

Extracts on Labor (P. R. 139)

Hegel - Jenenser Realphilosophie, ed. Hoffmeister, Leipzig, 1931, in two volumes

Vol. I, 220-22

Animal desire is an animal consciousness in which destruction checks itself and the structure of the opposition is only set up to be transcended. Desire is something compelling to destruction, the desired as such as the being transcended itself; and its ideality and the checking of it are separated in time. But the becoming actual of the transcendence, the quieting of the desire is an immediate becoming transcended without any ideality, without consciousness. Human desire must be transcended, ideal in the transcendence itself, and the object must remain in its transcendence; the means as the meaning of being becoming transcended of both, exists opposed to both.

Practical relation is a relation of consciousness, i.e., the simplicity of destruction must in its simplicity break apart and be one in itself checked and opposed.

The simplicity of destruction must be the general unity, transcending of both opposites, and at the same time the means by which they are one and by which they cut themselves off from their transcending as from their unity. The one side of the opposition, which appearing as active, the unity of the individual, must work on the other appearing as passive. In labor the desire snatches the object to be destroyed from its connection, particularizes it and sets it up as related to a desiring. Insofar as the desire exists as such, both are only ideally transcended, remaining in this relation, both at rest. It must transcend the object and itself as destruction, but in this

Cannot simulate  
to thing  
completely  
Ph. 235 - also  
it wants to

must just be  
desire without  
knowing why it does  
it.

Human desire is aware  
of its own limits. It  
transcends through  
the desire through  
which it desires for  
itself.

transcendence itself, consciousness is an ideality of trans-  
 scendence. Thus, the individual as working is active and the  
 object is transcended, both remaining. Desire in its destruc-  
 tion does not achieve satisfaction, and the objective even as  
 destroyed, remains. Labor is this practical consciousness as  
 the relation of both the general and of the singular. It must  
 likewise exist as the means whereby they are related as opposed,  
 and whereby they remain as thus separated. It is thus that  
 work as such has a constant existence. Labor is itself a thing  
 [in margin: remaining active through desire and passive against  
 it and active against the object]. The tool is the existing  
 reasonable medium, the existing generality of the practical  
 process. It appears on the side of the active against the  
 passive, is itself passive from the point of view of the work-  
 ing, and active against the thing worked on. It is that where-  
 by the work maintains itself; what alone remains from the  
 working and the worked on, and whereby its contingency is im-  
 mortalized. It propagates itself in traditions, while both  
 desiring and the desired exist only as individuals and perish.  
 It is a limited destruction through necessity or an absolute  
 external. The freedom of consciousness transcends this neces-  
 sity and checks the destruction in enjoyment through itself.  
 It makes both sexes conscious of one another, for one another,  
 continuing to exist; thus, in the for-itself of the other, each  
 is himself, each is in the consciousness of the other, that is,  
 in his existence, in his for-himselfness is consciousness of  
 himself, is for himself. And the sex relation is such a re-  
 lation that, in the being of consciousness of each, each him-  
 self is one with the other, i.e., ideal relation. Desire thus

"The object of the  
 consciousness is the  
 (subject) leaves to the  
 consciousness who (labor)  
 "for it." Ph. 24

to first affirmation  
 as relation of reason  
 to the being of production

3.

free itself from relation to enjoyment, it becomes an immediate unity of the absolute-for-itselfness of both, i.e., it becomes love. And enjoyment is in this aspect of itself in the being of the other's consciousness. The relation itself is in this manner the being of both and remaining as the being of both, i.e., it becomes marriage.

Vol. I, pp. 236-41.

Among the people <sup>B.</sup> labor and C. possession are related directly to one another in the same way that they are related in their concepts. Just as labor rests on the needs of the particular as one such, so possession is simply that of a particular. Just as labor becomes in its particularity a universal, in the same way does possession.

I. Labor which rests on the needs of a particular becomes a universal in its being the labor of a particular individual and also being based on his needs.

In work as such the requirement must exist. When it is acknowledged, it will have the form of universality. When it appears as something external, as inorganic nature and must be learnt, it is a universal mode, a rule of all labor which is something for itself. However, this universal is for labor the true essence, and the native lack of skill must overcome itself in learning the universal. Labor is not an instinct but a rationality which among people makes itself into a universal and thereby is opposed to the particularity of the individual which must overcome itself. And to work does not exist as instinct but in the mode of spirit, just because what is the subjective activity of a particular must nevertheless become an other, a universal rule, and the skill of the particular first returns through this process of learning to the other-becoming of itself.

The acknowledgement of labor and skill runs the same course

P.R.  
197

into the universal that it did in the particular individual through learning. Against the universal skill the particular sets itself up as a specific (skill), separates itself therefrom, makes itself more skilled than the others, and invents useful tools. But it is the ~~the~~ invention of a universal which is a true universal in its specific skill. The others learn it, transcend their specificity and it becomes immediately a universal good.

