimbabwe, the African radicals asked: if the Congress of African People is truly revolutionary, why is it not socialist?”³² Post-1972, CAP committed itself to obtaining a comprehensive understanding of Marxist-Leninist theory and its utility when applied to their struggle.

The Turn: 1974, the Year of Ideological Clarity

Two scholars of Black radical history, Robin Kelley and Komozi Woodard, have briefly examined the leftist turn of the Congress of African People and Amiri Baraka. Kelley in a work co-written with Betty Esch, “Black Like Mao,” identifies several factors. First, he points to the influence and readings of the Communist Labor Party (CLP), the October League, and the African Liberation Support Committee (ALSC). He also highlights Baraka’s significant role in the 1970 Newark mayoral election of Kenneth Gibson. Gibson’s betrayal of Newark’s Black community by increasing police repression and failing to work towards their political interests made more visible the cooptation of Black politicians into the power structure and the reality of neocolonialism. Woodard makes this same contention asserting that the rise in racial violence in Newark and Mayor Gibson’s undermining of CAP and the Modern Black Convention Movement’s legitimacy played a large role in CAP’s shift to the left. Woodard maintains that these events, added alongside Black elected officials’ allegiance to the Democratic Party and withdrawal of support for independent politics, forced CAP to recognize that “internal colonialism, when faced with the challenge of Black Power had changed to neocolonialism.”³³ Both Kelley and Woodard also reference the ALSC’s May 27, 1972 African Liberation Day (ALD) demonstration in Washington, D.C. as a key event in CAP’s ideological transformation.

Notwithstanding the multiple events and factors that influenced CAP’s ideological transformation between 1973–1976, I contend that three 1974 events were key: the 1974 African Liberation Support Committee’s (ALSC) conference; the resignations of two of CAP’s chief members and organizers and the rift that resulted afterward; and CAP’s travel to Tanzania for the Sixth Pan African Congress.

Woodard and Kelley both point to the ALSC’s 1972 African Liberation Day demonstration and its 30,000 protestors who descended on Washington D.C. to call for independence of all of Africa as a key moment in CAP’s transformation. I include another ALSC event: the 1974 “Conference on Racism and Imperialism.” The conference’s eight hundred attendees assembled at Howard University from May 23–24 to debate their respective theoretical positions and ideological differences. As “one of the most important forces for African liberation in African American history,”³⁴ the ALSC brought together a wealth of Black revolutionary nationalists, cultural nationalists, Marxists and separatists. Conference delegates deliberated over new approaches for Black liberation and worked to recommit their energy “to organizing new strata within the black community, particularly workers.”³⁵ By the conference’s end though, what was clear was the ideological

split between nationalists and Marxists—a “two-line struggle . . . between a dominant position asserting that the chief enemy of black people in the U.S. (and Africa) is monopoly capitalism and imperialism, and an opposing line which argued that racism (or European society) is the primary enemy and that capitalism and imperialism are secondary.”³⁶ This split was also transparent in the depths of the ALSC’s own leadership.

The Youth Organizations for Black Unity (YOBU), formally the Student Organization for Black Unity (SOBU), led the Marxist charge. Represented by Owusu Sadaukai, founder of the Malcolm X Liberation University in Greensboro, North Carolina, YOBU promoted the importance of Black struggle in the United States and the primacy of mass work in Black communities where Black workers could take the lead. YOBU had moved from a strict Pan-Africanist perspective to studying Marxism and they linked Black revolution to the anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist struggles in the Third World. YOBU viewed the ALSC’s conference as a site for the “fight for ideological clarity,”³⁷ and used the event to denounce Black revolutionary and cultural nationalisms as short-term and narrow methods.

