

## PLAN FOR RECRUITMENT

Comrades, our ability to recruit and develop advanced workers and militants from all strata of society is bound up with the <sup>ideological</sup> development of our organization and with our ability to sink deep roots into the class. The quality and character of our classes and strata of society is inevitably determined by our ~~st~~ ideological outlook and by the scope of our revolutionary activity. As long as our grasp of ML is narrow, our methods of work will remain amateurish and our ability to recruit and train communists will consistently fail to match the speed with which the spontaneous movement of the masses produces militants fit for communists training. Through our study of what is to be Done we have begun at last to grasp the significance of the fact that: "the strength of the present day movement lies in the awakening of the masses (principally the industrial proletariat) and that its weakness lies in the lack of consciousness and initiative of the revolutionary leaders." The thesis that 'there are not enough workers revolutionaries at this time to build the party' must be thoroughly repudiated. Again, Lenin clarifies this question in What is to be Done: "The fact of the matter is that society advances very many persons fit for work but we are unable to make use of them all. The critical transitional state of our movement in this respect may be formulated as follows: there are no people -yet there is a mass of people. There is a mass of people because the working class and ever more diverse strata of society year after year, advance from their ranks an increasing number of discontented people, who desire to protest, who are ready to all the assistance they can in the fight against absolutism..... At the same time we have no people, because we have no leaders, no political leaders, no talented political organizers capable of arranging extensive and at the same time harmonious work that would employ all forces, even the most inconsiderable..."

Thus, the question of recruiting and training the "very many persons society advances" is bound up with our ability as an organization to develop "talented organizers" and "leaders capable of arranging extensive work". In other words, **OUR POLICY ON RECRUITMENT MUST BE INSEPARABLY LINKED WITH OUR POLICY ON DEVELOPING CADRES IN GENERAL. ~~BY~~** On the question of recruitment CADRES DECIDE EVERYTHING.

special attention, particularly in the illegal Communist Parties, the more so because in their practical work these cadres with their poor theoretical training frequently come up against very serious political problems which they have to solve for themselves.

The problem of what shall be the *correct policy with regard to cadres* is a very serious one for our Parties, as well as for the Young Communist Leagues and for all other mass organizations—for the entire revolutionary labour movement.

What does a correct policy with regard to cadres imply?

First, *knowing one's people*. As a rule, there is no systematic study of cadres in our Parties. Only recently have the Communist Parties of France and Poland and, in the East, the Communist Party of China, achieved certain successes in this direction. The Communist Party of Germany, before its underground period, had also undertaken a study of its cadres. The experience of these Parties has shown that as soon as they began to study their people, Party workers were discovered who had remained unnoticed before. On the other hand, the Parties began to be purged of alien elements who were ideologically and politically harmful. It is sufficient to point to the example of Cloré and Barbé in France who, when put under the Bolshevik

and chatterboxes who actually harm the cause are promoted to leading positions.

Third, *the ability to use people to the best advantage*. We must be able to ascertain and utilize the valuable qualities of every single active member. There are no ideal people; we must take them as they are and correct their weaknesses and shortcomings. We know of glaring examples in our Parties of the wrong utilization of good, honest Communists who might have been very useful had they been given work that they were better fit to do.

Fourth, *Proper distribution of cadres*. First of all, we must see to it that the main links of the movement are in the charge of strong people who have contacts with the masses, have sprung from the very depths of the masses, who have initiative and are staunch. The more important districts should have an appropriate number of such militants. In capitalist countries it is not an easy matter to transfer cadres from one place to another. Such a task encounters a number of obstacles and difficulties, including lack of funds, family considerations, etc., difficulties which must be taken into account and properly overcome. But usually we neglect to do this altogether.

Fifth, *systematic assistance to cadres*. This assistance should take the form of careful instruc-

microscope, turned out to be agents of the class enemy and were thrown out of the Party. In Poland and in Hungary the checking up of cadres made it easier to discover nests of provocateurs, agents of the enemy who had sedulously concealed their identity.