*Production  
in the  
of production*

*L. 25, 252*
 The tool as such postpones for man his material denial. But it remains in it his form; it remains his activity which is directed against a dead thing. Of course, his activity is essentially the death of itself, if it is torn out of its living context and set up as something to be destroyed as such. In the machine ~~the~~ man transcends this his formal activity and lets it work for him completely. But this transcendence, which he practices against nature and with which he keeps within his particularity, avenges itself against him. What he gains from it, the more he subjugates it, the lower he himself becomes. While letting nature do the work through all kinds of machines, he does not transcend the necessity of his labor, but only shoves it out, estranges it from nature and directly himself as something not living to it as something living. But it escapes this negative living and the work that is left to him itself becomes mechanical. He reduces it only for the whole but not for the particular. Rather he increases it, for the more mechanical labor becomes, the less value it has, and the more he must labor in this manner.

To wit, his labor, as the labor of a particular individual for his needs is at the same time a universal, ideal. Man satisfies his needs well with it but it satisfies his needs not with this product as determined by him. Rather in that it satisfies his needs, it is another than it is. (Marx says: "The individual satisfies his needs by his labor but not by the particular product of his labor. The labor to fill his needs, has to become other than it is.") Man no longer produces what he needs or he no longer needs what he has produced. Rather it becomes instead of the actuality of the satisfaction of his needs, only the possibility of this satisfaction. His labor becomes formal, abstractly universal, a particular. He limits himself to labor for one of his needs, and exchanges himself for his other needs. His labor is for necessity, for the abstract of needs, and as a universal, not for his needs. And the satisfaction of the totality of his needs is a labor of all.

The labor of the whole people intervenes between this range of the needs of the particular and his activity therefor. The labor of each becomes in regard to its content a universal for the needs of all, just as the adjustment took place for the satisfaction of all of his needs. That is, it has a value. His labor and his possession are not, what they are for him, but what they are for all. The satisfaction of needs is a universal dependence of everyone upon everyone else. For each there disappears all security and certainty that his labors as a particular are directly suitable to his needs. As a single needy individual, he becomes a universal. Through the particularization of labor, the skill of each is immediately greater for this labor. All relationships of nature to the



particularity of men come more under his control. Comfort is increased. This universality in which the particular need and the labor is elevated to this adjustment is a formal universality. Its consciousness is not an absolute in which these relationships are destroyed, but is directed to transcending this particular in order to free working from its dependence on nature. The needs and labor are elevated to the form of consciousness. They simplify but this simplicity is abstract, formally universal, the dissection of the concrete which achieves in this dissection an empirical infinity of particularity. And in this formal false manner, while it subjugates nature as itself, the individual only increases his dependence upon it. >

94 The particularization of labor increases the aggregate of products. In an English factory 18 men work on one pin. (in margin: Hegel cites A. Smith). Every one has a specific ~~activity~~ aspect of the work and only this aspect. A particular individual would not be able to make 120 perhaps not even one. When each of 18 (kinds of) work are divided among 10 men, they make 4000 in one day. But if the work of these ten were divided among 18, we would get 48,000 in a day. However, in this same proportion as the produced aggregate soars, the value of labor falls.

< Labor becomes the more absolutely dead as it becomes machine labor. The skills of single persons become more infinitely limited, and the consciousness of the factory worker is tressed down to its lowest stupidity.

And the connection of the particular kinds of work with the whole infinite mass of needs becomes quite incomprehensible (unübersichtbar), and a blind dependence. Thus, an isolated operation - often makes the work of a whole class of men, who satisfy their needs with it, suddenly checked, superfluous, and unnecessary. Just as the assimilation of nature is achieved through the insertion of the links of greater comfort, so these stages of assimilation are infinitely divisible and the aggregate of comforts makes it again just as absolutely uncomfortable. >

These manifold labors of needs as thing must realize their concept, their abstraction. Their universal concept must be a thing just as the thing presents everything as universal. Money is this concept in its material existence, the form of unity or the possibilities of all things needed. Need and labor elevated to this generality thus form for themselves among a great people a mammoth system of community and mutual dependence, a moving life of the dead, which in its movement is blindly and primitively moving here and there and like a wild animal needs constant and strict control and curbing.

C. Likewise this activity of labor and of needs, like the movement, has its resting place in possession. Possession in its particularity likewise becomes among the whole of a people a universal. It remains possession of this particular but only insofar as it is posited through the general consciousness, or insofar as in it everybody likewise possesses his own, i.e., it becomes property. Its exclusion is such that everyone communally excludes every one else, and in the determinate possession of each is the possession of all. In possession there is the contradiction that a thing is as thing a universal, and



nevertheless only a particular possession. This contradiction transcends itself through the consciousness while it is opposed in itself as the opposite of itself. It is the acknowledgment of the individual possession and the universal possession at the same time ~~that~~ <sup>in that</sup> every one possesses in this particular possession. The assurance of my possession is the assurance of the possession of all. In my property everyone has his property. My possession has attained the form of consciousness. It is determined as my possession. But as property it is not related to me alone but universal.

Just as in the foregoing power (Harcuse calls this medium), labor and need has particularized itself absolutely - so property particularizes itself in this medium. Particularization is the placing of the concrete in the universal. Differences which it in itself has opposed as identity, fall to pieces and become an abstraction for it. The totality of particularity which was wholly in every particular individual but (is no longer because of) the extension of its existence to that which it itself makes, is transcended only in the whole of the people. And the particularity of needs and possession collapses in the nature of its individuality. Consciousness as to totality of the particulars was the oneness of itself and its externality, its possession. While both fall apart, the particular ceases to have the honor which placed its whole essence in every particular. In this particularization that which is related to it directly as an organization constituting what was called its person, and that which appears externally to it as matter of fact, fall apart, since for the honor this distinction does not exist which in every relationship posits every possession itself as the whole.