Baraka was very impressed with YOBU’s presentation. He publicly agreed with their position, using Black Marxist James Boggs’s essay “The Awesome Responsibility of Revolutionary Leadership,” to suggest that Blacks must resolve their oppression in the United States by dealing with the contradictions of the total society, a capitalist society. Baraka asserted to the delegates:

Most of the old radicals thinking about Lenin in the United States today are still thinking of what he did in Russia and the concepts he evolved to achieve the Russian Revolution. In that sense they have become dogmatists, not recognizing that Lenin was building a party of his time, to change the intolerable conditions in his country, based on the analysis of the specific conditions in that country. Lenin is not relevant to us unless we have done the same for this country and for our time. Marx was writing at a specific stage in Western history. . . if he were living today, he would have advanced his theory. . . for the simple reason that society itself has advanced to another historical stage.³⁸

This speech demonstrated that CAP was moving in line with YOBU’s Marxist stance. The developing acceptance of Marxist-Leninism by Baraka and other CAP members signaled a “newer level of unity and struggle” between the left and CAP’s Black cultural nationalism. It also sparked a developing antagonism between Black comrades who once shared an ideological position and now found themselves at opposing ends. Manning Marable explains: “The ‘Great Debate’ between black independent Marxist-Leninists and the narrow cultural nationalists from 1973–1976 was a kind of replay of the Black Panthers-US battle of the late 1960s. . . . Cultural nationalists attacked Baraka, Alkalimat, Sadaukai and others for ‘selling out’ to the white man.”³⁹ So deep was this “great debate” that though “a reemergence of the Panther-US conflict [was] exactly what Baraka [was] attempting to avoid. . . the enmity, distrust and differences between Marxists and Pan-Afrikanists transcend[ed] his attempts to bridge this gap.”⁴⁰

This growing divide can be discerned in the 1974 resignations of CAP leaders Jitsu Weusi and Haki Madhubuti. Weusi—director of The East, a Black cultural organization in Brooklyn, New York, and executive council representative for CAP’s Brooklyn branch—and Madhubuti—director of Chicago’s Institute for Political Education (IPE), editor and publisher of Third World Press, and the executive council representative for CAP’s Chicago chapter—were leading

CAP organizers since the organization's founding. Their resignations in April of 1974 surprised many people and also displayed CAP's altering ideological perspective.

Received in the first week of April, both Weusi and Madhubuti's resignation letters ended their individual membership from CAP, as well as their respective organizations' relationship with CAP. Weusi's difficulties with CAP were made visible on a trip Baraka made to The East earlier that year. At that meeting, members of The East asked Baraka: "Was it the objective of the Chairman to make all CAP organizations carbon copies' of the CFUN? Must all CAP organizations submit to views held by the Chairman? Does the Chairman see the present state of leadership within the CAP developing into a personality cult?"⁴¹ The East and its members were unhappy with Baraka's leadership and the leftist direction to which CAP was heading. Alongside the resignation of Mjenzi Kazana, CAP's executive council secretary and former finance director, this critical query of Baraka and CAP policy made Weusi uncertain of his future role and work in the organization. Weusi argued that he was unable to have ideological discussions with the Newark cadre of CAP due to The East's continued relationship with Paul Nakawa, an ex-member of CFUN who was expelled from the US organization. Madhubuti's resignation stemmed from his being told not to question the purpose of CAP's Kawaidi doctrine and his anger at the constant "bumping of heads" of the IPE and CAP. He argued that many of IPE's problems resulted from its change "from community to cadre" after its indoctrination into CAP. As a result, Madhubuti resigned from CAP and as Midwest Regional Chairman of the ALSC.

CAP's ideological transition induced Madhubuti and Weusi's resignations. Baraka would comment on Weusi, and indirectly on Madhubuti: "Jitsu Weusi must . . . see some Marxist conspiracy behind recent writings of CAP which have quoted Lenin and Marx and Mao."⁴² Baraka also labeled the two men "individualist" and "liberalist." He argued that their critique of Marxism as a "white man's theory" was contradictory in that both Weusi and Madhubuti advocated and continuously referenced their "emergency survival list," a list of physical health and recipe books authored by white men. These comments inspired a six month public commentary by Madhubuti on the merits of Marxist theory. Madhubuti would write, "The root of our difficulty is our tendency to get high off the theory and not to look at the theoretician. . . Marx, Guevara, Castro, Lenin, Trotsky. . . are just another set of white boys who are just as racist as Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, Abraham Lincoln."⁴³ He continued, "What we have here is white world unity superficially divided into the Communist and capitalist camps. Two sides of the same knife. Both systems were set up for the continuation and advancement of white supremacy."⁴⁴ Madhubuti referred to Black Marxists as the "buffer zone" between the white left and the Black community. They used Marxist-Leninism as a "rehashed Euro-American theory" that allowed white communists to "infiltrate and control and destroy Black nationalist movements. And they are much more effective with their Black Marxist theoreticians."⁴⁵ Madhubuti's public resignation and critique of CAP's transforming ideology further solidified the position Baraka would later take at the ALSC conference.