Second, *Proper promotion of cadres*. Promotion should not be something casual but one of the normal functions of the Party. It is bad when promotion is made exclusively upon the basis of the ability of the various Party workers to discharge particular functions, and of their popularity among the masses. We have examples in our Parties of promotions which have produced excellent results. For instance, we have a Spanish woman Communist, sitting in the Presidium of this Congress, Comrade Dolores. Two years ago she was still a rank-and-file Party worker. But in the very first clashes with the class enemy she proved to be an excellent agitator and fighter. Subsequently promoted to the leading body of the Party she has proved herself a most worthy member of that body.

I could point to a number of similar cases in several other countries, but in the majority of cases promotions are made in an unorganized and haphazard manner, and therefore are not always fortunate. Sometimes moralizers, phrasemongers

tions, comradesly control, rectification of shortcomings and mistakes, and concrete, everyday guidance.

Sixth, *proper care for the preservation of cadres*. We must learn promptly to withdraw Party workers to the rear whenever circumstances so require, and replace them by others. We must demand that the Party leadership, particularly in countries where the Parties are illegal, assume paramount responsibility for the preservation of cadres. . . . Remember the severe losses the Communist Party of Germany suffered during its transition to underground conditions! . . . .

Only a correct policy in regard to cadres will enable our Parties to develop and utilize all available forces to the utmost, and obtain from the enormous reservoir of the mass movement ever fresh reinforcements of new and better active workers.

What should be our *main criteria* in selecting cadres?

First, *absolute devotion* to the cause of the working class, *loyalty to the Party*, tested in face of the enemy—in battle, in prison, in court.

Second, *the closest possible contact with the masses*. The comrades concerned must be wholly absorbed in the interests of the masses, feel the life pulse of the masses, know their sentiments

## ON ORGANIZATION

and requirements. The prestige of the leaders of our Party organization should be based, first of all, on the fact that the masses regard them as their leaders, and are convinced through their own experience of their ability as leaders, and of their determination and self-sacrifice in struggle.

Third, *ability independently to find one's bearing* and not to be afraid of *assuming responsibility in making decisions*. He who fears to take responsibility is not a leader. He who is unable to display initiative, who says: "I will do only what I am told," is not a Bolshevik. Only he is a real Bolshevik leader who does not lose his head at moments of defeat, who does not get a swelled head at moments of success, who displays indomitable firmness in carrying out decisions. Cadres develop and grow best when they are placed in the position of having to solve concrete problems of the struggle independently, and are aware that they are fully responsible for their decisions.

To sum up:

Our policy on recruitment must be linked with our policy on developing cadres in general.

Our main criteria for recruitment into the BWC must be:

- 1) devotion to the cause of the proletariat
- 2) contact with the masses
- 3) ability, independently to find one's bearings
- 4) discipline in the struggle against the class enemy

Our Constitution further states:

- 1) The BWC is open to workers of all nationalities, and other revolutionary individuals who are eighteen years old, accept the line and program of the BWC, belong to a BWC organization, actively carry out organizational work, practice the discipline of the organization and pay dues
- 2) All applicants for membership must be recommended by 2 BWC members, fill out an application, engage in training and be examined by the district leadership and the National Organization Committee

Names of potential candidates for recruitment must be forwarded to the District Exec.. One comrade will be assigned to each candidate for recruitment. This comrade will have the following responsibilities

- 1) To work along with the Dist. Exec. in setting up the proper process of study and training for the candidate
- 2) To guide the candidate in completing this process
- 3) To carry out a minimum security check on the Candidate
- 4) To conduct, along with the Dist. Exec., an interview of the candidate based on completing the application for membership
- 5) To complete and submit to the Dist. Exec. an assessment of the candidate including a brief history of his/her work with our organization and an assessment of the process of recruitment itself

Fourth, *discipline* and *Bolshevik hardening* in the struggle against the class enemy as well as in their irreconcilable opposition to all deviations from the Bolshevik line.

We must place all the more emphasis on these conditions which determine the correct selection of cadres, because in practice preference is very often given to a comrade who, for example, is able to

write well and is a good speaker but is not a man or woman of action, and is not as suited for the struggle as some other comrade who perhaps may not be able to write or speak so well, but is a staunch comrade, possessing initiative and contacts with the masses, and is capable of going into battle and leading others into battle. Have there not been many cases of sectarians, doctrinaires or moralizers crowding out loyal mass workers, genuine working class leaders.

Our leading cadres should combine the knowledge of *what* they must do—with *Bolshevik stamina, revolutionary strength of character and the will power to carry it through.....*