Vol. II, 213-217

## Actual Spirit

The spirit is actual neither as intelligence nor as will, but intelligence exists as will, i.e., in intelligence <sup>exists</sup> this unity of two universals, and in the universal will exists this complete self. It is a knowing of its existence and its being is spiritual - the universal will. In these elements the foregoing has now to be presented; in it, just as in the will the abstract intelligence has transcended itself or has achieved its object, through itself, so here the abstract will is to be transcended or as transcended to produce in the elements of universal acknowledged existence this spiritual actuality. Just as possession thereby transforms itself into right, so labor earlier transforms itself into the general. What was the family good, in which marital enjoyment knew itself, becomes the general deed and enjoyment of all, and the difference of the individual becomes a knowledge of good and evil - personal right and not-right.

## Acknowledged Existence

Acknowledged <sup>ment</sup> is immediate actuality, and in its element we have the person first as for itself in general. It is enjoying and working. Here first desire has the appearance of right, for it is actual, i.e., it itself has universal spiritual being. Work of all and for all, and enjoyment - the enjoyment of all. Everyone serves every one else and helps, or the individual here first has particular existence. Before it was only abstract or untrue. Spirit can set itself (rest?) easily in an abstraction, analyse itself, and give itself an existence as the animal cannot, wherever the self that places itself in a system, becomes ill (?), but

it has only momentary disappearing existence. Here is desire. Opposed to the I as abstract for-itselfness stands its inorganic nature as existent. It relates itself negatively to it and transcends this in the unity of both, but in this way, that it first forms itself <sup>own</sup> as a self, observes its/form and consumes itself accordingly. The existence, the scope of natural needs -- (in margin: a) immediate I of work a) immediate movement of doing that is not taken up in knowing; its work has the character of abstraction. It works not as particular concrete totality of needs] is an element of being in general, a multitude of needs. The things which serve for their satisfaction are manufactured (verarbeitet), their general inner possibility set up as external, as Form. This manufacturing, however, is itself a manifold. It is the making-of-itself-into-a-thing of consciousness. But it is in the element of universality that it becomes an abstract working. The needs are many; to take up this manyness into the I, to work, is the abstraction of the universal forms (Bilder) but a self-moving formation (bilden). The I-for-itself is abstract. It is to be sure working, but its labor is accordingly abstract. Need in general is analysed into its many aspects. The abstract in its moving is the for-itselfness, the doing, the working. Because it is worked only for the needs as abstract, for-itselfness, so it is also only abstractly worked. This is the concept, the truth of desire, which exists here. As its concept is, so is its work. Satisfaction of all the needs of the particular is not, as it develops into the existent object, what is brought before him. Universal labor is, accordingly, division of labor, economizing. Ten can make as many pins as a hundred. Every particular, accordingly, because he is here particular, works for a need. The con-

tant of his labor extends beyond his need. He works for the needs of many, and every one does the same. Accordingly, each satisfies the needs of many and the satisfaction of his many special needs is the labor of many others. Since his labor is this abstract (kind), he relates himself as abstract I or according to the mode of thinghood, not as comprehensive, internally rich, circumpect, spirit which controls a great range and is master over it. It has no concrete labor but its strength consists in the analyzing, in the abstraction, in the tearing apart of the concrete into many abstract aspects. His labor itself becomes quite mechanical or relative to a simple determination.

CP. R. 198  
 But the more abstract it becomes, the more it is only abstract activity, and thus he is capable of extracting himself from labor and in the place of his activity, substituting that of external nature. He needs mere movement and this he finds in external nature; ~~xxx~~ the pure movement is just the relation of abstract forms of space and time - the abstract external activity, the machine.

Between these manifold abstract products there must now be found a movement whereby it again becomes concrete needs, that is, needs of a particular; ---(in margin: determination in itself; return to particularity)---this becomes a subject which contains in itself many of the same ----(in margin: He has made it a being for the needs of others, just as in family possession he held it in opposition to itself. The ground is, because his simple existence is universal. His possession has now the meaning of being for another)----The judgment which it analyzed,

opposes as determined abstraction; its universality to which it attained, is the equality of the same or value. In this they are the same. This value itself as thing is money. The return to concretion, to possession is exchange. ----(in margin: b)

In his abstract labor he observes the universality of himself, of his form, or that it is for others. He will accordingly posit, to share with others or these others should be viewed therein. The second movement which contained the movements of the first develops. I I is doing against another I, and of course, as acknowledged by him, as something that relates itself to my possession, but this it will have only with my will, just as I direct myself to his with his will. The equality of both is acknowledged - Value, meaning of the thing. The thing has the meaning of relation to another. To be for another, existence is acknowledged existence, i.e., it is the specific will of every particular in it. and their equality, and thus for everyone there is the will of another - unity of absolute difference.)----

The abstract thing appears in exchange as it is, namely, to be this alteration, to return from thinghood to the I, and of course thus, since its thingness consists in this, to be the possession of another. Every one gives himself his possession, transcends his existence, and since it is acknowledged therein, the other preserves it with the willingness of the first. They are acknowledged, each receives from the ~~xxx~~ other the possession of the other, so that he receives it only insofar as the other is the negative of itself, i.e., as property. It is through mediation of every one, the negating of his being, his having; and this is mediated through the negating of the others. Only

Show  
Reflection  
Circulation }?