In June of 1974, Baraka and several CAP delegates traveled to Dar es Salaam, Tanzania to attend the Sixth Pan African Congress (PAC). The 6th PAC, which some labeled "a forum for the ideological showdown between the Pan-African cultural nationalist and the newly emerging Marxist,"⁴⁶ was organized by a small group of African Americans and Caribbeans who met in the United States and Bermuda in 1971 and 1972. It was attended by fifty-two delegations from African

and Caribbean states and liberation movements, two hundred and fifty African Americans, and communities of diasporans from South America, Britain, and the Pacific. Attendees convened to discuss many issues: independence through armed struggle, imperialism, neocolonialism, underdevelopment, education and culture, colonialism that remained in the Caribbean and Africa, and the role of women in the struggle. Nevertheless, they were unable to make any concrete resolutions and failed to set up an organizational structure around which the Congress could function as an institutional base.

Though the conference was deemed by some to have been hampered by the ego-tripping of several of its organizers and attendees,⁴⁷ it was reported by observers that Maoists Baraka and Owusu Sadaukai emerged from the congress as leaders of the Black American delegation. There, they delivered a paper on “Revolutionary Culture and the Future of Pan Afrikan Culture” and held private meetings with the country’s political elite.

Tanzanian President Mwalimu Julius Nyerere’s socialist approach made a grand impression on them, especially Baraka who departed Tanzania feeling that “the revolutionary line that we are taking and the line we must soon develop must speak very clearly to the need to build socialism.”⁴⁸ Nyerere, along with Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah, was one of the first Africans to embrace Marxist theory as a general guide to government policy. To Nyerere, it was not Russia who served as his model for socialist development, but China. Vijay Prashad relays Tanzania’s connection to Chinese Communism:

The African reaction to Chinese Communism is best captured in President Nyerere’s 1965 speech to welcome Chou En-lai to Dar es Salaam. After praising the Long March, Nyerere noted that both China and Africa are on a joint long march, a ‘new revolutionary battle—the fight against poverty and economic backwardness.’ But the war was not only economic, because, said Nyerere, Tanzania had to defend against neocolonialism, and carefully take assistance from others, for ‘neither our principles, our country, nor our freedom to determine are for sale.’⁴⁹

Nyerere argued that it was integral for Africans across the diaspora to implement revolutionary programs that were scientific and therefore rational. How to put into practice such programs depended on a thorough analysis of the particularities of one’s respective national economy and social structure. It was important that they not reproduce other socialist nations’ brands of socialism, but that they create socialist blueprints that were unique and fit to the inequalities and oppressions in their own homelands.

Nyerere’s pro-China stance was influenced by Tanzania’s developing relationship with China. In 1961 Tanganyika, which would merge with Zanzibar in 1965 to establish the United Republic of Tanzania, was one of eleven African states that politically recognized the Chinese Communist government. In 1965, Tanzania signed with China the Sino–Tanzanian treaty of Friendship. With these relations came many incentives. They established in 1967 a Sino–Tanzanian shipping line that exported Tanzanian cotton into China. Also, beginning in 1970, Chinese instructors began training the Tanzanian army, navy, and air force and also assisted in building a naval base in Dar es Salaam and jet airstrip at Ngerengere. In 1964 China expanded its loan program extending \$156.40 million in loans, 47.5% of which went to Africa. \$42 million of this aid and economic assistance went to Tanzania.⁵⁰ By the 1970s, the majority of China’s aid went to Tanzania, Algeria, Ghana, Congo-Brazzaville, and Mali.

In 1967 China agreed to finance the Tanzam railway, a project speculated to cost \$400 million. The 1,060-mile railway would connect Zambia's copper belt to Tanzania's ports. Europeans, Americans, and Soviets' refusal to help fund the railway was "interpreted by Africans as a refusal to help land-locked Zambia break away from its economic dependence on Rhodesia, South Africa, and Portugal."⁵¹ China agreed to assist in its building through an interest-free loan requiring repayment over thirty years after an initial five year grace period. By 1971, Tanzania and Zambia had already received \$201 million from China for the railway and in 1975 the Tanzam railway was completed.

Through relations with Tanzania, China established an important presence in Africa. This relationship of "Chinese-Tanzanian economic cooperation was a model for the future new economic order in the Third World."⁵² George Yu explains: "Tanzania considered that it shared a common political experience and a common environmental-situational background with China. Therefore, China's developmental experience was pertinent to Tanzania's development."⁵³ Tanzania wanted internal development and change to occur as rapidly as it had occurred for China: "The meaning of China's developmental experience lies in the hope it provided, because in general terms the goals were seen as within the reach of most African societies."⁵⁴

Nyerere's endorsement of Chinese Communism and Mao Zedong had a major impact on African American radicals and nationalists. Baraka followed Nyerere's example and began to re-assess the usage of Marxism and Maoist thought. Nyerere's influence on CAP was nothing new. From an early point in the creation of CAP, Nyerere and the Tanzanian African Nationalist Union (TANU), alongside Amil Cabral's African Party for Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) and Sekou Toure's Democratic Party of Guinea (PDG) in West Africa, served as Baraka's anticolonial African models for cultural nationalism. For example, CAP's archive files contain a 1973 Nyerere speech which posited that the oppressed groups of the Third World had no other option but to follow the principles and framework of socialism because capitalism offered them only a continued existence of subservience and dependency.⁵⁵ CAP's respect for Nyerere and his political policy was publicly displayed by their including Nyerere's first name in the name of their community center and cafeteria for cooperative eating, "Hekalu Mwalimu."

After returning from Tanzania, Baraka was inspired by Mao's conception of revolution and the decisive role of the peasantry. On July 8, 1974, in his first CAP speech post PAC, Baraka pleaded members and organizers to begin reading and studying Mao Zedong's interpretation of Marxist-Leninism. Baraka assigned them to read six of Mao's essays: "On Contradiction," "On Practice," "Combat Liberalism," "Cadres Policy," "Study," and "Party Discipline."⁵⁶ And in his closing, he deftly proclaimed CAP's new mission, shouting: "STUDY FOR IDEOLOGICAL CLARITY! GAIN A CLEAR KNOWLEDGE OF SOCIALIST THEORY! MOVE TO THE LEFT!"⁵⁷

Many of CAP's critics and opponents were very critical of Baraka's transition from nationalism to Marxist-Leninism-Mao Zedong theory. Nagueyalti Warren argued that Baraka's support of Marxist theory proved that he was removed from the ghetto and Black indigenous ways of life: "Baraka is, after all, a college educated intellectual, turned bohemian, turned cultural nationalist, turned Marxist. True, he writes to the people and perhaps for the people, yet, he is not one of the people, and the people recognize his alienation."⁵⁸ In regard to Baraka's understanding of Maoist philosophy, Warren commented, "Dogmatically

spouting the concepts of Malcolm, Karenga, or Nkrumah was quite different from trying to popularize the ideas of Mao Tse Tung. Many of Baraka's followers felt betrayed and ceased to listen to him."⁵⁹ It is difficult to locate an exact number of members who resigned from CAP after the organization's switch. But several CAP documents, among which Baraka's "Second Answer to Houston CAP" is one, do reveal that many of CAP's followers were upset and discouraged with the organization's ideological transformation. Although Baraka's intentions were to increase CAP's level of criticality and to strengthen CAP's ideological stance, some activists felt that CAP's "ideological transformation, among other political developments, hampered both the Black Convention Movement and Baraka's effectiveness as a national black political leader."⁶⁰