Exclusion

Only because the other disposes of his matter of fact (Sache), do I do it. And this equality in the thing as its inwardness is its value, which has my complete consent and the intention of the other - the positive mine and thus the being, the unity of my will and his, and my will passes as actual, existent. The acknowledged being is the existent. Thereby, my will is valid. I possess. Possession is transformed into property. In possession being has the unspiritual meaning of my having as this particular (indiv.) Here, however, (we have) the acknowledged being, the being of the possession, that the thing is, and I am and everyone grasps it as myself. Here is the being of the universal self and having is mediated through the other or is universal. The universal is value, the sensuous movement is the exchange. The same universality is mediation to property, as knowing movement, accordingly, immediate having which is mediated through being acknowledged, i.e., its existence is spiritual existence---[in margin: a) Forms b) Memory. Value]-----Here the contingency of seizure by the possessor is transcended. I have (transformed) everything through labor and through exchange into an acknowledged being. I am thus a universal - not this particular person but at the same time family. I.e., property is a) the movement of things in exchange. Inheritance is therefore (simply) a change in the individual, the family is the constant - this does not yet appear here.---[in margin: I am the contingency of possession. My skill, inclination, talent - better more accessible accident - I myself absolutely necessary]----The source, origin of property is here that of work, of my doing itself - immediate self and being acknowledged. Grund. I am the cause just because I have willed - the purpose in exchange is the cause. The ground is the universal. I have willed in exchange to posit my thing as value,

show

Differences

= to Property individual

PR 55

Possession is transformed into property

PR 55 HA



ie. inner movement, inner doing, as work that is sunk into being.  
It is in both cases the same alienation.

^ I make myself immediately into a thing, into a form whose being is work.

Thus I alienate myself from this my existence, make it something strange to me, and preserve myself therein. Just in this way I view my acknowledged existence, being as known. There my immediate I, here my for-myselfness, my person.

Accordingly, I consider here my acknowledged being as existence and my will is this validity.

Vol. II, 231-233

B. This law of immediate existence of the individual exists as law of its will, or it achieves this as such in the disappearance of contingent existents. Through the death of the parents, it becomes positive; it appears as the existent, since they were before in the state. It is the actual validity of property, the element of actual existence through the work of all. The law protects the family, leaves it in its being, but it is, like the family, the substance and necessity of the particulars. I.e. it is the unconscious guardian over the particulars whose families have died. Thus it (as?) appears as particular. It is substance and necessity - its hand side in which it appears.

First of all, it is the universal right, property in general, protecting everyone in his immediate possession, heredity and exchange. But this is only formal right, that in view of the special cases remains quite free (contingency of heredity.) The individual appears as acquiring through labor. Here it is merely his law, that what he produced and what he exchanged belongs to him. But the universal is at the same time his necessity which sacrificed him in his free right.

The universal is a) pure necessity to the particular workings. He has his unconscious existence in the universal. The society is his nature, on whose elementary blind movement he depends, which preserves or transcends him spiritually and physically. b) he is there through immediate possession or heredity, completely accidental. He works an abstract labor. He conquers nature just as much. But this becomes another form of contingency.

P.R. 19.

He can work more but this decreases the value of his labor; he does not thereby depart from the universal relationships. Needs are thereby multiplied. Every particular is divided into many. Tastes are refined. They get more variations. A dressing is demanded which brings the things to be used continually nearer to custom. The demand is made that all sides of his maladjustments (incapacities) be provided for. (cork, corksores, candle-snuffers). He is cultivated as a naturally enjoying person. But at the same time he becomes through the abstraction of ~~work~~ labor, mechanical, stupefied, spiritless. The spiritual, this preserved self-conscious living, becomes an empty doing. The strength of the self consists in its wealth of range; this is lost. He can let free some work as machinery; the more formal thereby becomes his own doing. His dull work confines him to one point and labor is more perfect the more one-sided it is. But this variety produced the mode, the changeableness, the freedom in the use of the forms of these things. Cuts of clothes, kinds of ameublements are not constant. Their alteration is essential and rational, more rational than sticking to one fashion in which particular forms are declared to be fixed. The beautiful is cast in no mode. Otherwise there would be found no free beauty but a charming one, i.e., the ~~ornament~~ ornament of another; desire is aroused for this which belongs to others and would be accordingly contingent. ~~Just as undisting~~ Just as undisting is the wrestling for ~~the~~ simplification of labor, invention of new machines, etc. The skills of the particular (indiv) in the possibility of this preserving his existence. This is subjugated to the complete ~~entanglement~~ entanglement of the accidents of all. A multitudex is