By December of 1974, CAP had publicly renounced nationalist ideology. Baraka affirmed that the organization had reached its "highest ideological level" arguing that the nationalist character of the Black liberation movement was nothing but Blacks' reaction to their superexploitation in America.⁶¹ Despite evolving from a deep historical and socio-cultural context, nationalism, Baraka asserted, remained an uncritical perspective because it obtained its currency only from its success during the 1960s. Baraka argued that nationalism was a reaction to the middle class identity of the civil rights movement and was thus the dialectical reaction to white racism. It and Black militancy were the anti-thesis to white supremacy's thesis. Baraka criticized groups such as the Black Panthers and their misapplication of Marxism and Maoist thought stating that it was their "incorrect and romantic analysis that made the lumpen proletariat, i.e., the pimps, hustlers, those destroyed by capitalism, the leading force of revolutionary action"⁶² instead of the Black working class. He argued that "nationalism was not enough" and that what was imperative was for Black progressives to "show their solidarity and unity with our Puerto Rican brothers and sisters who are struggling against the same system of oppression."⁶³ When asked about CAP's transition, Baraka responded that CAP's prior cultural nationalist stance was due to its "acceptance of the reactionary aspects of the black-power line that came out of the 1960s. . .the heavy influence of the Black Muslim dogma and worldview on nationalism. . .confusing bourgeois nationalism with patriotism and national liberation struggle. . .misunderstanding culture as it applied to blacks in North America."⁶⁴

CAP in 1975 aligned with the Revolutionary Workers League (RWL), formerly the ALSC. The RWL's membership in the Revolutionary Wing, a Marxist umbrella group that brought them together with the Puerto Rican, Asian-American, and Mexican-American socialist groups, provided CAP with a wealth of other Marxist alliances. By 1976 CAP had changed its name to the Revolutionary Communist League (RCL) reflecting their strict commitment to Maoist theory and practice. In 1978, the RCL merged with the I Wor Kuen and the Chicano August Twenty-Ninth Movement to create the U.S. League for Revolutionary Struggle.⁶⁵ Despite China's shift towards capitalism, the league continued to endorse Mao's Theory of Three Worlds and networked with a broad range of Marxists, Trotskyists, and Maoists in both the United States and France. Also, during the 1984 and 1988 Presidential elections, they supported Jesse Jackson's primary campaigns.

Maoist thought declined among Blacks after 1976 as a result of China's shifting foreign policy. President Richard Nixon's February 1972 visit to China and the signing of the Sino-American joint communiqué signalled that China was realigning itself and its ideology. Also, its emergent relationship with conservative and pro-Western Zairean leader Mobutu Sese Seko in 1973 served as a symbol

of China's measured shift to the right. Nonetheless it was China's actions during the 1975 Angolan civil war that troubled and dejected Black Maoists. China supported the FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) and UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) rather than the more widely supported party, the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola). They endorsed the FNLA and UNITA primarily as a reaction to Soviet support for the MPLA. Nevertheless, China's decision had disastrous consequences for Chinese foreign policy.

Support for the FNLA and UNITA aligned China with the racist and apartheid South African government who also backed the FNLA and UNITA. Maoist circles could not believe that China, a nation whose rhetoric was based on notions of a Third World revolution to defeat the imperialist, colonialist, and racist West, would take sides with one of the world's most racist and oppressive governments. China's actions in Angola made it clear to many Black Maoists that China's model of development might not suffice in providing them a useful theory of revolution:

Differences between liberation movements over the issues of race, assimilation and miscegenation, ethnicity, and the roles of the OAU and South Africa were critical in the Lusophone African colonies. The Chinese seldom if ever mentioned these purely African issues and as no analogous controversies had existed in their own revolution, it is questionable whether they in some fundamental sense appreciated the gravity of these questions. The Chinese press, particularly from 1961 to 1973, consistently portrayed the struggles in Angola and Mozambique to be similar to the Chinese Communist Revolution. . . . It missed the point that the revolutions in Lusophone Africa were not a simple repetition of the Chinese revolution; Angola and Mozambique had their own distinct features, many of which were entirely foreign to the Chinese revolution.⁶⁶

Thereafter, Maoism was a hard sell to many Black nationalists and socialists. After the death of Mao and his chief foreign policy director, Premier Zhou Enlai, in 1976, Chinese domestic and foreign policy was determined by China's new leadership, first Hua Guo-Feng, and then Chairman, Deng Xiaoping. Deng abandoned Mao's class struggle and Third World-centered discourse and focused on modernizing China's industry, agriculture, national defense, science, and technology. To many Black Maoists, China, like the Soviet Union before it, was now moving on a revisionist and capitalist path.

Amiri Baraka and the Revolutionary Communist League (RCL) continued to organize and do work in Newark and New York's Black communities in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This was done mainly through their publication, *Unity and Struggle*, and theater troupe, the Afrikan Revolutionary Movers. Robin Kelley and Betty Esch argued that, "More than any other Maoist or antirevisionist, Baraka and the RCL epitomized the most conscious and sustained effort to bring the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution to the inner cities of the United States and to transform it in a manner that spoke to the black working class."⁶⁷ An investigation into RCL's and other Black Maoist organizations' work and efforts post 1976 would be a useful resource in understanding how Black Maoists and Black Maoists organizations translated theory into practice on American soil.

Baraka today no longer defines himself as a Maoist, but continues to often cite Mao as an example for Black intellectuals and radicals. In a 1998 interview with Kalamu ya Salaam, a Black nationalist writer and journalist who during the 1970s documented the nationalist-socialist debate, Baraka stated: "Going back to Mao Tse-Tung. You ever read the Yenan Forum written in 1941? Mao was trying

to build the communist party and one of the things he was talking about was intellectuals. What is the role of the intellectual? What is the role of artists in making social transformation? Now, if anybody needs to know that it's us. That is what Yenan is about."⁶⁸

It might be good for all of us to engage a bit of Mao's work. Mao's connecting the Black liberation movement in the United States to the Third World anti-colonial movement was based on a determination that colonialism remained a powerful force in global relations and Western structures of domination and exploitation. If the war in Iraq, the events of Hurricane Katrina, and the October 2005 youth rebellions in Paris and Toledo, Ohio display anything, it's that we still live in a world where colonial relationships continue to determine people's livelihoods and life chances. And though Mao was not successful in his goal of fully revolutionizing China, China continues to serve as an example to other developing nations of a "backward" nation that has emerged as a major player in global economic and political affairs. China now seeks its place in the sun, and so should we.

Notes

1. The author thanks the following people who have either generously reviewed this article or provided advice and assistance in regard to this study of Black Maoism: Robert Allen, Charles Henry, Ula Taylor, Gerald Horne, Ramon Grosfoguel, Waldo Martin, Ernie Allen, Patricia A. Patton, Manning Marable, Komozi Woodard, and Robin D.G. Kelley.

2. Peniel E. Joseph. "Black Power Revisited: A Review of Komozi Woodard's *A Nation Within A Nation*; Amiri Baraka (LeRoi Jones) & Black Power Politics," *The Gaither. Houston*, April 30 1999 Reporter, 4(4), 3.

3. One could also include Egypt, but during this period Egypt aligned itself with the Arab states. For more information look to G. H. Jansen's *Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment* (London: Faber and Faber, 1966), 23.

4. Mao's two stage revolutionary process asserted that it was not vital in a communist revolution to have a stage of bourgeoisie capitalism prior to the emergence of socialism. Instead, a nationalist patriotic united front could defeat imperialism spurring a national democratic revolution that would ultimately develop into a socialist revolution.

5. Renmin Ribao. "Chairman Mao's Theory on the Differentiation of the Three Worlds Is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism." *Peking Review*, no. 45 (November 4, 1977), 24.

6. Robin D. G. Kelley & Betsy Esch. "Black Like Mao." *Souls*, 1(4) (Fall 1999), 8.

7. Mohamed A. El-Khawas. "China's Changing Policies in Africa." *Issue: A Journal of Opinion*, 3(1) (Spring 1973), 26-27.

8. Komozi Woodard, *A Nation Within A Nation: Amiri Baraka (LeRoi Jones) & Black Power Politics* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 203.