trans. by  
Karakuse

condemned accordingly to the wholly stupefying, unhealthy, insecure and unskilled labor of factories, manufactories, mines, etc. "Whole branches of industry which supported a large bulk of the population suddenly fold up because the mode changes or because the values of their products fall on account of new inventions in other countries or for other reasons. Whole masses are thus abandoned to helpless poverty. The conflict between vast wealth and vast poverty steps forth, a poverty unable to improve its condition." Wealth, like every mass, makes itself powerful. Accumulation of wealth occurs, partly through accident, partly through the universality of its distribution. It is an interest point in <sup>ing</sup> a way ~~that~~ that whoever casts his glance over the universal vastness, collected around him, how a large mass attracts the smaller to it. Who has, to him it is given. Acquisition is a many-sided system that brings in from all sides, which a smaller business cannot use. The highest abstraction of labor reaches the most particular kind and attains a wider scope. This inequality of wealth and the poverty, this need and necessity becomes the highest dismemberment of will, inner revolt, and hate. > The necessity which is the perfect contingency of particular existence is just the preserved substance of it. State power steps in and must provide that every sphere be preserved, intervenes, seeks ways out, new channels of commerce in other lands, etc. which make activity more difficult to the extent that it encroaches too much to the disadvantages of others. Freedom of trade remains necessary; the intervention must be as unapparent as possible - for it is the field of arbitrary discretion (Willkur). The appearance of power must be avoided and one should save nothing which is not ~~to~~ to be saved, but occupy the suffering classes in other ways. The state power is the

universal overseer; the particular is only ~~xxx~~ buried with  
the particular. Trade becomes to be sure left by itself but  
with sacrifice of this generation and increase of poverty.  
Poor taxes and institutions are demanded.

In military affairs, also, Hegel was forced to tackle the essence of the problem. No nation is more willing to shed its blood for Germany than the German people; no people more capable militarily. It is hence not cowardice or military incapacity which make the German army the laughing stock of Europe. The German armies must indulge in negotiations between various armies and not conduct a war with orders from above because of its lack of an organic unity between states.



Fichte carried out the struggle for nationalism as an active propagandist and politician. At the same time, he worked out a metaphysics to correspond to this activity. <sup>(in both theory and practice)</sup> ~~Therefore~~ he remained dominated by the individualist ideology of the past century, and his metaphysics was essentially that of the isolated Ego. Hegel, on the other hand, ~~with his metaphysics~~ ~~seemed to stand aside from~~ the active political struggles, ~~with his metaphysics~~ <sup>His</sup> ~~scute~~ acute sense of historical development, led him to concentrate on the growth of the social organism rather than <sup>on</sup> the role of the individual agitator. Indeed, he went further, counterposing the social will to the private will as an inevitable higher stage of development of revolutionary activity for the achievement of the nation. Over and over again he contended that the unification of particular wills by laws and phrases did not make Germany a state. As such it was merely a formal and not an organic unity. This distinction between an aggregation (Menge) and an organism (Gemeinschaft), between the particulars (Einzelnen) and the ~~Ein~~ unity (Einheit), as applied to the German nation, was the beginning of Hegel's philosophy. More specifically, he railed against the existing state of political affairs, wherein "the State counted among its subjects, serfs, bourgeoisie, free nobility and princes, who themselves in turn have subjects and whose relationships exist not as pure political structures but in infinite modifications."

transcendence itself, consciousness is an ideality of transcendence. Thus, the individual as working is active and the object is transcended, both remaining. Desire in its destruction does not achieve satisfaction, and the objective even as destroyed, remains. Labor is this practical consciousness as the relation of both the general and of the singular. It must likewise exist as the means whereby they are related as opposed, and whereby they remain as thus separated. It is thus that work as such has a constant existence. Labor is itself a thing (in margin: remaining active through desire and passive against it and active against the object). The tool is the existing reasonable medium, the existing generality of the practical process. It appears on the side of the active against the passive, is itself passive from the point of view of the working, and active against the thing worked on. It is that whereby the work maintains itself; what alone remains from the working and the worked on, and whereby its contingency is immortalized. It propagates itself in traditions, while both desiring and the desired exist only as individuals and perish. It is a limited destruction through necessity or an absolute external. The freedom of consciousness transcends this necessity and checks the destruction in enjoyments through itself. It makes both sexes conscious of one another, for one another, continuing to exist; thus, in the for-itself of the other, each is himself, each is in the consciousness of the other, that is, in his existence, in his for-himselfness is consciousness of himself, is for himself. And the sex relation is such a relation that, in the being of consciousness of each, each himself is one with the other, i.e., ideal relation. Desire thus

free itself from relation to enjoyment, it becomes an immediate unity of the absolute-for-itselfness of both, i.e., it becomes love. And enjoyment is in this aspect of itself in the being of the other's consciousness. The relation itself is in this manner the being of both and remaining as the being of both, i.e., it becomes marriage.

Vol. I, pp. 236-41.

Ex Among the people <sup>B.</sup> labor and C. possession are related directly to one another in the same way that they are related in their concepts. Just as labor rests on the needs of the particular as one such, so possession is simply that of a particular. Just as labor becomes in its particularity a universal, in the same way does possession.

I. Labor which rests on the needs of a particular becomes a universal in its <sup>a</sup>being the labor of a particular individual and <sup>b</sup>also being based on his needs.

<sup>a</sup> In work as such the requirement must exist. When it is acknowledged, it will have the form of universality. When it appears as something external, as inorganic nature and must be learnt, it is a universal mode, a rule of all labor which is something for itself. However, this universal is for labor the true essence, and the native lack of skill must overcome itself in learning the universal. Labor is not an instinct but a rationality which among people makes itself into a universal and thereby is opposed to the particularity of the individual which must overcome itself. And to work does not exist as instinct but in the mode of spirit, just because what is the subjective activity of a particular must nevertheless become an other, a universal rule, and the skill of the particular first returns through this process of learning to the other-becoming of itself.