9. At CAP's first convention were a wealth of Black political figures from a diversity of Black political backgrounds and organizations such as: Louis Farrakhan of the Nation of Islam, Betty Shabazz, Owusu Sadaukai of Malcolm X Liberation University, Imari Obadele of the Republic of New Africa, former SNCC worker and freedom fighter, Julian Bond of the Georgia legislature, Mayor Richard Hatcher of Gary, Indiana, Mayor Kenneth Gibson from Newark, NJ, Rev. Ralph Abernathy of SCLC, Whitney Young, Jr. of the National Urban League, and the Rev. Jesse Jackson of People United for Self Help.

10. Bill Mullen. *Afro-Orientalism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), 95.

11. Woodard, 60.

12. *Ibid.*, 111.

13. In *The Black Power Movement: Part 1, Amiri Baraka from Black Arts to Black Radicalism*, a CFUN file document found on Reel 2, fiche 580, states, "Local movement of CFUN and evolving national CAP ideology diverges (as practice) at some points. But cadre development of CFUN, we feel would be good model for cadre development of CAP."

14. *Ibid.*, 168.

15. Look to Robin Kelley and Betsy Esch's "Black Like Mao," 6-41, and *Forward: Journal of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought* 3 (January 1980), 29-38.

16. John Bracey, Jr. "Marxism and Black Nationalism in the 1960's: The Origins of Revolutionary Black Nationalism." (Presented at the 72nd Annual Meeting of the Organization of American Historians, New Orleans, Louisiana 1968), 21.

17. Scot Brown. *Fighting For US* (New York: NYU Press, 2003), 89.

18. Clayborne Carson's Foreword in Brown's *Fighting For US*, vii.

19. For more info on the Black Panther–U.S. conflict, look to Scot Brown's *Fighting for US*.

20. Manning Marable. *Race, Reform & Rebellion* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1991), 134.

21. Amiri Baraka. "Congress of African People Political Liberation Organizing Manual: Ideological Statement of the Congress of African People." First Annual Meeting of the Congress of African People, September 6, 1970, 3.

22. Kawaida means tradition and reason in Swahili.

23. The seven principles of Nguzi Saba are black unity, self-determination, collective work and responsibility cooperative economics, the purpose of nation building, creativity, and faith. They also represent the seven days and principles of Kwanzaa, the weeklong holiday and celebration also established by Ron Maulana Karenga.

24. Amiri Baraka, "The Pan-Afrikan Party and the Black Nation," 6.

25. *Ibid.*, 8.

26. *Ibid.*, 9.

27. *Ibid.*, 9.

28. Baraka in "Black Nationalism: 1972 (Address by Chairman of Congress of African People)" asks: "Why should our models for Ujamaa be put forward by Europeans? Why does the term science have to connote Marx and Lenin? How scientific is it, if it yet does not exist, aside from in radical pamphlets and the fantasies of Afro-Americans."

29. Baraka, "The Pan-Afrikan Party and the Black Nation," 9.

30. Woodard, 111.

31. The League of Revolutionary Black Workers, a Detroit-based coalition of Black workers who came from the Ford Revolutionary Union Movement (FRUM) and the Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement (DRUM), was established in 1968. The organization worked "to transcend the Marxist/nationalist, the race/class dichotomy that would plague the succeeding radical organizations in the seventies," (Herb Boyd. "Radicalism and Resistance: The Evolution of Black Radical Thought." *The Black Scholar*, 28[1] [Spring 1998], 43) and focused primarily on worker's rights by taking an anti-management and anti-union position. The Republic of New Africa (RNA), a Black separatist organization whose agenda was both nationalist and Marxist, called for reparations from the federal government in the form of land acquisition. This territory—South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana—they asserted would serve as the land for a separate Black nation with the RNA as its government in exile.

32. Woodard, 171.

33. *Ibid.*, 254.

34. *Ibid.*, 175.

35. Phil Hutchings. "Report on the ALSC National Conference." *The Black Scholar*, (July–August 1974), 48.

36. Hutchings, 48.

37. *Ibid.*, 49.

38. Baraka, "ALSC Conference Speech, May 24, 1974." 30 (Reel 2, Fiche 843).

39. Marable, 135; Abd-al Hakimu Ibn Alkalimat (Gerald McWhorter), a professor at Fisk University, was one of the founders of the Institute of the Black World who before the 1970s followed a strict black nationalist line. Yet by the early 1970s, Alkalimat switched to Leninism and established a Marxist institute, the People's College, in Nashville, TN.

40. Kalamu Ya Salaam. "African Liberation Day: An Assessment—Tell No Lies, Claim No Easy Victories." *Black World* (October 1974), 18–34.

41. Baraka, "Comments of Chairman on Resignations of Haki Madhubuti and Jitu Weusi (IPE & The East)" (Reel 2, Fiche 789).

42. Baraka, "Comments of Chairman on Resignations of Haki Madhubuti and Jitu Weusi (IPE & The East)" (Reel 2 Fiche 799).

43. Madhubuti. "Enemy: From the White Left, White Right and In Between." *Black World* (October 1974), 38.

44. *Ibid.*, 38.

45. *Ibid.*, 43.

46. Nagueyalti Warren. "Pan-African Cultural Movements: From Baraka to Karenga." *Journal of Negro History* 75(1/2) (Winter–Spring 1990), 24.

47. Edith Austin states: "The Black Americans brought at least ten ideologies with them from the states ranging from socialism, communism, separatism, class vs. color struggles, Garveyism, and you-name-it-ism, but no single position representing a united front on the part of the delegation" (*Sun Reporter*, August 3, 1974).
48. Baraka. "Chairman Report, Central Council Meeting—July 8, 1974," 2.
49. Vijay Prashad. *Everybody was Kung Fu Fighting* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001), 143.
50. George T. Yu. "Sino-African Relations: A Survey." *Asian Survey* 5(7) (July 1965), 321–332.
51. Mohamed A. El-Khawas. "China's Changing Policies in Africa," 27.
52. George T. Yu. "China's Role in Africa." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 432, Africa in Transition (July 1977), 108.
53. Yu. "China's Role in Africa," 101.
54. *Ibid.*, 101.
55. Mwalimu Julius Nyerere. "The Rational Choice." Address delivered at Sudanese Socialist Union Headquarters, Khartoum, January 2, 1973.
56. Baraka. "Chairman's Report: Central Council Meeting—July 8, 1974." (Reel 2, Fiche 702–704).
57. *Ibid.*
58. Warren, 18.
59. *Ibid.*, 19.
60. Peniel, 3.
61. Robert Allen in his work, *Black Awakening in Capitalist America*, explains of the tendencies found in Black nationalism: "To understand outbursts of nationalism fully, it is necessary to delve into the social fabric of Afro-American life. The foregoing historical sketch strongly suggests that nationalism is an ever present but usually latent tendency, particularly among blacks who find themselves on the lower rungs of the socioeconomic ladder. The members of this class traditionally exhibit a sense of group solidarity because of the open hostility of the surrounding white society" (115).
62. Baraka, "The Position of the Afrikan People: December, 1974." 8; Baraka, "CAP: Going Through Changes," Found in *The Black Power Movement: Part 1, Amiri Baraka from Black Arts to Black Radicalism* (microform) (Editorial advisor Komozi Woodard, project coordinator Randolph H. Boehm, Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 2000).
63. Baraka, "Newark, NJ, a Classic Neocolonial Creation," *Monthly Review* 25(8) (January 1975), 23.
64. Sullivan, "Baraka Drops Racism, Shifts to Marx." *The New York Times*, December 27, 1974, 35.
65. Prashad, 136.
66. Steven Jackson. "China's Third World Foreign Policy: The Case of Angola and Mozambique, 1961–93," *The China Quarterly*, No. 142 (June 1995), 393.
67. Kelley & Esch. "Black Like Mao," 35.
68. Kalamu Ya Salaam. "Djali Dialogue with Amiri Baraka." *The Black Collegian*, available at www.black-black.uk/collegian.com/african/baraka-a1299.shtml, February 17, 1998.