<sup>b</sup> The acknowledgement of labor and skill runs the same course

into the universal that it did in the particular individual through learning. Against the universal skill the particular sets itself up as a specific (skill), separates itself therefrom, makes itself more skilled than the others, and invents useful tools. But it is the ~~the~~ invention of a universal which is a true universal in its specific skill. The others learn it, transcend their specificity and it becomes immediately a universal good.

The tool as such postpones for man his material denial. But it remains in it his form; it remains his activity which is directed against a dead thing. Of course, his activity is essentially the death of itself, if it is torn out of its living context and set up as something to be destroyed as such. In the machine ~~the~~ man transcends this his formal activity and lets it work for him completely. But this transcendence, which he practices against nature and with which he keeps within his particularity, avenges itself against him. What he gains from it, the more he subjugates it, the lower he himself becomes. While letting nature do the work through all kinds of machines, he does not transcend the necessity of his labor, but only shoves it out, estranges it from nature and directly himself as something not living to it as something living. But it escapes this negative living and the work that is left to him itself becomes mechanical. He reduces it only for the whole but not for the particular. Rather he increases it, for the more mechanical labor becomes, the less value it has, and the more he must labor in this manner.

To wit, his labor, as the labor of a particular individual for his needs is at the same time a universal, ideal. Man satisfies his needs well with it but it satisfies his needs not with this product as determined by him. Rather in that it satisfies his needs, it is another than it is. (Marx: "The individual satisfies his needs by his labor but not by the particular product of his labor. The labor to fill his needs, has to become other than it is.") Man no longer produces what he needs or he no longer needs what he has produced. Rather it becomes instead of the actuality of the satisfaction of his needs, only the possibility of this satisfaction. His labor becomes formal, abstractly universal, & particular. He limits himself to labor for one of his needs, and exchanges himself for his other needs. His labor is for necessity, for the abstract of needs, and as a universal, not for his needs. And the satisfaction of the totality of his needs is a labor of all.

The labor of the whole people intervenes between this range of the needs of the particular and his activity therefor. The labor of each becomes in regard to its content a universal for the needs of all, just as the adjustment took place for the satisfaction of all of his needs. That is, it has a value. His labor and his possession are not, what they are for him, but what they are for all. The satisfaction of needs is a universal dependence of everyone upon everyone else. For each there disappears all security and certainty that his labors as a particular are directly suitable to his needs. As a single needy individual, he becomes a universal. Through the particularization of labor, the skill of each is immediately greater for this labor. All relationships of nature to the



particularity of men come more under his control. Comfort is increased. This universality in which the particular need and the labor is elevated to this adjustment is a formal universality. Its consciousness is not an absolute in which these relationships are destroyed, but is directed to transcending this particular in order to free working from its dependence on nature. The needs and labor are elevated to the form of consciousness. They simplify but this simplicity is abstract, formally universal, the dissection of the concrete which achieves in this dissection an empirical infinity of particularity. And in this formal false manner, while it subjugates nature to itself, the individual only increases his dependence upon it.

aa The particularization of labor increases the aggregate of products. In an English factory 18 men work on one pin. (In margin: Hegel cites A. Smith). Every one has a specific ~~particular~~ aspect of the work and only this aspect. A particular individual would not be able to make 120 perhaps not even one. When each of 18 (kinds of) work are divided among 10 men, they makes 4000 in one day. But if the work of these ten were divided among 18, we would get 48,000 in a day. However, in this same proportion as the produced aggregate soars, the value of labor falls.

Ab Labor becomes the more absolutely dead as it becomes machine labor. The skills of single persons become more infinitely limited, and the consciousness of the factory worker is tessed down to its lowest stupidity.

76 And the connection of the particular kinds of work with the whole infinite mass of needs becomes quite incomprehensible (unübersichtbar), and a blind dependence. Thus, an isolated operated - often makes the work of a whole class of men, who satisfy their needs with it, suddenly checked, superfluous, and unnecessarily. 77 Just as the assimilation of nature is achieved through the insertion of the links of greater comfort, so these stages of assimilation are infinitely divisible and the aggregate of comforts makes it again just as absolutely uncomfortable.

These manifold labors of needs as thing must realize their concept, their abstraction. Their universal concept must be a thing just as the thing presents everything as universal. Money is this concept in its material existence, the form of unity or the possibilities of all things needed. Need and labor elevated to this generality thus form for themselves among a great people a mammoth system of community and mutual dependence, a moving life of the dead, which in its movement is blindly and primitively moving here and there and like a wild animal needs constant and strict control and curbing.

C. Likewise this activity of labor and of needs, like the movement, has its resting place in possession. Possession in its particularity likewise becomes among the whole of a people a universal. It remains possession of this particular but only insofar as it is posited through the general consciousness, or insofar as in it everybody likewise possesses his own, i.e., it becomes property. Its exclusion is such that everyone communally excludes every one else, and in the determinate possession of each is the possession of all. In possession there is the contradiction that a thing is as thing a universal, and is

nevertheless only a particular possession. This contradiction transcends itself through the consciousness while it is opposed in itself as the opposite of itself. It is the acknowledgment of the individual possession and the universal possession at the same time ~~that~~ <sup>in that</sup> every one possesses in this particular possession. The assurance of my possession is the assurance of the possession of all. In my property everyone has his property. My possession has attained the form of consciousness. It is determined as my possession. But as property it is not related to me alone but universal.

Just as in the foregoing power (Marx calls this medium), labor and need has particularized itself absolutely - so property particularizes itself in this medium. Particularization is the placing of the concrete in the universal. Differences which it in itself has opposed as identity, fall to pieces and become an abstraction for it. The totality of particularity which was wholly in every particular individual but (is no longer because of) the extension of its existence to that which it itself makes, is transcended only in the whole of the people. And the particularity of needs and possession collapses in the nature of its individuality. Consciousness as to totality of the particulars was the oneness of itself and its externality, its possession. While both fall apart, the particular ceases to have the honor which placed its whole essence in every particular. In this particularization that which is related to it directly as an organization constituting what was called its person, and that which appears externally to it as matter of fact, fall apart, since for the honor this distinction does not exist which in every relationship posits every possession itself as the whole.

Vol. II, 213-217

## Actual Spirit

The spirit is actual neither as intelligence nor as will, but intelligence exists as will, i.e., in intelligence <sup>exists</sup> this unity of two universals, and in the universal will exists this complete self. It is a knowing of its existence and its being is spiritual - the universal will. In these elements the foregoing has now to be presented; in it, just as in the will the abstract intelligence has transcended itself or has achieved its object, through itself, so here the abstract will is to be transcended or as transcended to produce in the elements of universal acknowledged existence this spiritual actuality. Just as possession thereby transforms itself into right, so labor earlier transforms itself into the general. What was the family good, in which marital enjoyment knew itself, becomes the general deed and enjoyment of all, and the difference of the individual becomes a knowledge of good and evil - personal right and not-right.

## Acknowledged Existence

Acknowledged <sup>want</sup> is immediate actuality, and in its element we have the person first as for itself in general. It is enjoying and working. Here first desire has the appearance of right, for it is actual, i.e., it itself has universal spiritual being. Work of all and for all, and enjoyment - the enjoyment of all. Everyone serves every one else and helps, or the individual here first has particular existence. Before it was only abstract or untrue. Spirit can set itself (rest?) easily in an abstraction, analyse itself, and give itself an existence as the animal cannot, wherever the self that places itself in a system, becomes ill (?), but

it has only momentary disappearing existence. Here is desire. Opposed to the I as abstract for-itselfness stands its inorganic nature as existent. It relates itself negatively to it and transcends this in the unity of both, but in this way, that it first forms itself ~~as~~ a self, observes its <sup>own</sup> form and consumes itself accordingly. The existence, the scope of natural needs -- (in margin: a) immediate I of work a) immediate movement of doing that is not taken up in knowing; its work has the character of abstraction. It works not as particular concrete totality of needs) is an element of being in general, a multitude of needs. The things which serve for their satisfaction are manufactured (verarbeitet), their general inner possibility set up as external, as Form. This manufacturing, however, is itself a manifold. It is the making-of-itself-into-a- thing of consciousness. But it is in the element of universality that it becomes an abstract working. The needs are many; to take up this manyness into the I, to work, is the abstraction of the universal forms (Bilder) but a self-moving formation (bilden). The I-for-itself is abstract. It is to be sure working, but its labor is accordingly abstract. Need in general is analysed into its many aspects. The abstract in its moving is the for-itselfness, the doing, the working. Because it is worked only for the needs as abstract, for-itselfness, so it is also only abstractly worked. This is the concept, the truth of desire, which exists here. As its concept is, so is its work. Satisfaction of all the needs of the particular is not, as it develops into the exists object, what is brought before him. Universal labor is, accordingly, division of labor, economizing. Ten can make as many pins as a hundred. Every particular, accordingly, because he is here particular, works for a need. The con-

tent of his labor extends beyond his need. He works for the needs of many, and every one does the same. Accordingly, each satisfies the needs of many and the satisfaction of his many special needs is the labor of many others. Since his labor is this abstract (kind), he related himself as abstract I or according to the mode of thinghood, not as comprehensive, internally rich, circumspect, spirit which controls a great range and is master over it. It has no concrete labor but its strength consists in the analyzing, in the abstraction, in the tearing apart of the concrete into many abstract aspects. His labor itself becomes quite mechanical or relative to a simple determination.

But the more abstract it becomes, the more it is only abstract activity, and thus he is capable of extracting himself from labor and in the place of his activity, substituting that of external nature. He needs more movement and this he finds in external nature; ~~and~~ the pure movement is just the relation of abstract forms of space and time - the abstract external activity, the machine.

Between these manifold abstract products there must now be found a movement whereby it again becomes concrete needs, that is, needs of a particular; ---(in margin: determination in itself; return to particularity)----this becomes a subject which contains in itself many of the same ----(in margin: He has made it a being for the needs of others, just as in family possession he held it in opposition to itself. The ground is, because his simple existence is universal. His possession has now the meaning of being for another)-----The judgment which it analyzed,



opposes as determined abstraction; its universality to which it attained, is the equality of the same or value. In this they are the same. This value itself as thing is money. The return to concretion, to possession is exchange. ----(in margin: b) In his abstract labor he observes the universality of himself, of his form, or that it is for others. He will accordingly posit, to share with others or these others should be viewed therein. The second movement which contained the movements of the first develops. I I is doing against another I, and of course, as acknowledged by him, as something that relates itself to my possession, but this it will have only with my will, just as I direct myself to his with his will. The equality of both is acknowledged - Value, meaning of the thing. The thing has the meaning of relation to another. To be for another, existence is acknowledged existence, i.e., it is the specific will of every particular in it. and their equality, and thus for everyone there is the will of another - unity of absolute difference.)----

The abstract thing appears in exchange as it is, namely, to be this alteration, to return from thinghood to the I, and of course thus, since its thingness consists in this, to be the possession of another. Every one gives himself his possession, transcends his existence, and since it is acknowledged therein, the other preserves it with the willingness of the first. They are acknowledged, each receives from the ~~xxx~~ other the possession of the other, so that he receives it only insofar as the other is the negative of itself, i.e., as property. It is through mediation of every one, the negating of his being, his having; and this is mediated through the negating of the others. Only

Only because the other disposes of his matter of fact (Sache), do I do it. And this equality in the thing as its inwardness is its value, which has my complete consent and the intention of the other - the positive mine and thus the being, the unity of my will and his, and my will passes as actual, existent. The acknowledged being is the existent. Thereby, my will is valid. I possess. Possession is transformed into property. In possession being has the unspiritual meaning of my having as this particular (indiv.) Here, however, (we have) the acknowledged being, the being of the possession, that the thing is. and I am and everyone grasps it as myself. Here is the being of the universal self and having is mediated through the other or is universal. The universal is value, the sensuous movement is the exchange. The same universality is mediation to property, as knowing movement, accordingly, immediate having which is mediated through being acknowledged, i.e., its existence is spiritual existence--(in margin: a) Forms b) Memory. Value)-----Here the contingency of seizure by the possessor is transcended. I have (transformed) everything through labor and through exchange into an acknowledged being. I am thus a universal - not this particular person but at the same time family. I.e., property is a) the movement of things in exchange. Inheritance is therefore (simply) a change in the individual, the family is the constant - this does not yet appear here.--(in margin: I am the contingency of possession. My skill, inclination, talent - better more accessible accident - I myself absolutely necessary)-----The source, origin of property is here that of work, of my doing itself - immediate self and being acknowledged. Grund. I am the cause just because I have willed - the purpose in exchange is the cause. The ground is the universal. I have willed in exchange to posit my thing as value,

is. inner movement, inner doing, as work that is sunk into being.  
It is in both cases the same alienation.

A I make myself immediately into a thing, into a form whose being is work.

B Thus I alienate myself from this my existence, make it something strange to me, and preserve myself therein. Just in this way I view my acknowledged existence, being as known. There my immediate I, here my for-myselfness, my person.

Accordingly, I consider here my acknowledged being as existence and my will is this validity.

Vol. II, 231-233

B. This law of immediate existence of the individual exists as law of its will, or it achieves this as such in the disappearance of contingent existents. Through the death of the parents, it becomes positive; it appears as the existent, since they were before in the state. It is the actual validity of property, the element of actual existence through the work of all. The law protects the family, leaves it in its being, but it is, like the family, the substance and necessity of the particulars. I.e. it is the unconscious guardian over the particulars whose families have died. Thus it (er?) appears as particular. It is substance and necessity - its hard side in which it appears.

First of all, it is the universal right, property in general, protecting everyone in his immediate possession, heredity and exchange. But this is only formal right, that in view of the special cases remains quite free (contingency of heredity.) The individual appears as acquiring through labor. Here it is merely his law, that what he produced and what he exchanged belongs to him. But the universal is at the same time his necessity which sacrificed him in his free right.

The universal is a) pure necessity to the particular workings. He has his unconscious existence in the universal. The society is his nature, on whose elementary blind movement he depends, which preserves or transcends him spiritually and physically. b) he is there through immediate possession or heredity. completely accidental. He works an abstract labor. He conquers nature just as much. But this becomes another form of contingency.

a He can work more but this decreases the value of his labor; he does not thereby depart from the universal relationships.

b Needs are thereby multiplied. Every particular is divided into many. Tastes are refined. They get more variations. A dressing is demands which brings the things to be used continually nearer to custom. The demand is made that all sides of his maladjustments (incapacities) be provided for. (cork, corkscrew, candle-nuffers). He is cultivated as a naturally enjoying person.

But at the same time he becomes through the abstraction of ~~other~~ labor, mechanical, stupefied, spiritless. The spiritual, this preserved self-conscious living, becomes an empty doing. The strength of the self consists in its wealth of range; this is lost. He can let free some work as machinery; the more formal thereby becomes his own doing. His dull work confines him to one point and labor is more perfect the more one-sided it is. But this variety produced the mode, the changeableness, the freedom in the use of the forms of these things. Cuts of clothes, kinds of ameublements are not constant. Their alteration is essential and rational, more rational than sticking to one fashion in which particular forms are declared to be fixed. The beautiful is cast in no mode. Otherwise there would be found no free beauty but a charming one, i.e., the ~~own~~ ornament of another; drive, desire is aroused for this which belongs to others and would be accordingly contingent. Just as undoesisting is the wrestling for ~~the~~ simplification of labor, invention of new machines, etc. The skills of the particular (indiv) is the possibility of this preserving his existence. This is subjugated to the complete ~~entire~~ entanglement of the accidents of all. A multitudex is